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Abstract 
In this dissertation I address the related problems of expertise and long-distance control 
in the context of British navigation and the bureaucratic practices of the English East India 
Company. Expertise, in particular, is used as a framework from which I build outward to 
establish a stronger understanding of commercial trade, the circulation of knowledge and, most 
crucially, the place of the metropole. The first half of this dissertation introduces expertise and 
long-distances control and puts the concepts into historical context through the example of 
navigation between 1673 and 1755. Navigation is illustrative of the problem of expertise because 
it was a contentious subject at the time and, therefore, the contemporary debates can be followed. 
Expertise is a crucial problem because it directly addresses power and who controls knowledge. 
Thus, the question of navigational expertise ties directly to the problem of long-distance control. 
Therefore, my dissertation begins by moving outward from navigational instruction at the Royal 
Mathematical School to the practice of navigation on Edmond Halley’s first Paramore voyage.  
In the context of global commercial exchange, long-distance control became an 
increasing priority for those who sought to assert such control from a presumed centre onto 
agents around the globe. As such, the second half of the dissertation continues to follow actors 
further away from London with the setting moving to India and China where I contrast the idea 
of long-distance control with the reality. In practice the East India Company had little ability to 
impose itself on either its own employees or on the peoples with whom the Company wished to 
trade. Instead, the Company’s efforts often drew attention to its ignorance of Asian trade and 
served to underline its weakness in the first part of the eighteenth century. The dissertation 
concludes by questioning the notion of the metropole and the periphery in the history of science 
and suggests an inversion of the traditional locations, with London now a periphery rather than 
centre, a state of affairs more in line with the situation at the time. 
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Note on Sources 
In my transcriptions I have sought to adhere as closely as I was able to the spelling and grammar 
of my source material. Therefore, I have not normalized or modernized spellings or grammar 
within quotations and have maintained the original abbreviations. A partial exception is 
quotations from Pepys MS 2612 as the Admiralty had grammatical conventions unique to itself 
that are not easily transcribed, most notably the spelling of words such as “navigation” as 
navigacon with line over the c. In this instance, I have followed the convention adopted by the 
editors of John Flamsteed’s correspondence and maintained the spelling, but not reproducing the 
exact diacritic marks. When quoting from published edition of a manuscript I followed its 
transcription.
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Introduction 
 When Robert Douglas arrived at Macau, China at the end of the seventeenth century, he 
was one representative of a much larger network that included the British Isles and Europe, the 
Americas, Africa, modern India, and China. Douglas is not famous. Though he kept a detailed 
journal of his time spent in China, it was not published. Besides the diary, he left behind only a 
few traces of his life and experiences with the English East India Company. Lesser known and 
obscure actors such as Robert Douglas are at the heart of this dissertation and have crucially 
shaped its argument. Rather than view the history of imperialism and science in the eighteenth 
century from a long lens, I have sought to focus closely on the actions of historical actors who 
provide a window into imperialism and globalization as it was practiced. Such an approach has 
consciously distanced the greater British world described in this dissertation from the one that 
would eventual come into being at the end of the eighteenth century. The English East India 
Company as a colonial power was not inevitable, or even the product of intentional policy by the 
Company’s Directors; instead, it was the result of a complex network of individual actors whose 
actions were the product of self-interest and not imperial ambition. The goal of this dissertation 
is to understand the relationship between such self-interest and individual agency and the 
structures of power and modernity that emerged during the eighteenth century. The primary 
argument of this dissertation is that expertise is contingent, local and constantly contested. It is 
only by paying attention to specific contests of expertise that we can fully understand how 
knowledge is developed, transmitted and used. 
 The dissertation is divided into four chapters, each of which develops a specific historical 
example that is intended to make both a particular historiographic argument and extend the set of 
broader claims being made in this thesis. The approach has resulted in a rather wide-ranging 
dissertation that has traversed an ambitiously large terrain. This has necessitated working 
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through a significant amount of historiographic material; however, I contend that the breadth of 
focus taken in this thesis has served to enrich the arguments being made. Despite the range of 
material covered, the use of specific examples in each of the four chapters has ensured that the 
dissertation has remained historically grounded. The dissertation is divided into two sections. 
The first two chapters focus on navigational practice between 1673 and 1761, while the next two 
chapters discuss the English East India Company in the early eighteenth century from an 
institutional perspective and with an emphasis on bureaucracy. These two narratives are drawn 
together by the two related problems of expertise and long distance control. By subjecting 
expertise and long distance control to historical scrutiny, this dissertation aims to make a 
contribution to the understanding of how knowledge was produced, used and circulated. 
Moreover, my concern for imperialism and the history of science has pointed to some significant 
historiographical consequences. The goal of this introduction is to provide something of the 
historiographic and intellectual development of this dissertation in order to give context and form 
to the chapters that will follow. 
Historiography 
It might not seem immediately evident that this dissertation is a contribution to the 
history of the Enlightenment; however, the scholarship on the Enlightenment has been crucial to 
the shape the work has taken. Crucially, one of the foundational questions for the history of 
science and science and technology studies more broadly has been that of expertise. How is it 
defined, maintained and enforced? In other words, how does an expert become an expert? It was 
during the period known as the Enlightenment that “experts” came to be. Thus, the debates over 
expertise that I discuss in this dissertation had critical consequences for both the history of 
3 
 
science and the Enlightenment. This dissertation is a contribution to the history of the 
Enlightenment, then, because it addresses a central problem of the Enlightenment. 
Indeed, as the Enlightenment and eighteenth-century natural philosophy so frequently 
overlapped both in terms of the people involved and the questions they sought to answer, it is 
almost surprising how thoroughly separated the study of the Enlightenment and eighteenth-
century science were for much of the twentieth century. Partly this has been because both were 
long viewed as primarily to do with ideas. For many historians of science and historians of 
Enlightenment, it was ideas that drove the progress of history. It is in the scholarship on the 
Enlightenment that one finds bold statements on ideas as the drivers of history. Thus, according 
to Jonathan Israel, “Radical Enlightenment is the system of ideas that, historically, has 
principally shaped the Western World's most basic social and cultural values in the post-
Christian age.”1  
Israel has drawn on a tradition that runs from Ernst Cassirer to Peter Gay and has 
regarded the Enlightenment as a coherent philosophical school. There were significant points of 
disagreement for the philosophes, but Gay saw synthesis as possible by viewing the philosophes 
as “a family of intellectuals united by a single style of thinking,” which he saw as having been “a 
dialectal struggle for autonomy, an attempt to assimilate the two pasts they had inherited—
Christian and pagan—to pit them against one another and thus to secure their independence.” 
Accordingly, for Gay “the Enlightenment may be summed up in two words: criticism and 
power.”2 Gay did see the Enlightenment as essentially having an underlying ideology, however, 
                                                 
1
 Jonathan Israel, A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern 
Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 8. However, the connection between the Enlightenment 
and secularization is tangential at best as mainstream secularization did not occur until well into the twentieth 
century (if it really happened at all), see Callum Brown, The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding 
Secularisation 1800-2000 (London: Routledge, 2001). 
2
 Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, Vol. I (London: Wildwood House, 1970), xii-xiii. 
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as can be seen in his chosen subtitle “The Rise of Modern Paganism.” For the Enlightenments 
twenty and twenty-first century defenders, it is in the Enlightenment that we find the origins of 
what are held up today as the “Western values” of liberalism. In sharp contrast to Gay’s and 
Israel’s embrace of the Enlightenment, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, writing in the 
shadow of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, saw the Enlightenment and twentieth-century 
totalitarianism as inexorably linked.
3
 Like Gay and Israel, Horkheimer and Adorno situated ideas 
at the heart of history. 
The Enlightenment, however, has not always been understood as existing entirely within 
the confines of the history of ideas. The Enlightenment in National Context, edited by Roy Porter 
and Mikuláš Teich, and Science and the Enlightenment by Thomas Hankins (published in 1981 
and 1985 respectively) did much to establish the Enlightenment within the broader social context 
of the eighteenth century. In doing so it was extracted from the history of ideas. In his review of 
Science and the Enlightenment, Jan Golinski pressed for an even more radical approach to the 
Enlightenment and the history of science and rejected any division between the two calling for 
historians to study science in the Enlightenment rather than science and the Enlightenment. As 
Golinski explained: 
To tell the parallel histories of independent disciplines would not have appeared 
an appropriate historiographical choice to the writers of the Enlightenment 
themselves. Their own historiographical and educational projects were dominated 
by the desire to see knowledge as an interconnected unity, and to understand the 
growth of the 'arts and sciences' in relation to the progress of their society as a 
whole. They perceived the scientific developments of their day as part of an 
overall process of cultural and social improvements, that of 'enlightenment' itself.
4
 
                                                 
3
 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectics of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, edited by Gunzelin 
Schmid Noerr, translated by Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). 
4
 Jan Golinski, “Science in the Enlightenment: Science and the Enlightenment,” History of Science 24 (1986), 411. 
Golinski revisited the essay in 2011, see Golinski, “Science in the Enlightenment, Revisited,” History of Science 49 
(2011): 217-31. 
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The Enlightenment, then, cannot be viewed as a history of ideas divorced from the social context 
in which it took place. By drawing together the history of the Enlightenment and the history of 
science, historians have refocused attention on the participants of these histories actually did and 
rejected ideas as the primary driver of history. 
 Instead of teleology toward “Western liberal modernity,” the historians of science and the 
Enlightenment who have followed Golinski’s precepts have done much to situate the 
Enlightenment within its varying local contexts. In doing so, it might seem as though the 
Enlightenment would lose its explanatory strength; however, as William Clark, Jan Golinski and 
Simon Schaffer noted in the introduction to Sciences in Enlightened Europe: 
Creation of geographical hierarchies and the formation of local or regional 
identities have been shown to have been closely associated with participation in 
enlightened culture. Local studies, particularly of the areas of the European 
domain traditionally regarded as ‘peripheral’ to the Enlightenment, thus have the 
potential to reconfigure our sense of geography of the movement and its unity.
5
 
Similarly, the increased focus on activities rather than ideas has greatly enhanced our 
understanding of the eighteenth-century intellectual world. As historians such as Mary Terrall 
and J.B. Shank have reminded us, Enlightenment figures were also participants in the political 
and social culture of their time and cannot be understood without full recognition of this reality.
6
 
                                                 
5
 William Clark, Jan Golinski and Simon Schaffer,  “Introduction,” The Sciences in Enlightened Europe, edited by 
Clark, Golinski, and Schaffer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 20. 
6
 Mary Terrell, The Man Who Flattened the Earth: Maupertuis and the Sciences in the Enlightenment (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002); J.B. Shank, The Newton Wars and the Beginning of the French Enlightenment 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). See also Jan Golinski, Science as Public Culture: Chemistry and 
Enlightenment in Britain, 1760-1820 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Larry Stewart, The Rise of 
Public Science: Rhetoric, Technology, and Natural Philosophy in Newtonian Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992); Robert Drayton, Nature's Government: Science, Imperial Britain, and the 'Improvement' of 
the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); Lissa Roberts, Simon Schaffer and Peter Dear, eds., The 
Mindful Hand: Inquiry and Invention from the Late Renaissance to Early Industrialisation (Amsterdam: 
Koninkliijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 2007). 
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 The development of what has come to be regarded as modern science coincided with the 
European global expansion that occurred during the early-modern period.
7
 The increasingly 
global European had a profound impact on how those involved and affected by the growing 
globalization perceived the world. For most, this expansion was experienced primarily through 
the introduction of new commodities; however, the introduction of new lands, peoples, and flora 
and fauna all helped to shape the way in which the world was understood by European 
intellectuals in the eighteenth century.
8
 It is unsurprising, then, that botany has been the bridge 
between the histories of the Enlightenment, science and imperialism because it was the botanists 
more than anyone who were the active agents of enlightened imperialism in the eighteenth 
century.
9
 Botany and collecting have been recognized as central elements to the enlightenment 
projects of classification and quantification.
10
 A deterministic reading of the history of collecting 
would see it as a process by which the world was transported to Europe to be classified and, 
thereby, understood. However, despite the metropolitan scientists’ claim to be the ultimate 
                                                 
7
 The role of global commerce has had particular recent currency, see Harold Cook, Matters of Exchange: 
Commerce, Medicine, and Science in the Dutch Golden Age (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 
8
 Julie Douthwaite, The Wild Girl, Natural Man and the Monster: Dangerous Experiments in the Age of 
Enlightenment (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2002); Alix Cooper, Inventing the Indigenous: Local Knowledge 
and Natural History in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Emma Spary, Eating 
the Enlightenment: Food and the Sciences in Paris, 1670-1760 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013). 
9
 John Gascoigne, Joseph Banks and the English Enlightenment: Useful Knowledge and Polite Culture (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994); Science in the Service of Empire: Joseph Banks, the British State and the Uses 
of Science in the Age of Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Neil Safier, Measuring the 
New World: Enlightenment Science and South America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); James 
Delbourgo and Nicholas Dew, eds., Science and Empire in the Atlantic World (London: Routledge, 2008); Daniela 
Bleichmar, Visible Empire: Botanical Expeditions and Visual Culture in the Spanish Enlightenment (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
10
 Tore Frängsmyr, J.L. Heilbron, and Robin E. Rider, eds., The Quantifying Spirit in the Eighteenth Century 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); M. Norton Wise, ed., The Values of Precision (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995); Nicholas Jardine, James Secord, and Emma Spary, eds., Cultures of Natural 
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) ; Richard Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions: Scientific 
Dictionaries and Enlightenment Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Horst Bredekamp, The 
Lure of Antiquity and the Cult of the Machine: The Kunstkammer and the Evolution of Nature, translated by Allison 
Brown (Princeton: M. Wiener Publishers 1995); Paula Findlen, Possessing Nature: Museums, Collecting, and 
Scientific Culture in Early Modern Italy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); James Delbourgo, 
“Collecting Hans Sloane,” in From Books to Bezoars, edited by Alison Walker, Arthur MacGregor, and Michael 
Hunter (London: British Library, 2013). 
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source of natural knowledge, in reality it was in the periphery and not the centre that this 
knowledge was best understood and put into practice. The centre was simply geographically too 
far removed from its sources.
11
 
 My aim, then, in this dissertation has been to follow an approach that emphasizes the 
local, contingent, messy reality that most closely corresponds to the actual experience of the 
eighteenth century. My interest is in what people actually did rather than to construct a broad 
narrative account of the time period. At the same time, however, by drawing strong connections 
between my localized examples and larger historiographic concerns situated within the scholarly 
context I briefly outlined in this introduction. In this section I have sought to clarify the general 
historiographical context; however, the dissertation is grounded on the more specific 
historiographic concern of expertise, which I will turn to in the next part of this introduction. 
The Problem Defined 
 This dissertation is premised on two distinct, but related, problems: expertise and long-
distance control. Expertise presents two problems. First of all, it is a terminological problem. The 
word did not enter English vocabulary until the latter half of the nineteenth century. For some 
historians, this renders it invalid as an analytical category for a work of history focused on the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, for example, stressed 
in their study of objectivity that the existence of a concept that we would now call “objectivity” 
cannot be claimed for a historical period that predates the origin of the word “objectivity” in its 
modern usage.
12
  As Leo Marx has shown in his study of the history of the word “technology” 
                                                 
11
 Ralph Kingston, “A Not-So Pacific Voyage: The 'Floating Laboratory' of Nicolas Baudin,” Endeavour 31 (2007): 
145-51; Natalie Zemon Davis, “Creole Languages and Their Uses: The Example of Colonial Suriname,” Historical 
Research 82 (2009): 268-84; “Physicians, Healers, and Their Remedies in Colonial Suriname,” Canadian Bulletin of 
Medical History 33 (2016): 3-34.  
12
 For the argument that it is ahistorical to attribute categories not available to the actors being studies, see Quentin 
Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and Theory 8 (1969): 3-53. 
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and its changing usage, such etymological concerns are significant and specificity cannot be 
discounted.
13
 This is especially important in the case of a word like technology, which existed 
prior to its current definition, but whose usage was crucially different. As primary sources are 
more likely to use the word, it is necessary to be clear what they mean by it and how that 
meaning changes over time. 
 Ideally, then, one would stick to actors’ categories. While there was not a perfect 
eighteenth century equivalent to technology, Leo Marx demonstrates that the word “mechanics” 
was used in roughly the same manner as we use technology today. Moreover, because what we 
understand as technology did not really exist prior to the rise of mass industrialization and the 
development of technological systems such as the railway and telegraph in the nineteenth 
century, the distinction between mechanics and technology is useful and important. Similarly, 
Daston and Galison argue that the development of the word “objectivity” is significant and 
marks an epistemological break because it demonstrates that it was only around the 1820s that 
objectivity took on it something like its modern definition. Such temporal specificity matters for 
Daston and Galison because they seek to locate the history of objectivity within the Kantian 
tradition.
14
 Thus, objectivity as we understand it today cannot have preceded the emergence of 
Kantian philosophy in the nineteenth century. Though Daston and Galison argue that before the 
mid-nineteenth century there was not objectivity, but instead “truth-to-nature” and the trained 
judgment they describe came only after the advent of objectivity. Yet, an argument can be made 
that the essential aspects of what we understand as objectivity today existed before the word 
itself entered the English vocabulary. Daston and Galison, however, rejected this view because 
                                                 
13
 Leo Marx, “Technology: The Emergence of a Hazard Concept,” Technology and Culture 51 (2010): 561-77. 
14
 Loraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York: Zone Books, 2010), 30-31. 
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they regarded it as stemming “from an identification of science with objectivity tout court.”15 By 
sticking rigidly to their epistemological approach Daston and Galison wished to demonstrate that 
science can exist outside of objectivity. They sought to show that objectivity has a specific and 
precise meaning and, therefore, a history. 
Like objectivity and technology, the word expertise did not enter the English vocabulary 
until the mid-nineteenth century. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the first use of the 
word expertise did not occur until it was used by the popular Victorian novelist Charles Reade 
and the actor and playwright Dion Boucicault in the 1868 novel Foul Play.
16
 In its modern 
usage, expertise describes extensive knowledge and/or technical skill in a particular subject or 
field. To be an expert is to have knowledge of the subject that goes beyond competence or even 
substantial skill and suggests a great understanding of the underlying theory. To have expertise is 
to have a deep knowledge of the how and why and not just the what of a given subject. Thus, an 
expert mechanic cannot just rebuild an engine, but also understands how engines work on a 
theoretical and scientific level. The argument here is basically claiming a distinction between 
knowing what to do and where the pieces fit based on learned experience and being able to 
figure out what to do and how to fit the pieces based on a greater knowledge of engines in 
general. Importantly, there is a tension to be seen in this very definition of expertise. It is not 
necessarily self-evident who is an expert. For instance, our imagined mechanic might not be able 
                                                 
15
 Daston and Galison, Objectivity, 28. 
16
 “expertise, n.”, OED Online. June 2017. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/view/Entry/66556?redirectedFrom=expertise& (accessed August 23, 
2017). Reade was one of England's highest-paid novelists in the nineteenth century, but his work rapidly fell out of 
fashion until George Orwell observed in an essay that “Since Charles Reade's books are published in cheap editions 
one can assume that he still has his following, but  it is unusual to meet anyone who has voluntarily read him,” 
George Orwell, “Charles Reade,” in The Collected Essays, Journalism, and Letters of George Orwell, Vol. II, edited 
by Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1968), 34. Dion Boucicault’s obituary in 
the New York Times, meanwhile, called him “the most conspicuous English dramatist of the 19th century,” “Dion 
Boucicault,” The New York Times, September 19, 1890. Like Reade, his reputation does not seem to have survived 
him. 
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to explain the scientific concepts that allow an engine to work, but that does not mean that they 
would not be able to figure out how to rebuild a type of engine they have not previously worked 
on because much of their past experience would be applicable to the new engine. Meanwhile, 
just because someone has spent years studying the theory of internal combustion engines but 
does not have practical experience with mechanical work does not mean that they would be 
better suited to repair an engine than the mechanic who has not. 
 Though Daston and Galison, among others, have argued against using terms outside of 
their historical context, there are good reasons for using the concept of expertise to frame my 
analysis. I justify using “expertise” for two reasons. Firstly, there is not an equivalent historical 
category that can be substituted. Secondly, I wish to use the term “expertise” in this thesis 
because it defines the problem at the centre of the dissertation. Expertise is an analytical tool that 
allows me to advance a theory—one that I would not be able to develop without the concept of 
expertise. Moreover, my use of expertise in this dissertation has a strong historiographic basis 
and builds on the work of the historian of science Eric Ash.
17
 In his work, Ash has traced a shift 
between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries from “experience” to “expertise.” The traditional 
definition of expert indicated having a personal experience of something—“to be experienced.” 
As an example, Ash noted a critic of Martin Frobisher who wrote that Andrew Dier, one of the 
mission’s junior officers, was “so unexpert of the sea, as he was never further from England than 
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France, and Ireland.”18 The comment was notable because it said nothing about Dier’s 
knowledge or overall competence as a mariner in the areas where he had previously sailed, but 
rather was directed specifically toward his lack of experience in oceanic navigation. To be an 
expert, then, in the sixteenth century was to have considerable first-hand experience doing 
something. Someone who had sailed extensively would, therefore, be a greater expert than 
someone who had not even if the latter had a great deal more theoretical knowledge. 
 The central thesis of Ash’s book is that this notion of expertise as grounded upon first-
hand experience had begun to change. Accordingly, “it began to encompass not just experience 
but also skill, a more abstract and general term.” Though skill often did imply experience, it was 
not necessarily the case. One did not necessarily have to have done something over and over to 
be able to do it well. Thus, expertise became an increasingly ambiguous term and hands-on 
experience was no longer a sufficient basis for expertise. Increased access to books created new 
avenues for learning; meanwhile, a craftsman might have been experienced, but lack the deep 
understanding needed to be considered an expert. It was on this distinction that the Royal Society 
was established. Indeed, one of its earliest planned projects was to undertake a history of the 
trades. Such a history was explicitly based on the presumption that the greater intellectual 
learning possessed by the Royal Society’s virtuosi would enable them to acquire a deeper 
understanding of the trades than was possible for the unlearned, but highly experienced, 
craftsmen.
19
 Robert Boyle argued that one of the great benefits to humanity that natural 
philosophy offered was that it might reform or improve the trades. Moreover, it was up to natural 
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philosophers to provide such improvement because mechanics were “too familiar with their 
processes and unable to render effective accounts of experiments because ‘some important 
circumstance’” was generally missing.20 Boyle emphasized that studying trade practices would 
improve natural philosophy as those involved in the trades had developed and perfected their 
crafts over many years of experiment and had important knowledge that would benefit subjects 
that particularly interested Boyle such as chemistry and alchemy. Natural philosophers, however, 
had much to offer as well because they would be able to put craft practices into context and 
apply their deeper learning to understand not just what the methods were, but why. 
 Robert Boyle sought to draw a distinction between natural philosophy and commercial 
interests in which the natural philosopher was to be disinterested in base concerns. At the same 
time, however, English commerce was undergoing a significant expansion. According to Ash, 
this expansion resulted in a growing number of royal administrators and corporate investors who, 
in turn, relied on expert mediation in order to make decisions. Thus, a new profession of expert 
developed during the seventeenth century whereby these self-styled experts sold their “ability to 
translate their knowledge and skills into effective action.”21 Patrons were wealthy merchants, 
worldly statesmen, and educated courtiers; therefore, they were not inclined to associate with 
base and unlearned craftsmen. As a result, Ash has argued, they were attracted to individuals 
who were able to combine the highly literary style of humanist education with knowledgeable 
explanations of practical, useful skills. Thus, instead of “turning to common practitioners,” these 
wealthy patrons “were an enthusiastic audience for the abstracted, text-based, theoretical version 
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of expertise that began to flourish” in sixteenth-century England.22 Ash’s thesis, then, was that 
the increasingly centralized, bureaucratic forms of government and wealth led to a growing 
separation between practice and capital. As the scope of trade expanded, the size of investment 
and amount of regulation required also grew significantly. This meant that ventures were 
increasingly owned and financed by investors who were not local and did not have personal 
experience of the trade in question. Thus, they needed experts who were able to translate craft 
practice into a vocabulary that their genteel patrons were able to understand. In order to market 
themselves to patrons, such would-be experts needed to develop an entire vocabulary and literary 
genre from which to assert their authority. They needed to convince potential patrons that they 
possessed knowledge that unlearned practitioners did not. 
 Administrators’ and investors’ need for expert mediators points to the second core 
problem of expertise addressed by this dissertation. They were engaged in operations that were 
increasingly far removed geographically from where the administrators in question were located. 
As such, one of the principal problems for the development of modern capitalism was that of 
long-distance control. Merchants were engaging in commerce over ever longer distances and, 
therefore, relied more heavily than ever on agents to conduct their business on their behalf. 
Similarly, as the English government become more centralized it needed to be able to assert a 
greater degree of authority from its administrative centers. The new form of expertise described 
by Eric Ash was one of the crucial methods by which administrators attempted to establish long-
distance control. Underlying the new expertise was an effort to transform who defined expertise. 
In doing so, the administrative state sought to wrench control over the trades from craft 
practitioners by re-defining expertise in a way that excluded the unlearned practitioners. If 
successful, it would then have enabled the administrative institutions to assert long-distance 
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control through their ability to regulate expertise. The sociologist of science John Law, in 
particular, has argued that new technologies of control were developed by western Europeans, 
beginning with the Portuguese in the fifteenth century. These new technologies of control, in 
turn, allowed for the rise of European hegemony from the sixteenth century onward.
23
 
 In this dissertation I argue that to a significant degree both the attempt to redefine 
expertise and to use it to establish long-distance control failed. The administrative state was 
never really able to impose the kind of regulatory power it desired. Moreover, the universal, text-
based forms of expertise described by Eric Ash did not really win out nearly to the extent he 
suggests. While certainly there were plenty of instances where such experts were turned to for 
advice and put into positions of authority, they often failed. Andre Wakefield, in particular, has 
elegantly demonstrated the contradiction between the claims made by cameralists and the often 
very different results that occurred when these supposed experts on governing states and 
managing the economy were given administrative posts from which to put their expertise into 
practice.
24
 Though many schemes were devised to establish long-distance control, the historical 
evidence suggests these efforts were largely unsuccessful. 
 Eric Ash’s conception of expertise and John Law’s theory of long-distance control both 
point to a related set of historical assumptions. These assumptions have been best articulated by 
John Brewer.
25
 As military technology advanced and militaries grew in size and became more 
centralized, wars became increasingly expensive to fight. Because states needed an ever larger 
amount of money to fight wars, they had to devise new means of taxation in order to raise the 
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revenues they required. Brewer’s thesis, then, was that growing military costs created the need 
for a more centralized, administrative state in order to manage the fiscal demands created by the 
military. As the state acquired greater fiscal powers, the administrative apparatus continued to 
expand in kind and, therefore, ever further expansion of fiscal powers were demanded. At the 
centre of the fiscal-military state was the state bureaucracy. The rise of the fiscal-military state, 
then, directly resulted in the development of the expertise described by Eric Ash. Similarly, the 
military technologies that necessitated the fiscal-military state also served as important 
technologies of long-distance control for John Law. A strong reading of this historical 
progression would be to argue that the rise of modern, state militaries created the bureaucratic 
state in which the civil service was detached from court politics, which led to the power of the 
state to expand exponentially through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries so that state 
power became increasingly ubiquitous and hegemonic. The technologies of power devised to 
fund the state’s growing fiscal needs also enabled greater capacity for long-distance control and 
global trade, which, in turn, allowed the rise of European imperialism. By focusing on specific 
institutional examples such as the Royal Mathematical School or the English East India 
Company in some detail, my dissertation provides some much needed context to the broader 
claims made by Brewer, which do not necessarily refute his argument, but do bring into question 
the scope of the developments he described. 
 Underlying Brewer’s teleology can be seen Michel Foucault’s conception of power and 
his argument that during the seventeenth century there was a transition in the location of state 
power. Under monarchism the power of the state is embodied in the person of the monarch; 
therefore, power is centralized and visible. As the administrative advanced, monarchial power 
waned and power became increasingly diffuse, abstract and invisible. For Foucault, as power 
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became less visible it was not diminished. Indeed, because power was no longer embodied in a 
single person, it was much more difficult to challenge. Foucault’s argument does not have much 
room for individual agency. Indeed, Foucault made this point explicitly in his argument that it is 
impossible for individuals to exist outside of the structures of power that govern our lives and 
that everyone is complicit in reinforcing such forces of control. At times, then, Foucault appears 
to present a nihilistic vision of the world, though his persistent involvement in direct political 
action from the later 1960s until the end of his life undermines an attempt to read Foucault as 
hopeless to the possibility of enacting political change.
26
 Nonetheless, Foucault’s terminology 
has been plagued by abstraction. For Foucault power is an omnipresent, impersonal social force 
that defies easy description; indeed, it is that obtuseness that gives power its strength to impose 
social norms on our day-to-day actions.
27
 Power is powerful because it does not have an evident 
source. According to Foucault, “Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but 
because it comes from everywhere.”28 Power, then, is disembodied and outside of human 
agency. Too close an adherence to Foucault creates the risk of becoming caught up in abstraction 
and losing track of what people actually did. Though people may have existed inside of insidious 
structures of power, it does not necessarily follow that they had no relative latitude within their 
daily lives to assert a degree of agency on their world. It is this juxtaposition of small acts of 
individual agency in defiance of overt efforts to impose institutional control that particularly 
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interest me. While the technologies of surveillance and control that Foucault pointed to may have 
come into being between the early seventeenth and mid-eighteenth centuries, in many regards 
these efforts to impose control can be read as a sign of enduring institutional weakness.
29
 
Chapters and Sources 
 In an effort to avoid the pitfalls I have outlined in this introduction, I have focused on 
specific incidents and emphasized individual actions and agency. My intention has been to 
combine historiographic breadth with fine-grained historical examples. What this has meant in 
practice has been to develop a set of examples situated within a specific historiographic context 
in which the historical material I have uncovered engages with the existing literature in a way 
that often serves to complicate or refine an existing narrative. In this final section I introduce the 
sources that I have used to advance my argument and establish the challenges and, more 
importantly, the opportunities that resulted from the sources I have chosen. Each of these sources 
has been selected because they are illustrative of aspects of my central argument. 
 The dissertation is divided into two parts and begins in London and works its way 
outward into the South Atlantic Ocean before finishing in India and China. It is not, however, a 
narrative of moving from the local to the global because the examples remain focused on the 
local regardless of the geographic context. Instead, I have sought to demonstrate the way in 
which local concerns, knowledge, and individual interests were key motivators of the actions 
taken by the different actors I discuss. This effort to uncover “ordinary” historical actors in the 
context of their daily work constituted the greatest archival challenge, but also offered the 
greatest opportunities. The sources I have used have primarily been institutional records, but I 
have not attempted to write institutional histories per se; instead, my objective has been to use 
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these records to uncover the day-to-day practices within the institutions in question—namely the 
Royal Mathematical School and the English East India Company. 
 Chapter One is a detailed study of the Royal Mathematical School. My interest in this 
school began when I came across it in the correspondence of John Flamsteed. The school offered 
itself to me as a valuable source to explore because it correlated with my desire to avoid overly 
focusing on elite sources and actors and provided evidence from those operating below the level 
of elite science. The Royal Mathematical School sought to provide an education that combined 
knowledge of contemporary astronomy and mathematics with the practical skills needed for 
marine navigation. Because the school came into conflict with both experienced mariners (as a 
result of examinations carried out by Trinity House) and astronomers (due to Flamsteed’s and 
Isaac Newton’s involvement with the school), the institutional records offer valuable insight into 
existing tensions between different representatives of navigational expertise. Of the primary 
sources I have used, those of the Royal Mathematical School are the most straightforward. The 
material has been microfilmed and is now housed in the London Metropolitan Archive, having 
been moved there from its previous location in the Guildhall Library. As well, there are 
duplicates and additional manuscript material in the Pepys Library, Magdalen College, 
Cambridge as Samuel Pepys kept his own records during the period in which he was involved 
with the school. The Pepys records are the most complete and best organized; however, he left 
the school in 1683. Similarly, the period prior to the late 1690s is better recorded than the years 
after that. I have tried to give a longer picture of the school that extends through to the middle of 
the eighteenth century and gives more attention to the operation of the school under James 
Hodgson than previous accounts; however, it is not possible to provide as detailed an account as 
the early history allows due to the more limited records available. 
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 One of the more interesting, but frustrating, set of records in the Royal Mathematical 
School archives is the apprenticeship lists. The school kept a record of every boy apprenticed to 
a ship captain, the name of the captain, and the name and destination of the ship. The survival of 
these lists means that we know where the students were going immediately after leaving Christ’s 
Hospital, thus, I initially hoped was that I would be able to follow some of the mathematical 
boys to sea. In doing so, I might have been able to track them from the contests over expertise 
found in the Royal Mathematical School to their experiences and practice at sea and put the 
Mathematical School more concretely into context. The founding mission of the school was to 
improve navigation on English ships and the intention was to educate the boys in mathematics 
and navigation so as to provide a steady supply of skilled navigators to fulfill this objective. By 
following the boys to sea, then, I would be able to reconcile the intention with the reality and 
uncover to what degree the mathematical school succeeded in its mission. Unfortunately, 
however, the mathematical boys turned out to be highly elusive once outside of the institutional 
boundaries of Christ’s Hospital and I had to turn to other sources to try to get a sense of how the 
conflicts over expertise I found in the Royal Mathematical School played out on English ships. 
The most straightforward example for my purposes was the dispute between Edmond Halley and 
his chief mate Edward Harrison and, thus, it was on that example that I based my second chapter. 
 While the first chapter primarily relied on manuscript sources, the second chapter made 
considerably more use of published primary sources as Edmond Halley’s Paramore journals 
have been published along with a collection of supporting material such as correspondence 
between Halley and the Navy. Along with the edition of Halley’s correspondence published in 
1932 and his publications in the Philosophical Transactions, the Paramore journals make up a 
substantial portion of the extant Halley material. Halley lived a more active life than John 
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Flamsteed, his predecessor at the Royal Observatory, and he did not leave behind a significant 
papers. Though Halley’s surviving correspondence is more limited and perhaps less revealing 
than Flamsteed’s, whose letters devoted considerable attention to his multitude of disputes and 
grievances, Halley’s active public life with the Royal Society and frequent contributions to the 
Philosophical Transactions ensure a clear picture of his activities and interests can be 
maintained. The Paramore journals are especially valuable for my purposes because they not 
only give a relatively detailed account of navigation as practiced on board the Paramore, but do 
so in the context of a dispute with his chief mate and navigator Edward Harrison. Moments of 
controversy are particularly useful sites of academic inquiry because they force the disputing 
parties to state their positions more clearly. Thus, activities that generally pass unremarked are 
entered into the record. The dispute between Halley and Harrison, therefore, is a particularly 
insightful episode in the history of navigation and the English Navy because it tells us a great 
deal about practice. This account of the first Paramore voyage follows the discussion of the 
Royal Mathematical School given in the first chapter because it builds upon the theme of 
expertise. While the Royal Mathematical School demonstrates the tensions created by the 
construction of expertise, the Halley/Harrison dispute displays the continuation of these disputes 
and the implication that debates over expertise had for the increasingly bureaucratized British 
state. 
 At the centre of the second chapter is the problem of long-distance control. A claim that 
has been made about the rise of European economic and political power and the eventual 
establishment of European imperial hegemony during the early-modern period was that 
Europeans developed superior technologies of long-distance control. I regard long-distance 
control to be a problem, however, because the historical record suggests that it was not ever 
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really achieved. I argue that the idea of long-distance control is intertwined with questions of 
expertise and, like expertise, was not settled. Rather than a powerful centre imposing its will 
over appendages around the world, global expansion and commerce was a constant contest of 
authority between a large and disparate collection of actors. Part Two builds on the themes of 
expertise and especially long-distance control developed in Part One while moving the 
geographic site to South Asia and the institutional context to the English East India Company. 
The shift to the East India Company began in part because the Company was by far the most 
frequent destination for mathematical boys. My original hope when I entered the East India 
Company archives in the British Library was that I would be able to trace some of the 
mathematical boys and uncover something of their lives after leaving the Royal Mathematical 
School. This hope did not work out in practice in part because the mathematical boys largely did 
not establish themselves in the upper echelons of society and, thereby, leave behind a significant 
record. Moreover, while I found a number of possible matches in the East India Company 
archives, I was not able to verify that they were the same people. Overall, then, I was not able to 
sustain a significant argument that continued the Royal Mathematical School directly; however, 
the East India Company records are an especially rich and vivid collection of material. Though I 
did not expand on the Royal Mathematical School in the way that I had originally planned, the 
East Indian archives had much to say on the problem of long-distance control.  
 The East India Company archives run into hundreds of thousands of pages and can be 
measured in miles on the British Library shelves. As such, the records can be overwhelming to 
work with, especially since the period for which I am interested has not been fully catalogued. 
The type of material available includes financial records for the Company’s commercial 
transactions and employment records, official and private correspondence, and an assortment of 
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journals and logbooks and other miscellanea. While the records would become highly detailed 
during the British Raj and provide a wealth of information about the people who administered 
British India in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the records are considerably less detailed 
for the period covered by this dissertation. The correspondence, however, includes numerous 
illuminating episodes that provide insight into the regular operation of the East India Company. 
Unlike the other chapters, which focused primarily on a single example, I did not find an 
incident in the correspondence that provided enough depth for an entire chapter; instead, I used a 
set of illustrative examples from the period between 1690 and 1720. These examples taken from 
the Company’s internal correspondence enabled me to piece together how its bureaucracy and 
administration actually worked. What these records make clear is that any strong claim for 
European long-distance control does not stand up to historical scrutiny.  
The Board of Directors’ influence over their agents was limited and the English East 
India Company was only one of several European trading companies operating in Asia. 
Moreover, the European trading companies were frequently in a subordinate position to local 
political and economic forces. The limitation of European influence is most clearly seen in the 
China trade where the Qing emperors were able to maintain strong regulation over the trade until 
well into the nineteenth century. Thus, like the first chapter, Chapter Three seeks to get inside of 
a specific institution in order to understand the individual motivations for those inside of it and to 
better understand the relationships between the different actors. In doing so, the objective is to 
establish an account of British commercial activities in South Asia that is not deterministic or 
read the history of the English East India Company backward from the establishment of the 
Company State at the end of the eighteenth century. The eventual rise of the Company State 
occurred due to specific decisions and actions and took place against significant resistance by 
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many involved. For the period around the beginning of the eighteenth century the East India 
Company not only did not have the means to establish a colonial regime, its directors, 
shareholders, and agents were largely uninterested in doing so. The Company’s attempts to assert 
political control were directed primarily toward its own employees and focused principally 
strengthening its commercial interests. 
 The centrepiece of the fourth and final chapter is the journal of Robert Douglas, which he 
kept while conducting business for the East India Company in Canton at the turn of the 
eighteenth century. His journal is an invaluable source because it provides a detailed day-to-day 
account of his activities while in China and details clearly the challenges and limitations faced by 
the East India Company merchants. The second and third chapters challenged the idea of long-
distance control and the fourth chapter builds on this foundation while situating the argument in 
the context of science studies accounts of the metropole and periphery. While Robert Douglas 
was not involved in any practices that would traditionally be regarded as part of the history of 
science, his journal still sheds much light on how marginal British merchants were at this time 
and, therefore, helps to undermine the idea of the metropole as a historiographic concept. What 
this means is that Douglas’s journal is an invaluable source for the history of science because it 
gives a strong account of the situation on the ground. This, in turn, enables a better 
understanding of the knowledge practices available to curious Europeans in China in the 
eighteenth century. Douglas’s journal brings the narrative trajectory of the dissertation to a 
conclusion.  
Inasmuch as science and technology studies can be said to have a central question, the 
issue of expertise is it. This dissertation is a story of expertise. It is not, however, a story of how 
modern expertise came to be or how a single expertise came to dominate. Instead, I treat 
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expertise as a constantly contested issue and each chapter emphasizes a specific site in order to 
demonstrate how problems of expertise and control were experienced in a certain local context. 
All of these spaces were sites of contest for control and these struggles had important 
consequences. In drawing attention to some of these specific controversies over expertise, I have 
sought to contribute to the foundational problems of STS. While my examples are local and 
might seem narrow in their scope, such fine-grained investigations have significant 
consequences to the discipline as a whole because they demonstrate how things actually worked 
in practice and what people were actually doing. The development of expertise occurred in the 
context of commerce, bureaucracy and exploration. Yet, there was not a linear progression 
toward “modernity,” nor was expertise ever a settled issue. It is important not to view history as 
overly determined or to read later developments, such as nineteenth-century science or the 
establishment of the British Raj, onto an earlier time period. It is through the investigation of 
specific historical examples such as presented in this dissertation that such historicity can be 
achieved.
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PART ONE 
London
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During the eighteenth century there was a transition from the absolute monarchies that 
marked the post-feudal era to the modern democracy that began to emerge at the end of the 
century. This shift was eloquently described by Michel Foucault’s classical episteme and its 
emphasis on categorization and taxonomy. That the classical episteme emerged in concert with 
capitalism and global trade is not a coincidence because capitalism necessitated the political 
reorganization of Europe. Two things occurred during this political reorganization. Firstly, there 
was a relocation of power from local, visible authorities (i.e. the lord), who derived their power 
from a monarch to a political arrangement whereby power was increasingly exercised by 
institutions and, therefore, was not embodied by specific individuals. This disembodiment of 
power both enabled and was a consequence of the way in which power was increasingly 
exercised over a greater distance. Nowhere is this more evident than in the emergence of global 
trade. In order for capitalism to function new means of establishing trust were needed; hence, the 
rise of expertise as a form of standardizing and credentialing experts in the service of the nascent 
bureaucratic state. The new expertise, in turn, enabled the establishment of long-distance control, 
which allowed for the formation of European economic and political hegemony. There is, 
however, a problem. The bureaucratic state, its experts and long-distance control are all largely 
idealizations that do not correspond to the historical record. 
 Samuel Pepys’s reforms of the Royal Navy exemplify the move toward bureaucratic 
centralization. For instance, he established an examination for would-be officers. The purpose of 
this examination was to ensure a baseline of knowledge and competence across the officer corps 
of the navy. After Pepys the Admiralty continued to attempt related reforms such as efforts to 
employ teachers on board ships and to establish a naval academy. On the one hand, these efforts 
support the argument that there was a trend toward standardization and expertise during the 
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eighteenth century. On the other hand, none of these schemes were particularly successful and to 
a large extent the Navy continued to operate on its own terms. The vast majority of officers 
continued to bypass the naval academy and navigation largely followed older practices. 
 Both the Royal Mathematical School and the Halley/Harrison dispute demonstrate that 
the new form of bureaucratic expertise promoted by Samuel Pepys did not appear in a vacuum. 
Instead, there was already existing means of validating skill. What bureaucratic expertise sought 
to do was to redefine who had the authority to accredit someone as an expert. Thus, Pepys 
supported examinations and standardized education because it centralized expertise. Naval 
officers, however, recognized that such centralization undermined their authority and were 
largely able to maintain control on board their ships and within the fleet. The example of the 
Royal Mathematical School introduces the concept of expertise and demonstrates the terms of 
the debate. Essentially, I show an example of an attempt at defining and imposing expertise in a 
specific institution and some of the difficulties that were experienced. Meanwhile, the dispute 
between Halley and Harrison takes the concept of expertise and applies it to the problem of long-
distance control. What this controversy further demonstrates is that expertise was not a settled 
question on board English Navy ships. Moreover, I want to establish the stakes involved, 
particularly for those for whom the new expertise looked to supplant. Edward Harrison’s 
credibility was his experience, while Halley’s authority was derived from his learned knowledge. 
 Part One, then, situates the dissertation and orients the theoretical concepts. The case 
study of the Royal Mathematical School centres the discussion in a specific, local context. In 
doing so, I ground the idea of expertise on a concrete example. Having done so, the next three 
chapters each aim to expand the scope of the dissertation to an increasingly global stage. The 
objective is to demonstrate how bureaucratic models of expertise were applied, with limited 
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success, when the institution in question spanned the globe. At the same time, the examples 
covered in Part Two will continue to emphasize specific, local contexts. Thus, I hope to show 
how the tensions around expertise and institutional authority played out on the ground and some 
implications of this for how we understand the history of science and imperialism in the 
eighteenth-century British world. 
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Chapter One 
Defining Expertise: Navigational Pedagogy and the Royal Mathematical School at Christ’s 
Hospital 
When, in 1695, the governors of Christ’s Hospital elected Samuel Newton to replace 
Edward Pagett as the mathematical master at the Royal Mathematical School, the Astronomer 
Royal, John Flamsteed, was not impressed. In a letter to Isaac Newton (no relation to Samuel), 
Flamsteed complained that the treasurer of the school—Nathaniel Hawes—had told him that 
“too much learning made their Masters proud. that the Youths were proud and troublesome to the 
seamen.”1 Thus, the school preferred Samuel Newton, who did not have a University education 
over John Caswell of Oxford and William Collins of Cambridge. As far as Flamsteed was 
concerned, the “methods of ordinary teachers of Navigation” would “ruin our schole.”2 When 
Newton finally resigned in 1708, Flamsteed gloated, “Mr Newton the math master at Christs 
Hospitall has resigned that is, is turned out for insufficiency and James Hodgson succeeds him 
and has been in that schoole ever since Christmas.”3 
The validity of Flamsteed’s opinion of Samuel Newton is impossible to judge from the 
distance of three hundred years as the records are limited and generally heavily biased, especially 
as Flamsteed was friends with Caswell and had been close to Collins’s father (the mathematician 
John Collins).
4
 Not only that, despite Flamsteed’s anger with the situation his information might 
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not have been the most accurate as the minutes for Christ’s Hospital’s Court of Governors 
regarding the election indicate that Caswell was not present when he was called for and Collins 
is not named at all in the list of candidates.
5
 Moreover, while Flamsteed and Samuel Pepys both 
regarded Newton’s predecessor Edward Pagett as having been a complete disaster, Hawes wrote 
to Pepys: 
We beleive we have substantial reasons to esteem Mr. Paget better then ordinarily 
qualified for his imployments & myself have good reason to esteeme him a 
Gentleman of soe much ingenuity &  Constiense that he wil not, nay that he does 
not faile to aply those qualifications, for the most advtange & improvement of his 
schollars.
6
 
It is necessary to remember Flamsteed was notoriously opinionated and his views should, 
therefore, be taken with a grain of salt. Certainly, one would not rely primarily on Flamsteed’s 
opinion for a fair picture of the astronomer Edmond Halley, who Flamsteed developed a strong 
enmity toward and repeatedly attacked as a lazy drunk who stole other people’s work.7 
Flamsteed’s views, however, reflect the desire for naval reform held by many of his peers. 
 The leading advocate for naval reform in seventeenth-century England was the secretary 
to the Admiralty and famed diarist Samuel Pepys. While on one of the few sea voyages he would 
make in his life, Samuel Pepys was particularly keen to observe how navigation was practiced. 
What he saw, however, disturbed him as he regarded mariners as relying on little more than 
“looking-out” for the shore. Instead of possessing skills in mathematics, the use of navigational 
instruments and the making and reading of charts, Pepys proclaimed “the best navigator is the 
best looker-out” and that “stories are told of West Countrymen going home that they have lain 
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by looking out for land 200 leagues off out.”8 It was this supposed anti-intellectualism that 
particularly concerned Pepys, as it stood in the way of the improvement of navigation: 
 It is clear also that rather than show their differences, for fear of showing their 
mistakes, masters will conceal their differences and so let the charts forever 
remain as they are. Their only care now being to lie off in the night and make in in 
the day, when they think themselves drawing in towards any shore.
9
 
In these two examples from Flamsteed and Pepys, a conflict is presented between navigation as 
an imprecise practice learned through experience and as a science dependent on book knowledge 
and skills that could be rendered universal. 
The debate that took place around how navigation should be taught at the Royal 
Mathematical School indicates a dichotomy between navigation as practice (techne) and science 
(episteme). Royal Society elites such as Samuel Pepys, John Flamsteed and Isaac Newton 
viewed navigation as a sub-discipline of astronomy. From this perspective, the Royal 
Mathematical School offered an ideal opportunity to transform navigational practice into a 
standardized method that emphasized mathematical skill and universal knowledge over local 
experience and technical competence. Historians of science have seen an increasing 
standardization in the eighteenth century and argued that it was part of a general process of 
quantification that resulted from the increasing centralization required by state expansion, a 
process described in detail by the historian John Brewer and which will be discussed in more 
depth in Chapter Three.
10
 The dispute between Nathaniel Hawes and John Flamsteed usefully 
articulates the tension that existed between those who represented the new administrative state 
and practitioners for whom the imposition of coordinated standards was an erosion of traditional 
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authority. By framing my account of the Royal Mathematical School around the problem of 
expertise in the context of centralization, this chapter demonstrates the connections between the 
local debates that took place in the school to the larger developments that were occurring in 
British society. 
From Experience to Expertise? Navigation becomes Universal 
 The central problem at the heart of the debates at Christ’s Hospital is one of expertise. As 
this chapter will demonstrate, expertise is not a straightforward concept. Instead, close attention 
to controversies over expertise demonstrate that expertise, like most problems, is a political one. 
The historian of science Eric Ash has sought to articulate the formation of expertise as a concept 
between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.
11
 Ash has taken up the historian of mathematics, 
E.G.R. Taylor’s thesis of an increasing mathematicization of the world during this period, in 
order to posit a transformation of the word “expert” in sixteenth-century England.12 While it had 
traditionally meant “to have personal experience of something” it began “to encompass not just 
experience but also skill, a more abstract and general term.” What this meant for Ash was that 
there came to be a distinction between experience—which was associated with localized 
artisanal knowledge—and expertise—which was associated with the more theory-based 
knowledge typically linked to science.
13
  
One of the primary examples Ash used to make his argument was navigation, arguing that 
“perhaps the most important change in English navigational practice during the latter half of the 
sixteenth century was the introduction and further development of navigational technologies 
                                                 
11
 Eric Ash, Power, Knowledge, and Expertise in Elizabethan England (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2004). 
12
 E.G.R. Taylor, The Mathematical Practitioners of Tudor and Stuart England (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1954). 
13
 Ash, Power, Knowledge, and Expertise, 10. 
33 
 
founded upon mathematics and astronomy.”14 While a pilot’s knowledge was necessarily local in 
nature because it was learned through particular experience, expertise in navigational science 
meant that the navigator possessed a set of skills that were generalizable and able to be applied to 
any context. Unlike a traditional pilot, “a mathematical navigator could leave his familiar coasts 
and practice his art from any point on Earth” and, thus, “expertise was set loose from its local, 
empirical moorings.”15 As navigation became increasingly global in scale, according to Ash’s 
argument, it was increasingly less important that one had local knowledge and more essential 
that a navigator possessed skills that would allow successful navigation regardless of whether or 
not one had previous experience in a particular locale. The distinction Ash draws between 
“experience” and “expertise” is helpful to how I have framed my discussion of the Royal 
Mathematical School; however, though it is certainly true that there was a proliferation of 
navigational technologies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Ash overstated the 
degree to which navigation transitioned from a local craft to a universal skill during this time 
period. 
By Samuel Pepys’s day, navigation was increasingly reliant upon instruments. The most 
common instruments included sextants, quadrants, telescopes and other astronomical 
instruments, the magnetic compass and tables and charts that relied on more advanced theoretical 
knowledge of the world. Despite this proliferation of instruments aboard ships, the primary 
means of navigation remained dead-reckoning.
16
 Dead-reckoning was conducted by throwing a 
rope over the side of the ship in order to calculate the speed it was travelling. This speed was 
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recorded along with the direction of the wind and the ship in an hourly log. In order to plot the 
location of the ship, the navigator would thus add up the logs in order to obtain an estimate of 
how far the ship had travelled and provide a reasonable estimate as to where they currently were. 
Dead-reckoning was not extremely precise, but it was generally adequate as most voyages had a 
fairly significant amount of leeway. The primary concern was simply to ensure that the ship was 
staying on course and to have a general idea as to when they ought to reach land again. While 
incidents of shipwreck or of ships becoming lost and wandering around the sea unable to find 
their intended port are dramatic, such episodes were quite uncommon and it is often unclear to 
what degree methods of navigation such as dead-reckoning ought to be blamed on the occasions 
where such disasters did occur.
17
 
In writing about the history of the marine arts, it is not necessarily clear how the 
conversation should be framed in relation to the history of science. The Navy was not completely 
divorced from the scientific developments of the period. Historian of Naval Science Larrie 
Ferreiro has argued that “Naval architecture was developed and used by various navies, starting 
in the late 1600s, in response to a bureaucratic need by naval administrations for greater control 
over their constructors and for standardization of the ship design process.” Nations such as 
France, Spain, Denmark and Sweden, where scientific naval architecture already had strong 
institutional development, were quick to incorporate ship theory because “in those navies, the 
development of ship theory coincided with—and was integrated into—the standardization and 
centralization of the design process during the 1700s.” Britain and the Netherlands, on the other 
hand, offered little direct support for those working on ship theory. According to Ferreiro, this 
was because they had “already refined [their] bureaucracy and standardization rates before 
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1720,” which was well before ship theory had been fully developed.18 In support of his 
institutional argument regarding the limited role of ship theory in eighteenth-century Britain, 
Ferreiro contrasted the situation of navigation in the same time period and in particular pointed 
to the establishment of the Longitude Prize in 1714.
19
 
 There certainly was a great deal of noise made in the eighteenth century about the need to 
improve navigation, but the situation from within navigational practice does not look 
significantly different from Ferreiro’s depiction of ship construction. It was a skilled craft whose 
practitioners were highly trained professionals with a great deal of practical knowledge of 
arithmetic and geometry, but who lacked formal education and were often unable to read or 
write.
20
 Ship constructors did not possess knowledge of ship theory because it “served no useful 
purpose for them.” Rather, “they knew their business and built good ships.”21 Similarly, 
navigators on board ships did not need to know advanced mathematics or the latest 
developments in astronomical theory because neither served a useful purpose to the day-to-day 
practice of navigation. Indeed, the latest navigational theories were no more accurate than the 
long established conventions, which relied on dead reckoning and simple calculations to plot the 
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ship’s course. Moreover, even once a reliable means of finding the longitude was established, it 
did not take hold with nearly the speed or conviction with which it has often been portrayed. 
Much like naval architecture, scientific navigation was promulgated in the context of 
institutional developments and was part of bureaucratic efforts to establish greater control over 
its periphery, an argument which will be made in more detail in a later chapter. 
 Larrie Ferreiro’s argument points to the question of what is the relationship between 
artisanal practice and theory in the history of science, a concern that has long dogged the 
disciplines that have coalesced into what is now known as Science Studies.
22
 It is not my 
intention to involve myself overly deeply with these debates; however, as this chapter draws 
heavily on work in the area, a brief summary of some of the arguments might be beneficial. The 
argument that science should be studied as part of, rather than separate from, public culture and 
that it can be understood in relation to economic history, was first raised by a number of Marxist 
scholars in the 1930s such as the Soviet scientist Boris Hessen and J.D. Bernal. Hessen’s 1931 
paper is particularly significant, though its value was not recognized until much later, for its 
contention that Isaac Newton’s Principia was explicitly concerned with the industrial, political 
and economic issues of Newton’s time.23 Such materialist arguments engendered an immediate 
response by Western scientists like Michael Polanyi who regarded science as inseparable from 
liberal democratic values.  
Polanyi was not so naïve as to reject out of hand that social factors helped to shape the 
course that science had taken, but he objected to the position that science should embrace the 
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kind of governmental control that was occurring in the Soviet Union. He recognized that 
scientists could not entirely escape external influence on their research, but argued that they 
should continue to try to strive toward a free pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. Science left 
free to pursue knowledge for its own sake would naturally progress in a way that would benefit 
society. If, on the other hand, it was subjected to government interference, the result would be 
the Soviet Union in which scientists were forced to conform to ideology at the expense of truth. 
For Polanyi, the Soviet model would necessarily lead to “disciples steeped in fanaticism” who 
“able to suppress their own scruples” would “wield the weapon of terror with sufficient effect.” 
Such “party members educated in unscrupulous fanatiscism” was regarded by Polanyi as “an 
indispensable factor in the making and maintenance of the Totalitarian State.”24 The end result of 
Soviet science was not that it would achieve greater societal benefit, but that progress would be 
stifled as a result of political intervention. Moreover, in Stalinist Russia, such interference went 
beyond simple interference or the pursuit of a supposed “Soviet” science, to the deep political 
repression and frequent purges that took place in the Soviet Union during the 1930s (and of 
which Boris Hessen himself was a victim).
25
 
 Thus, in its first incarnation, the relationship between science and artisanal practice was 
embedded in deeply held ideological convictions and played out as part of arguments for and 
against liberal, democratic capitalism on the one side and Soviet-style Marxism on the other. 
With the advent of the Cold War, the issue became less prominent in Western discourse.  More 
recently, however, historians of science have become more comfortable positioning science 
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within public culture.
26
 In one of the key clashes between new and old schools of thought, the 
notion that economic factors have a direct bearing on what science is produced again came to the 
fore. Unlike Hessen, however, this argument, first articulated at length by A.E. Musson and Eric 
Robinson, did not depend on a Marxist interpretation of the world. Instead, Musson and 
Robinson sought to demonstrate that eighteenth-century science and the Industrial Revolution 
were inseparable and neither could be adequately understood without reference to the other.
27
 
The Newton scholar A. Rupert Hall took issue with Musson and Robinson’s thesis. In an article 
titled “What Did the Industrial Revolution Owe to Science?” he concluded that the two owed 
nothing to each other, or at least, very little.
28
 Hall conceded the correspondence between 
eighteenth-century industrialists that Musson and Robinson had demonstrated, but rejected their 
conclusion that it proved industrial practice was significant to the history of science or science to 
that of industrialization. As Hall explained, James Watt’s “acute interest” in natural philosophy 
did not lead “to commercial success.”29   
Explicitly demanding elsewhere that a clear division between science and technology be 
maintained, Hall proclaimed that “one need not be long misled by the vulgar sophism that would 
see Leonardo da Vinci's studies of artillery or Galileo's lessons in fortification as evidence that 
‘science’ had been overtaken by novel military necessities.”30 Demarcation was to be maintained 
between ‘high’ and ‘low’ science; between the scientist-philosopher and the mechanic-artisan. A 
distinction that, as the historian of scientific instruments J.A. Bennett observed, “established the 
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impossibility of the mechanics’ realm seriously impinging on science.”31 Thus, Hall might have 
allowed for “the growing importance of the artisan and mechanic in the period” having “created 
a favourable climate for its wider practice, but not that such popular practices contributed to 
science itself.”32 However, maintaining a distinction between science and popular culture, as 
Roger Cooter and Stephen Pumfrey have explained, privileged elite science, marginalized other 
ways of knowing and obscured contests between and within classes.
33
 Musson and Robinson’s 
thesis has been taken to its logical extreme by the historian of science Margaret Jacob, who has 
argued that it was the scientific revolution that allowed the Industrial Revolution to take place in 
Britain, an argument that has been picked up and developed further by the economic historian 
Joel Mokyr.
34
 
 While Jacob and Mokyr have put forward the argument that science contributed directly 
and significantly to the development of industry in Britain during the eighteenth century, much 
scholarship has been devoted to the inverse proposition. Historians of science such as J.A. 
Bennett, Pamela Smith and Pamela Long have concentrated on reconstructing artisanal-
mechanical practice. Such studies have put artisan methods under the microscope and subjected 
them to the kind of rigorous historical analysis as had previously been reserved for elite 
science.
35
 The examination of artisanal practice within the context of the history of science and 
technology has served to further erode the easy distinction between science and technology 
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demanded by Hall, especially in the period before 1700. Meanwhile, historians of alchemy and 
related cognates such as books of secrets and magic have demysticized the investigations of 
early-modern alchemists and their ilk and, in doing so, have made more coherent the rationality 
behind investigations that now seem arcane or even ridiculous.
36
  
While Isaac Newton and Robert Boyle’s enthusiasm for alchemy has long been known, it 
tended to be treated separately from their supposedly serious scientific work; however, it has 
become clear that the concepts and techniques Newton learned during his alchemical studies also 
played a role in his scientific thought.
37
 Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs, in particular, argued that much 
Newton scholarship overly privileged his mathematical investigations over the many other areas 
of study to which he devoted his attention. In particular, she took issue with I. Bernard Cohen’s 
thesis “that an essential part of Newton’s methodology was deliberately” creating “mathematical 
models as a first step.” Mathematics, she contended, was just one of his tools. Alchemy was 
another, equally important, aspect of his philosophical project.
38
 Rather than a unified method, 
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then, she sought to demonstrate the unity of his different pursuits from the standpoint of a single 
intellectual project: that of understanding how God works upon the universe. 
The history of navigation has been caught up in these debates. Unlike alchemy, which 
until recently was often regarded as essentially an unproductive dead-end that had little bearing 
on the history of chemistry, navigation has been aligned with mathematical practice and that this 
relationship was solidified as the discipline became more dependent on increasingly advanced 
instruments between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries. Though there were a reasonable 
number of textbooks on the art of navigation published in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, it remained something that one learned through doing. As commerce expanded and 
European powers became more globally-minded as a result, the length and variety of voyages at 
sea grew accordingly. This transformation in marine enterprise had obvious consequences with 
regard to navigation and seamanship. Samuel Pepys made such a claim when he observed that it 
was “generally confessed that the East Indies masters are the most knowing men in their 
navigations, as being from the consideration of their rich cargoes, and the length of their 
sailing.”39 While mariners had previously tended to stay close to the shore and stuck to routes 
they knew well, this was increasingly not the case as travel between Europe, the Americas and 
the Asia became ever more frequent. The new globalized world, therefore, has fitted neatly into 
the thesis of the mathematization of navigation, which was first articulated by E.G.R. Taylor. 
The history of the Royal Mathematical School and a close attention to navigation as practice, 
however, calls into question some of the core assumptions of this point-of-view. 
The Royal Mathematical School in Historical Context 
 The Royal Mathematical School was established at Christ’s Hospital in 1673 for the 
purpose of improving navigation at sea. The Mathematical School was first accorded 
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significance by the historian of education Nicholas Hans who regarded it as the first “modern” 
school as it focused on practical, technical education rather than the study of Latin, Greek and 
the classics. According to Hans, “Christ’s Hospital served as a radiating centre for similar 
schools in France, Russia and Germany.”40 In support of this claim, he pointed in particular to a 
similar school started in France by Louis XIV in 1682 and to Peter I of Russia who had the 
Royal Mathematical School inspected while he was in England in 1698 and took two alumni of 
the back to Russia with him with the intention of establishing a similar school in Moscow.
41
 That 
the Royal Mathematical School represented something new was crucial to Hans’s argument; 
however, N. Pumley noted that Spain had been providing navigational instruction since 1502 and 
in France there had been a school for navigation at Dieppe since 1666, which according to 
Pumley led to the establishment of further schools under Louis XIV such as the one that Hans 
mentioned.
42
 In their recently published history of the Royal Mathematical School, Nerida 
Ellerton and M.A. Clements have again made grand assertions about the import of the 
mathematical school. Similar to Hans, they have argued that the Royal Mathematical School 
“provided a model by which educational institutions at the school level could offer instruction to 
ordinary children in mathematics beyond arithmetic and elementary geometry” and that “Christ’s 
Hospital's influence was fresh, extensive and international, and its example led to the creation of 
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secondary school mathematics which were not to be found in schools before RMS was 
created.”43  
Though the School had begun with high expectations, Pumley's detailed account of the 
School's early struggles concluded by observing “the first 50 years of the King's foundation were 
not a great success.” Pumley’s pointed to Hodgson’s arrival in 1708 and his half-century tenure 
as mathematical master as having stabilized the institution and having provided the secure and 
competent instruction needed while also securing greater connections between the School and 
other institutions such as the Royal Society and the Royal Observatory.
44
 Thus, for Pumley, it 
was the combination of individual brilliance and the fortunate location of the School within the 
large and already well-known Christ’s Hospital that ensured the School’s survival and eventual 
success.
45
 The fact that the School existed within Christ’s Hospital, however, was the result of an 
interesting series of events that are rather telling about the haphazard development of the School 
and its status within English society. 
In the seventeenth century, Christ’s Hospital was a charity school that had begun as a 
foundling school in the middle of the previous century and had grown to have an average of 
about eight hundred male and female students. Located only a few minutes’ walk north of St. 
Paul’s Cathedral, Christ’s Hospital was well-located geographically to be embedded in the social 
and political networks of London. It was, however, perennially short of money as it relied 
primarily on the combination of charity and income from properties that the school owned. 
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Charitable donations were a particularly unreliable source of income. One particularly difficult 
incident, the will of Richard Aldworth, played a crucial role in the history of the Royal 
Mathematical School at Christ’s Hospital. Aldworth’s 1646 will bequeathed his estate to Christ’s 
Hospital. Though he died in March, 1648, the will was not proven until June 12, 1654.
46
 As a 
result of the English Civil War and the resulting military dictatorship under Oliver Cromwell, 
Christ’s Hospital did not receive the promised income. Once the monarchy was restored under 
Charles II in 1660, the treasurer of Christ’s Hospital, Mr. Parrey, would spend the next decade 
petitioning the Crown and Parliament for the money the school was owed and had not received 
as a result of the “late Rebellion.”47  
The issue of Aldworth’s bequest persisted through the entirety of the 1660s and it does 
not seem as though either Crown or Parliament was particularly concerned about bringing about 
a resolution. The Second Anglo-Dutch War, however, made the state of the English Navy and 
the quality of its seaman a major concern for a number of members of Charles II’s inner circle.48 
It was perceived that “the trade of seaman is of much better credit in Holland & enjoys more 
privileges & encouragements all Europe over.”49 While Aldworth’s bequest was not intended for 
the purposes of mathematical education or the improvement of the Navy, but, instead, was meant 
“to provide and ordaine a convenient Place and Receipt and Entertainment for other 40 poor 
Male children to be at his Cost educated in Reading, Writeing, Arithetic, and the Lattin 
Tongue.”50 The troublesome bequest was seized upon as a means of achieving just such an 
improvement. Thus, Aldworth’s original bequest was allowed to fall into legal forfeiture and, in 
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1673, the Royal Mathematical School was established at Christ’s Hospital for the improvement 
of navigation and Charles II was “Entitled to ye sole Foundershipp of this Institution.” By this 
point, Aldworth’s bequest was essentially irrelevant as the money now came from the Crown and 
the Royal Mathematical School’s purpose was “wholly unregarded to ye first purposes of Mr. 
Aldworth.”51 
 The timing of the mathematical foundation at Christ’s Hospital is notable for a couple 
reasons. That it came in the wake of the Second Anglo-Dutch War has already been noted. Both 
Charles II and his brother James, the Duke of York, were closely associated with the Navy, with 
James acting as its commander.
52
 Unlike later British monarchs, both Charles and James had 
significant experience at sea and were skilled seamen. Thus, a project that purported to improve 
the quality of the Navy perhaps piqued their interest in a way that would not have been the case 
for other monarchs. The Anglo-Dutch War, moreover, was expensive and Charles II was 
embroiled, as was the case for most of his reign, in a battle with Parliament for more money. 
Finally, in 1672 Charles’s Parliamentary adversaries had passed an Act that forced the King’s 
Cabinet to publically take Protestant oaths. This act had been designed in order to force into the 
public the secret Catholics who were close to Charles II. Most significantly, Charles’s brother 
James—the heir to the throne—was revealed to be Catholic.  
All of this is important to the Royal Mathematical School insofar as the School appealed 
directly to Charles’s vanity at a time when his authority was at particularly low ebb. As the 
foundations Royal patent put it: 
Know yee therefore, That wee being desirous to promote so pious & Publick a 
Work, of Our Especiall Grace, Certaine knowledge & meere Motion, Have 
Erected, founded, constituted, Ordained, appointed, & Established, and by the 
Present for Us, Our Heirs, & Successors, Doe Erect, found, constitute, Ordaine, 
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appoint, & Establish a Mathematicall Schoole to be held from time to time and for 
ever continued within the said Hospitall called Christ=Hospitall.
53
 
The King’s power was being aggressively eroded by Parliament, in stark contrast to the situation 
in France where Louis XIV sat as the supreme exemplar of the absolute monarch. Furthermore, 
Charles II’s legacy was under threat. Charles had no legitimate children and James was deeply 
unpopular due to his Catholicism. While in 1673 these issues were merely simmering in the 
background, they would explode by the end of the decade, with the exclusion crisis and then 
eventually the so-called Glorious Revolution of 1688 in which James II was deposed in favour of 
the Protestant William of Orange (who was married to one of James’s daughters). Thus, a Royal 
Foundation at Christ’s Hospital offered Charles a relatively inexpensive opportunity to build a 
legacy. 
 At the time, naval training was received on the job by boys who went to sea at a young 
age (typically twelve to fourteen, but younger was not uncommon), much like would have been 
the case in any of the trades. While intended to be trained as apprentices, the quality of the 
education varied widely. Moreover, unlike other trades, navigation did not unambiguously 
belong to the realm of artisanal mechanics. For example, in sixteenth-century Spain, University 
cosmographers successfully wrested control over navigation in the Spanish Navy from practicing 
pilots.
54
 In seventeenth-century England, the connections between navigation, astronomy and 
mathematics were the area of contention. The Royal Mathematical School served the interests of 
those were aligned with the New Science of the Royal Society and who conceived of navigation 
as a subsect of astronomy. Thus, the RMS might be seen as explicitly representing what Eric Ash 
has regarded as the transition of navigation from a practice to an expert skill. The early history of 
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the School has tended to be from the perspective of the mathematization of navigation during the 
seventeenth century.
55
 As such, many of the accounts of the early history of the School have 
been biased in favour of points-of-views such as expressed by John Flamsteed disapproving 
quotation of Nathaniel Hawes with which this chapter opened. That much of the literature has 
taken such a view is perhaps unsurprising considering the major accounts were written by the 
primary editor of Flamsteed’s correspondence in biography of Jonas Moore (Frances Willmoth), 
a member of Christ’s Hospital (Plumley) and a Newton scholar in an edited collection on 
Flamsteed (Rob Iliffe).
56
 All of these accounts are excellent pieces of scholarship. They were; 
however, written with Flamsteed or Samuel Pepys as the starting point.
57
 
 The mathematization of navigation is only one possible approach to the study of the 
Royal Mathematical School. Another option is to consider its history in the context of the 
gentlemen/tarpaulin debate. One of the major narratives with regard to the English Navy in the 
seventeenth century was that there was a sharp divide between Gentleman and tarpaulin officers, 
meaning officers who achieved their rank as the result of their social status and connections 
versus those who rose through the ranks through merit. The essential claim of the 
gentleman/tarpaulin controversy was that the English Navy was being weakened by commands 
being given to aristocrats who did not have any experience at sea over highly skilled mariners 
who lacked such fortunate births. The degree to which such a division actually existed in reality 
has been challenged by historians of the British Navy as in practice it is often difficult to separate 
the supposed gentlemen from the so-called tarpaulins.
58
 Interestingly, the officer corps of the 
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British Navy became increasingly genteel during the course of the eighteenth century, a 
development that does not seem to have negatively impacted the competency of the Navy. 
Moreover, social connections were crucial for advancement regardless of one’s social class as 
promotions were meted out primarily through the fortunate association with a successful 
commander.
59
 
 The controversy, thus, to an extent, a strawman used by a number of individuals in the 
seventeenth century who wished to initiate reforms to the Navy and the most prominent of these 
reformers was Samuel Pepys. The British Naval historian J.D. Davies contested the importance 
that Pepys’s opinions had been accorded by historians who studied the seventeenth-century 
Navy. According to Davies, because Pepys kept such extensive and well-organized records, and 
because his manuscripts were so conveniently located, historians ended up neglecting other 
significant sources such as the naval records now housed at Kew. This has led to the history of 
the English Navy during the seventeenth century to have been seen almost exclusively from the 
point-of-view of Pepys. While Pepys tended to flatter himself as to his importance—the 
prominence to which he gave himself as President of the Royal Society on the title page of 
Newton’s Principia being one good example—Davies has demonstrated that Pepys was only one 
part of the larger Naval enterprise. Pepys’s particular background meant he favoured what might 
be described as middle-class virtues. He had a marked preference for standardized education, 
examinations and preferred tarpaulin to gentlemen officers. Pepys was, however, an 
administrator. Though he had sought to educate himself on the subject of navigation upon 
joining the Naval Office and thus had read much of the literature on the subject, he had very little 
practical experience at sea. 
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Due to Pepys’s fastidious record-keeping, the interest in the School by figures such as 
Isaac Newton and John Flamsteed and a series of controversies regarding the competency of its 
schoolmasters and what sort of instruction its students ought to receive which dogged its early 
years, the material available for the period of 1673 to around 1700 are significantly greater than 
is the case for the eighteenth century. Thus, it is much easier to develop a detailed account of the 
School’s first thirty years than it is for the thirty years that followed. The story of the early period 
of the Royal Mathematical School has been excellently told a number of times and, therefore, I 
will not give a more detailed narrative in this chapter. To summarize somewhat facetiously, the 
Royal Mathematical School was established in 1673 and went through a string of generally 
unsatisfactory schoolmasters until 1709 when Samuel Newton resigned and Flamsteed’s former 
assistant James Hodgson was given the job. Hodgson then went on to hold the position until his 
death in 1755 during which time the School seems no longer to have been a source of public 
controversy. With the arrival of James Hodgson, the School finally had a qualified mathematical 
master and disrepute and poor instruction that had marked its early history has been regarded as 
a thing of the past. In what remains of this chapter, however, I seek to re-evaluate the early 
controversies, the Royal Mathematical School under James Hodgson and finally the place of the 
School within education and marine history. 
Expertise Contested at the Royal Mathematical School 
 As was touched upon at the beginning of this chapter, the early years of the Royal 
Mathematical School were frequently turbulent and its management and teaching came under 
heavy criticism. After James Hodgson became mathematical master, however, such public 
criticism disappeared, which has generally been regarded as a sign that the school eventually 
achieved significant success. It is less clear to me, however, that the contrast between the largely 
50 
 
failed early years and the supposedly triumphant period after 1709 is entirely warranted. In this 
chapter I aim to demonstrate the ideological convictions that underlay the critiques made by 
Samuel Pepys, Isaac Newton and John Flamsteed in order to show that the early years of the 
school, while certainly troubled, were not necessarily as disastrous as has been claimed. 
Meanwhile, careful investigation of Christ’s Hospital’s institutional records has suggested to me 
that the School under James Hodgson was less stable than it appears from the outside. The 
school was caught between a number of different competing interest groups—sea captains, the 
Board of Governors, the school masters, the students, Newton and Flamsteed and the Navy itself 
to name a few—and these interests frequently did not align. Thus, the questions that have guided 
my study have been: How did the school operate on a day-to-day basis? And how does the Royal 
Mathematical School help to develop a better understanding of “expertise” in the period being 
covered by this dissertation? Essentially, who is an expert? How does one teach expertise? How 
can such expertise be accredited? 
 When the school was first established, it does not seem as though such questions were at 
the forefront of the minds of those involved. Indeed, Samuel Pepys’s extensive records relating 
to the early years of the school indicate that significantly more time and effort was devoted to 
designing the badges the mathematical boys were to wear than to the selection of the first 
mathematical schoolmaster or the development of the curriculum. Curriculum, examinations and 
the system of apprenticeship were all sorted out on an ad hoc basis as the school’s governors 
attempted to resolve unforeseen problems. One example of this was the “King’s bounty,” which 
was payment made to captains who took on one of the mathematical boys as an apprentice. 
51 
 
Essentially, the Crown provided the equivalent of the first three years of wages in exchange for 
agreeing to provide the boy in question with a seven year indenture at sea.
60
  
Initially there was no such provision of funds to pay apprenticeship fees. The payment of 
an apprenticeship fee to the intended master was standard practice; however, the provision of 
payment was only set up after it was found to be inordinately difficult to obtain appropriate 
masters for boys who had completed their education and were considered ready to go to sea.
61
 
By August 21, 1675, fifteen boys had completed their education and passed an examination at 
Trinity House, but did not yet have a place on board a ship. The Governors expressed concern: 
For the future Welfare of those Boys as to pravaile with His Majesty to write 
effectually to the East India, Turky, Royall African, & Russia Company’s to 
perswade them to establish an order in their Respective Courts. That y
e
 
Commander of every Shipp, which they shall hire or imploy in their Severall 
Trades, may be by them oblidged to take one of those Boys, and such others as 
shall from time to time be fitted for ye sea, from this foundation, and constantly 
imployed by them in their Navigation.
62
 
Though the School had been set up with the Navy in mind, the nation was not involved in a 
naval war when the first students were ready to go to sea. In response to the predicament, Pepys 
wrote letters to the East Indian, Russian, Turkey, African and Muscovian Companies imploring 
their assistance.
63
 
 The first mathematical master was a man by the name of John Leake. Leake had previous 
experience teaching mathematics and navigation. Unlike later schoolmasters, there is no record 
of Leake’s application for the job, who his references were or if he had any competition for the 
position. The Court Records simply state, “Mr. Leake this Day first tendering his Service to be 
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Master.”64 Similarly, he does not seem to have received many directions as to how and what 
specifically he was to teach. He was to instruct forty bluecoat boys and was given leave to take 
on another forty from outside the school to supplement his salary, which was set at £50 per 
year.
65
 As for his manner of instruction, Leake promised: 
I will constantly & diligently attend upon y
e
 said forty Children of the New Royall 
Foundation from seven of the Clock in y
e
 morning with all diligence & Care 
teaching and instructing the said Scholars in the said Arts of Arithmetick and 
Navigation until it bee Eleven of y
e
 Clock; and from one of the Clock in y
e
 
afternoon until Five of the Clock, or at such houres, days, & Times as y
e
 
Governours shall thinke fitt to direct & appoint.
66
 
He also agreed to take the boys to geometry lectures at Gresham College and to keep the books, 
globes, maps and instruments necessary for the teaching of navigation. It was not indicated if the 
school’s governors expected any specific books to be used. A list of books owned by the school, 
however, suggests that its mathematical master and students had access to a fairly large number 
of navigational and mathematical texts.  
Similarly, the school possessed an impressive collection of instruments.
67
 As well, Jonas 
Moore was in the process of preparing a textbook for the Royal Mathematical Foundation’s use, 
which would be completed principally by John Flamsteed after Moore’s death. While it had 
aimed to be the primary mathematical textbook for the Mathematical School, it appears to have 
been unsatisfactory for those purposes and it does not seem to have been particularly used. 
Though there are not clear and consistent records as to what the students were taught, there is 
reasonable evidence as to what they were expected to know before they were considered ready to 
go to sea. Initially, there were not any plans for how the boys were to be certified; however, it 
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was decided that the boys should be subjected to an external examination by the Masters at 
Trinity House in order to demonstrate their competence. Trinity House was made up of ship 
captains and was responsible for protecting the interests of sailors as well as the maintenance of 
lighthouses.  
The first round of examinations occurred on August 21, 1675 with fifteen boys going 
down to Trinity House. As all fifteen passed, the performance of the mathematical boys seemed 
to be satisfactory. The letter sent from Trinity House to accompany the certifications stated: 
This comes to accompany y
e
 inclosed Certificates on Behalf of y
e
 poore Children 
concerned therein, in w
ch
 (as wee hope) wee have done them full rights, soe wee 
take this occasion of letting you know, That it is matter of very great content to 
us, to see His M
t’s
 Royall Institution (under yo
r
 Care) receive soe hopefull a 
Beginning as y
e
 Instances wee have met w
th
, Both of y
e
 ability & Industry of Mr 
Leake yo
r
 Mathematicall Schoole=m
r
 & y
e
 great Improvement of y
e
 Child
n
 under 
him has given us y
e
 knowledge of, in this first Office of Service wee have been 
called to, by you, assuring you, That in w
t
 ever else it shall fall within Our power 
to contribute towards y
e
 Advantage of this His M
t’s
 Foundation, & Benefitt of y
e
 
poore Child
n
 interested in it, you shall find us most ready to doe y
e
 same.
68
 
The letter went on to outline the aspects of navigation on which the boys were questioned: 
1. The principles of Geometry with y
e
 practice theof in describing of lines, 
Angles, Paralells, Chords, Sines, Tangents, Secants, Triangles, and all sorts of 
plaine Geometricall Figures by a plaine Ruler and Compass. 
2. The division and proportionall section of Lines the use of y
e
 Diagonall Scale, & 
y
e
 Rule of Three in Lines, with y
e
 dividing of y
e
 Circumference of a Circle, & y
e
 
Description of ye scale of Chords, Houres, Rumbs & Longitude. 
 3. Decimall Arithmetick with y
e
 Composition & Extracon of y
e
 Square Roote 
4. The Doctrine of y
e
 plaine straight lined Triangles w
th
 y
e
 use of y
e
 Naturall 
Tables of Lynes, Tangents & Secants. 
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5. Propositions of y
e
 Julian Calendar with y
e
 Comon Rules for finding y
e
 Course 
of ye Sun, Moone & Tydes. 
 6. A general Rule for finding y
e
 Latitude by y
e
 Sun and fixed Starrs 
 7. Questions of plain sayling with y
e
 use of the plaine Sea Chart. 
 8. The use of Logarithms & Tables of Artificiall Lynes and Tangents. 
 9. The use of Gunter’s Scale 
10. The projecting of the Sphere in Circles or Globe on a plaine, Diverse ways, 
with y
e
 Rule of projecting all sorts of Mapps.
69
 
Thus, the project was off to a good start and John Leake seemed to be a capable mathematical 
master. This state of affairs would not last long, however, and soon Leake’s suitability began to 
be questioned. 
 While Leake was experienced as a mathematical teacher and clearly knew well enough 
what needed to be taught, he was elderly (“antient” according to one description in the minutes) 
and soon the physical strain of providing instruction from “7 of ye Clock in ye morning” until 
“11, & from one in ye afternoon till 5, except Holy-days” with only three weeks off during the 
year began to catch up with him.
70
 The number of students the mathematical master was to teach 
was reduced to a maximum of ten from each cohort and the mathematical master was no longer 
allowed to take in external students to supplement his salary. In order to make up for this lost 
income, the mathematical master’s salary was increased, rising from its initial £50 to £70. By 
1680 it had been increased further to £100 pounds.
71
 As well, Leake was allowed to hire an 
assistant so as to reduce the burden on himself. While these changes were intended to improve 
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the quality of instruction within the school, it remained unclear what Leake was expected to be 
teaching. Despite the positive outcome of the first set of examinations, in November, 1676 Leake 
requested more clarity in what was expected and that he be provided with “a Rule from ye 
Worthy Members of Trinity House as to y
e
 Instructions of y
e
 Children hereafter, that be they may 
come qualify’d to their Examination.”72  
 In response to Leake’s request, it was decided that Pepys, who had recently become one 
of Christ’s Hospital’s governors, would provide Leake with a more defined set of expectations. 
Presumably Pepys did as instructed, however, no record seems to have been kept as to what, if 
any, further instructions Pepys might have given Leake regarding what the mathematical 
students were to be taught in preparation for the examination other than a timetable that Pepys’s 
produced indicating the expected progression of students through the school (see Table 1 below). 
Those children who did not obtain the proficiency required by the age of sixteen were “Not to 
partake of the King’s bounty, but to be placed forth to Trades as the other children of the 
Hospital be.”73 Despite this claim, in reality many students failed to receive their qualifications 
on the first attempt and were given time for further study and a second opportunity to take the 
examination rather than being put out of the mathematical school.
74
 An investigation of the 
records of apprenticeships received by the mathematical students indicates that it was quite 
uncommon for a boy not to be apprenticed on board a ship and in the instances where such an 
apprenticeship did not occur, it was typically for reasons other than academic failure. While 
Pepys’s plan seemed reasonable on paper, in practice his schedule was frequently too ambitious 
for students to maintain. 
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Pepys’s description Age Length Age at Completion 
“Writeing school to prepare him for the 
Latine” 
9 ½ Year 9 ½ 
“The Latine School to understand Tully’s 
Epistle or Erasmus Colloquy’s” 
9 ½ 4 ½ Years 14 
“The Writeing Schoole to finish his 
Writeing and Learne Arithmetick to the 
Rule of Three” 
14 ½ Year 14 ½ 
“The Mathematicall Schoole to be raised 
to a proficiency fitting him to be put 
forth as an Apprentice” 
14 ½ 1 ½ Years 16 
Figure 1.1: Pepys’s Plan for Student Progression 
(LMA CLC/210/B/001/M MS 12873/02, 31-2) 
 Nicholas Hans’s principal claim regarding the Royal Mathematical School was to see it 
as an exemplar of a general trend in education during the eighteenth century.
75
 For Hans, 
education transitioned from the traditional grammar schools to a more practical, technical 
education as Britain became increasingly industrial and urban. Hans made an important 
contribution to the historiography of education as his work sought to revise how grammar 
education in eighteenth-century England was viewed. The classic work on the subject had been 
done in the nineteenth century by Arthur Francis Leach, an All Soul’s, Oxford Fellow and 
Principal, who was deeply prejudiced by his bias toward a classical education.
76
 His view of 
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what a proper education entailed led him to regard the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a 
period of decline as venerable grammar schools lost their previous vigour. As access to 
education increased, the emphasis became increasingly vocational and Latin and Greek went into 
sharp decline. For Leach this was a sign of decline, while Hans regarded it as a renewal.
77
 
Leach and Hans, then, did not disagree that the old grammar schools had lost their place 
of primacy in English education; instead, where they differed was on if this was good or bad. 
Neither was particularly informed by statistics and a number of social historians beginning in the 
1970s used more data-driven approaches to challenge many of the central assumptions held by 
both Leach and Hans.
78
 Lawrence Stone, for instance, posited an education revolution in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that put into place the structures that allowed the 
development of the highly literate, urbanized, middle-class world of the nineteenth century.
79
 
Meanwhile, as O’Day observed, “the acceptance of Latin as the be all and end all of grammar 
school education was at odds with reality in many cases,” even at its supposed peak in the 
seventeenth century.
80
 David Cressy’s study of literacy rates from the mid-sixteenth to mid-
eighteenth centuries suggested that while literacy did increase during the period, it was “not 
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sudden or spectacular” and in the second half of the eighteenth century literacy stagnated.81 
Cressy emphasized that “literacy did not occur as a natural development at a particular stage of 
childhood, but depended on successful contact with a teacher, contact which for many children 
was frustrating, fleeting, or never happened at all.”82 
From a macroscopic perspective, then, Hans’s thesis that education in England underwent 
a transformation from being focused on the classics and ancient languages with the intention of 
education a small middle-class for positions in the church to a more varied and dynamic 
education that had greater emphasis on the vernacular, mathematics and practical skills needed 
as England urbanized and the middle-class grew is not as clear-cut as he presumed. At a glance, 
however, the Royal Mathematical School does appear to fit his hypothesis as its primary 
objective was to find apprenticeships for its boys. Doing so would, hopefully, provide them with 
a profession and, therefore, ensure that they would be able to be self-supporting adults. Despite 
these stated assumptions, the make-up of the student body calls this somewhat into question. 
Richard Thompson’s analysis of the occupations of the students’ fathers found a significant 
change in social backgrounds for the students during the eighteenth century. While in 1700 
Christ’s Hospital was a charity school whose students were drawn from the lower classes, by 
1800 the social background of its pupils had become decidedly middle-class.
83
 Meanwhile, 
Rosemary O’Day pointed out that while Christ’s Hospital was initially intended to take in 
fatherless and illegitimate children, it quickly closed its doors to them and limited itself to 
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children of freemen and citizens of London becoming “an institution caring for the domestic, 
responsible poor rather than the vagrant child.”84 The students in the seventeenth century, then, 
were those who could reasonably be expected to take up a trade, but whose family did not have 
the means to elevate the child without assistance. 
The school abandoned its commitment to the lowest classes and the education received at 
Christ’s Hospital was as much focused on moral and religious education as on teaching practical 
skills. The schoolmaster was expected to “see yor Childn make Prayrs & Supplicon to God both 
morning & Evening” and to “attend at Christ’s Church upon yor Childn every Lord’s Day soe 
they may be kept in order during Prayers & Sermon-times.”85 As the children came to the school 
from the London poor, such moral instruction was deemed particularly essential so that they 
would be able to rise above the ignobility of their births. Sailors were frequently regarded as 
being morally questionable. For example, when Edmond Halley expected to succeed John Wallis 
as Savilian Professor of Astronomy at Oxford, Flamsteed sought to impinge upon Halley’s 
character claiming, “now talks sweares and drinkes brandy like a sea captaine so that I much fear 
his own ill behaviour will deprive him of the advantage of this vacancy.”86 While such slanders 
by Flamsteed had little effect on Halley’s career—he got the position and would later succeed 
Flamsteed as Astronomer Royal—it does demonstrate the concern held by many middle-class 
English that the Navy needed to be made more virtuous.  It was believed that the introduction of 
youths who had received strong moral education and were inoculated by middle-class values 
from the moral dangers that came with going to sea would further serve to improve the moral 
character of the English Navy. Notably, the first requirement listed when replacing John Leake 
in 1677 was that the mathematical master was to “be a sober discreet & diligent Person, of good 
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Life, Governm
t
 & conversation.”87 In this regard, the tenure of the third mathematical master, Dr. 
Robert Wood, is particularly indicative of the importance of moral instruction in the minds of the 
school’s governors. 
 The choice of Wood was controversial to begin with as he was an Oxford scholar who 
had neither practical experience with navigation or teaching youths. Though neither of the two 
previous mathematical masters, John Leake and Peter Perkins, had come from Oxford or 
Cambridge, the requirement that the mathematical master have strong enough Latin and Greek to 
continue the boys’ education in those languages limited the available candidates.88 The emphasis 
on Latin belies the view of Christ’s Hospital as an exception to the norm. This expectation made 
it significantly more difficult for someone to be found from outside of the Universities. It was 
generally expected that a University mathematician would have the skill so as to be able to pick 
up the necessary navigational knowledge without significant difficulty. In contrast, someone who 
had practical experience in navigation, but lacked Latin could not be expected to learn Latin and 
Greek while also employed as the mathematical master. Robert Wood’s abject failure as 
mathematical master severely challenged this belief. 
 Wood might have been a capable mathematician; however, he was not a good teacher. As 
mathematical master he was expected to put in long hours every day. When he was hired he 
promised not to employ an assistant, which had been an issue previously with Leake because the 
school’s governors were not able to vet an assistant to ensure they met expectations.89 Moreover, 
the position of mathematical master was already difficult to fill because the salary did not 
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correspond with the expectations and requirements.
90
 Wood failed to live up to these obligations. 
A few months after Wood was hired, the general state of the Royal Mathematical School was 
reviewed and the mathematical students questioned to see how well they were progressing. The 
review was not positive as the examiner deemed “that ye said Children have been neglected, for 
that they might have learned more in a month’s time, then what most of them have been doing 
since Christmas last.” Furthermore, “some of ye Children, & upon examinacon ye Childn were 
found to be very deficient in answering to what y
e
 Dr. what said he has taught them, & 
particularly in y
e
 Doctrine of y
e
 Globe.”91 Not only were the students not being taught at an 
adequate rate, but they did not even remember what they were supposed to have been taught. 
When the committee called Wood in to explain himself, he admitted that due to poor health he 
had not always been able to attend to the students as much as was expected, though he 
“constanty employ’d a man to look after them.” The committee was not satisfied and resolved 
“yt they would meet every first Thursday in ye Month to inspect whethr he was performing his 
Duty or not, & what progress y
e 
Child
n
 make in their Learning und
r
 his care.”92 
 Though the governors had resolved to keep a closer eye on Wood, the situation does not 
seem to have improved. Samuel Pepys met with members of Trinity House regarding the 
mathematical boys and reported back to Christ’s Hospital “they have of late found ye Boys very 
deficient in their Arithmetick & have complain’d of It & other Defects to their very Masters.”93 
One of the principal reasons why Wood had been hired was due to his faculties in Latin; yet, the 
mathematical students’ Latin fared no better than their mathematics and Wood was noted to have 
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been entirely neglectful in that area.
94
 The man whom Wood had hired to assist him with the 
boys was a particular concern. Despite all the promises Wood had made to the governors that he 
would attend to his responsibilities, it was alleged that “ye Doctor never teaches any of them 
himselfe...this even when some of them (& particularly Guy) have gone to his Closett on purpose 
to be inform’d by him.”95 Similarly, Wood did not look over the students’ books, except on one 
occasion when there had been complains of some boys tearing their books. Even then, “wth out 
examining their Bookes himselfe, but committing it to some of y
e
 Elder Boys, he sent for a 
Bealde & caused to whip those that were found guilty.”96  
Instead of teaching the mathematical students, Wood seems to have kept himself in his 
rooms and left the teaching and discipline to Hudson, the usher he had hired. Unfortunately, this 
man was “One for whom they have noe reverence, he being an idle drunken fellow, having at 
times come to them plainly in Drink, setting them ill Examples in y
e
 slovenliness of his Dress; 
lodgeing in an Ale-house,” spending all of his money on drink and mistreating the boys. The 
situation meant that “they have learned ye most part of what the know from ye upper Boys & not 
from their Mast
r
 nor Hadson; save a little of sphericall Triangles, w
ch
 they say y
e
 Trinity House 
told them they were taught wrong, & y
t
 they must  untaught it againe.”97 Meanwhile the boys 
were “ungovernable” and took “great liberty in spending their time at Schoole, even to ye playing 
at Football there. As alsoe takeing their owne hours of going into  y
e
 Schoole & leaving it.”98 
This was contrasted to the governing of the boys under Leake and Perkins, who it was claimed 
had understood the rules and carried out their duties satisfactorily. 
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 Robert Wood was clearly not a good teacher, but he was not the only problem. It 
remained unclear to everyone involved what the students ought to be taught. While Jonas Moore 
had laboured to prepare a mathematical textbook for use in the school, a committee deemed it 
necessary that the book be “inspected into, & so much thereof taken out as is necessary for ye 
instrucon of y
e
 Math Child
n
 in their Learning.”99 Because there was no set curriculum, it was 
difficult to establish what the students should be expected to know. Pepys had drafted a schedule 
for how the mathematical boys were to progress through the school; however, it was not 
particularly specific. Similarly, there was a disconnect between what the different mathematical 
masters taught and what the examiners from Trinity House expected the students to know. 
Moreover, the efficacy of sending to the boys to Trinity House to be tested is not clear. While 
“upon Examination, how to judge whether a Boy answers and works right or wrong,” because 
they were not involved with any of the day-to-day instruction and “through want of use and 
overlooking their Books they are not themselves best fitted for Examining y
e
 Children.”100 The 
decentralization of education meant there were significant differences in the standards of 
education and even within institutions disagreements regarding the selection of new masters, the 
criteria and who should make the appointment were frequent. Thus, such problems were not 
confined to Christ’s Hospital, but were frequently faced by endowed grammar schools of the 
period.
101
 
 The fundamental problem at the heart of the Royal Mathematical School’s early 
difficulties was not the competency, or the lack thereof, of its early educators, but the vagueness 
of its remit. The School was established in order to teach boys mathematics in order to improve 
navigation at sea, but what this entailed or how it was to be executed was not planned in 
                                                 
99
 Pepys MS 2612, 386. 
100
 Pepys MS 2612, 392. 
101
 Vincent, The Grammar Schools, 184-8 and Ch. 8. 
64 
 
advance. This meant that the early mathematical schoolmasters were left to sort things out on 
their own. In 1677, following the tenure of John Leake, Samuel Pepys presented the governors of 
Christ’s Hospital with a long report outlining the School’s current shortcomings. In this report 
Pepys made it rather clear the extent to which the School had been set-up and then operated on 
an ad hoc basis. According to Pepys, while the first set of boys had been exemplary, the School 
had already begun a rapid decline and “it is complained of by the Gentlemen of the Trinity 
House universally and others” that the most recent students were “beneath the first sett of Our 
Boys were raised to.”102 It was not only their mathematical skills that were not up to par, but 
“though some of them appear entred toward a good hand, yet they are few, and those not able in 
y
e
 fairest of their writing to writte true English.” Meanwhile, their Latin was so poor that “Wee 
found them as Ignorant of Latine as if they had never learned a word of it, or been acquainted 
with any one Rule towards it.”103  
The problems were not limited to the Mathematical School as “even they that were 
presented to us the Other day by the Gram
r
 Mast
r
 to bee advanced to the Mathematicall Schoole 
knew not how to put a sentence of ten words of the plainest English into true Latine.”104 Indeed, 
the mathematical master was not the only position the school had difficulty filling adequately. 
For instance, the grammar and catechism master Mr. Mansfield was fired in 1682 for failing to 
fulfill his duties and he was not the only such example of one of the non-mathematical masters 
being removed from his duties.
105
 However, the Mathematical School was funded by the Crown, 
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had a Royal patent and had higher ambitions for its students than was the case for most of the 
ordinary students. This meant that the Mathematical School was held up to greater external 
scrutiny than was the case for the rest of Christ’s Hospital. Many of the difficulties the School 
dealt with are perhaps more reflective of the general problems inherent in running a school in 
seventeenth and eighteenth-century England than specifically with the poor governance of 
Christ’s Hospital itself. 
 When Samuel Newton was hired in 1694, it marked a change in direction for the 
Mathematical School. Though the first two mathematical masters had not come from the 
Universities, the next two—Dr. Robert Wood and Edward Pagett had. The preference for a 
University educated mathematical schoolmaster was due to the desire to have someone versed in 
theoretical mathematics and skilled in Latin; however, Pagett’s hiring after the disaster that had 
been Wood’s tenure caused an immediate rift. Samuel Pepys, in particular, was incensed. He had 
concluded that the emphasis on Latin was misguided and a principal problem with the 
mathematical masters the School had hired up to that point was that they lacked experience at 
sea.  
Wood’s incompetence as a teacher made it particularly clear to Pepys that a University 
man was especially ill-suited for the role. Having submitted his view to the Christ’s Hospital 
governors, Pepys was then obligated to be away from London when Wood’s replacement was to 
be chosen. Upon his return, he found the School had overlooked candidates with practical 
experience in favour of another University educated mathematician who had no practical 
experience either at sea or as a teacher.
106
 For Pepys, this was nearly the last straw. He found his 
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advice repeatedly ignored and ultimately resigned from his position as governor and recused 
himself of any further responsibility: 
Memorandum – That from my Despaires long since conceived & frequently in 
this Collection mentioned of any satisfactory successe to this Foundation from y
e
 
Methods of it’s then management, & being therein dayly confirmed by my 
observations of y
e
 still greater inproficiencyes of it’s Children at theyr 
Examinations at ye Trinity House, I persisted in my first withdrawing myself from 
ye Care thereof, to the time of the Generall Dissolution of the Government both of 
the Hospitalls & City. Nor though rechosen thereinto by the succeeding 
Commission of his Majesty’s, bearing the date of 26th of October 1683 (which 
GOD prosper) can I yet finde any Encouragement to the reengaging myself in any 
new Charge therein.
107
  
He would continue to abstain from involvement for the next decade, only to be spurred back into 
action around the election of Samuel Newton in 1695, by which time he no longer held his 
position at the Navy. 
 When John Evelyn visited Christ’s Hospital in 1687 he was very impressed. He described 
the school enthusiastically in his diary: 
I went this evening to see the order of the boys and children at Christ’s Hospital. 
There were neere 800 boys and girls so decently clad, cleanly lodg’d, so 
wholesomely fed, so admirably taught, some the mathematics, especialy the forty 
of the late King’s foundation, that I was delighted to see the progresse some little 
youths of 13 and 14 yeares of age had made.
108
 
Yet, as we have seen, those more closely involved with the school’s operations were less 
satisfied with its condition. The tenures of Edward Pagett and Samuel Newton saw Christ’s 
Hospital endure some of its most sustained crises. In particular, toward the end of the 1690s, 
Christ’s Hospital’s finances were in such disarray that it was unable to take new students for 
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couple years.
109
 Such pressing concerns as well as the general political climate of the time might 
in some part explain why both Pagett and Newton were each able to persist in their posts for well 
over a decade despite repeated accusations of incompetence and failure. Pagett, furthermore, 
benefitted from a seemingly positive relationship with influential figures within Christ’s 
Hospital. While Pepys held him in low regard, the treasurer Nathaniel Hawes was much more 
positive: 
We beleive we have substantial reasons to esteem Mr. Pagett better than 
ordinarily qualified for his imployments & myself have good reason to esteeme 
him a Gentleman of soe much ingenuity & Constiense that he wil not, nay that he 
does not faile to apply those qualifications, for the most advtange & improvement 
of his schollars.
110
 
Significantly, it was not Pagett’s qualifications as a teacher that ultimately led to his undoing, but 
his persistent poor health that had led him to be absent from his post for the last two years of his 
employment, a situation that did not seem to be likely to improve as Pagett had requested further 
absence in order to recover his health, which the Court of Governors rejected in the hopes that 
“by his constant attendanse and diligense he will retrieve what hath bin found amisse.”111 
 When Pagett was hired, Samuel Pepys had pointed to Pagett’s obvious shortcoming—
that he had not been to sea—and there was an attempt to address this. The mathematical 
committee suggested he be given leave to go to sea and gain some practical experience shortly 
after he was hired and Pagett would make similar requests later on.
112
 Pagett’s request points to 
one of the more obvious challenges the school faced: the mathematical boys were expected to 
learn navigation without the opportunity to obtain direct experience. It was a problem recognized 
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from the outset, Pepys for instance noted: that “the Foundation of Christ-Hospital, as it is now 
set for the teaching the children all they are to be taught before they go to sea to have any 
practice, will never do the business it is designed for, their masters being generally very ignorant 
themselves.”113 Despite the awareness of the problem, the school struggled to find a way to 
resolve it. While some plans were made to send Pagett to sea for experience, there is no evidence 
that these plans were ever acted upon. As well, the amount of skill he would have been able to 
obtain during twenty days at sea would have been rather limited. It does; however, suggest that 
he took his position seriously and was diligent in carrying out his duties while his health still 
permitted despite how he was represented by Flamsteed. Such efforts may have endeared him to 
Hawes and the other governors; however, it did not assure the quality of his instruction.  
The relationship between the mathematical masters, the governors of Christ’s Hospital 
and the masters at Trinity House, moreover, was troublesome as the examiners provided by 
Trinity House and the mathematical masters frequently clashed. Robert Wood, Edward Pagett 
and Samuel Newton all claimed that the examiners were prejudiced against them and that it was 
this bias, rather than the quality of instruction, that led to their pupils’ frequent failures when 
examined. For example, Trinity House noted that Wood complained, “Of Discouragemt in ye 
execucon of his Employm
t
 from our Witholding to grant Certificates in approval of y
e
 
proficiencies of some of y
e
 Children of the said schoole whom he has under his Hand reported to 
be duely qualified in y
e
 severall Points of y
e
 Arts of Navigacon & science of Arithmetick.”114 
Unsurprisingly, they denied any prejudice against him and “that we are so far from being 
conscious of any personal disregard to y
e
 s
d
 Doctor, or inclinacon to y
e
 giving him y
e
 least 
discouragement in y
e
 well performance of his Duty, that we have ever endeavoured to give >to< 
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all that have been in his Place before him.” Moreover, they claimed that out of tenderness toward 
the poor children, they had “sometimes been prevailed with to grant our Certificates even in 
cases where we should rather have forborne them, had we been disposed y
e
 exercising any 
strickness of serverity therein.”115  
Wood, however, continued to view the situation differently. When he resigned, he gave 
“finding a Tide elsewhere stronger against me then I am able to stemme” as the reason.116 When 
pressed by the governors, Wood assured them that he was not referring to them, who had always 
treated him with kindness, but rather: 
It was at y
e
 Trinity House that those Gentlemen refus’d to sign such Certificates 
as was sent to from y
e
 Governours of this House of y
r
 Children’s abilities in order 
to their being plac’d forth to sea service that he had often in vain, and to ye loss of 
a great deale of time attended them about y
e
 same, not only to his & of y
e
 
Children’s great discouragement but also as he conceived, of good Maisters, who 
would have taken y
s
 Children.
117
 
The children themselves also complained of being ill-treated by Richard Norris who they 
claimed had refused to give a good account of their examinations while the questions they were 
asked were unfair and unexpected. In response the mathematical committee told the children to 
follow the instructions of Pagett as the committee had found to be a “learned and able 
Mathematician whatever Mr. Norris said to the contrary.” Furthermore, it was promised “that the 
Court [of Governors] would take care that they should receive no discouragem
t
 at the Trinity 
house when they were sent thither for their Examination.” The committee went on to note they 
had “put to Mr. Norris his unwarrantable proceedings of Endeavour to set the said Children 
against their Master at his very first Entrance upon his worke.”118 As independent audits of the 
students also frequently found shortfalls in their education, the tendency to blame Trinity House 
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was likely motivated by self-preservation; however, it is clear that Trinity House was frequently 
obstructionist and the relationship fractious. Norris, in particular, was likely unfavourable to 
Pagett because he had also been one of the candidates for the position of mathematical master 
and resented Pagett for being given the job for which he believed himself to be more qualified.
119
 
Indeed, Norris was so antagonistic toward Pagett’s pupils that it was suggested it was “wholly 
inexpedient” that Norris continue to examine the boys.120 The removal of Norris as examiner, 
however, did not resolve the problems as the examiners continued to find the boys to be 
insufficient in learning.
121
 
 The tensions continued after Pagett resigned. While Pagett’s difficulties might have been 
brought on by personal antagonisms, in the 1690 there were different, significant reasons why 
members of Trinity House might have been biased against the Royal Mathematical School. The 
principal reason was the change in the political situation following the 1688 revolution. This 
caused problems for the Royal Mathematical School being the School was closely associated 
with Charles II and James II. The fallout of such a political association became evident when 
Samuel Pepys, who was particularly close to James II and had High Church leanings, returned to 
involvement in the school around 1694.
122
 The political situation of the Anglican Church was 
certainly one of the factors that led Flamsteed to dislike Nathaniel Hawes whom he described in 
a letter to Isaac Newton as, “a stiffe formall Churchman, and a freind of those who dissent from 
the present establishment.”123 Like Pagett, Samuel Newton almost immediately ran into 
difficulties with Trinity House and went so far as to resign from his position proclaiming that 
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opposition from Sir Matthew Andrews, Joseph Lane and Mr. Midgley made it impossible for 
him to carry out his duties, though a few months later he successfully petitioned to have his job 
back.
124
 Newton’s resignation followed a December 15, 1695 report from Trinity House saying 
“taking them together, they are…the worst set of Boyes we doe remember to have any at any 
time come to us.”125 
By 1695 Samuel Pepys had not been involved with the school for over a decade, but at 
this point he began to take an interest again. Pepys wrote to Matthew Andrews to ask about the 
progress of the mathematical boys; however, his inquiries were rebuffed. Pepys did not take the 
slight well and wrote to Andrews that “I have a great deal to say to you which you will bee sorry 
for, at our next meeting.”126 Pepys went on to request that Andrews speak to the masters of two 
boys who had been recently bound to a captain that the boys might be sent to Pepys so that he 
could better gauge the situation. Andrews agreed to do so and concurred with Pepys’s view that 
the present lack of learning by the children at the Mathematical School was due to Pagett’s 
absences over the previous two years. While the first set of boys sent to Trinity House by 
Newton to be tested performed very poorly, Pepys, at least, did not see Newton as particularly to 
blame. Upon Newton’s election he noted that Newton had been recommended to him and he had 
“no reason of doubting his being a learned & virtuous man; but on ye contrary have much ground 
of expecting far great fruit from him than wee either had or could ever expect from Mr. Pagett’s 
method of Management.” Even though Newton did not have direct experience as at sea, he had 
spent several years teaching mathematics at Yarmouth and, therefore, at least “been in ye way of 
seeing & conversing more with the People & Business of Navigation.”127 Shortly later, Pepys 
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met with Newton in person and “as so farr as my short Conversation wth him can warrant it, I 
have mighty hope of seeing the Roy
ll 
Foundation recover through y
e
 Industry, Practice, & 
Sobriety of this Gent
m.”128  
Pepys’s impression of Newton, thus, was quite different from that of John Flamsteed, for 
whom the election of Newton to replace Pagett was a further sign of the incompetent 
management at the School. The difference between how Pepys and Flamsteed regarded Newton 
had little to do with whether or not Newton was a competent teacher of navigation, and much 
more to do with how they believed navigation was best taught. Pepys, as he had written in 1682, 
thought the most important thing was that the mathematics master be someone who had actual 
experience with navigation and, thus, would be able to teach the actual practice of navigation. As 
one of the leading astronomers in the world, Flamsteed had a different view. It was not practice 
that he regarded as most important, but a more advanced understanding of mathematics and 
astronomy that was crucial if navigation was to be advanced. A significant difference that must 
be recognized here is that Pepys was primarily concerned that navigators aboard naval ships 
would be competent in executing their duties; Flamsteed, on the other hand, was more interested 
in the theoretical advancement of navigation as a discipline. It was this same bias that led Isaac 
Newton to disregard the improvement of mechanical marine timekeepers as solving the 
longitude because such a method would only enable a navigator to keep the longitude, it would 
not aid in the finding of it.
129
 
After Newton returned to the School following his initial resignation, he seems to have 
applied himself diligently enough though the pupils continued to have gaps in their knowledge, 
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they were now judged that “they may be capable of entering into a practice of the Art of 
Navigation, and being put out apprentices.”130 While this was not the most enthusiastic 
endorsement, it was really all that was required of the boys. They were, after all, going to sea not 
as ready navigators, but as apprentices. Newton’s time as mathematical master was not without 
difficulties and he never seems to have been able to teach his students to the full satisfaction of 
the masters at Trinity House; however, for significant portions of his time in charge he was at 
least able to execute his duties well enough for what was needed. Much the same can be said of 
Edward Pagett. The harsh assessment of their tenures is in part because of controversies at the 
beginning and end of their time as mathematical master while ignoring the more placid periods 
in between. Pagett, in particular, was undone more by ill-health than anything to do with his 
teaching. Similarly, Robert Wood’s failures coincided with significant family tragedies. His two 
children were intended to live with him at Christ’s Hospital; however, his daughter almost 
immediately fell ill and had to return to the country. His son continued to reside with him, but, 
too, became sick and died after two months. His wife was hit hard by the death of her child as 
“thereupon Grief & some Friends prevailed with his Wife to retire agne into ye Country.”131 
While Wood and his wife intended for the family to return to London in the future, as smallpox 
was endemic at the time, his wife and remaining child continued to live in the country. It should 
not be surprising that Wood found himself unable to attend to his duties with the fullness of heart 
and mind in such circumstances and instead kept to his rooms while leaving an usher in charge. 
The poor results by the mathematical boys when examined was not the only major charge 
against the various instructors as they, unsurprisingly, also frequently had difficulty maintaining 
discipline of their charge of fourteen to sixteen year old boys. Poor discipline and irreligion was 
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one of the principal charges against Wood; however, the most significant incident occurred while 
Samuel Newton was mathematical master. A group of seven boys left the school without leave 
and went to visit one of the recently apprenticed boys on board his ship and proceeded to get 
drunk and unruly. Furthermore, three of the boys had gone to a public house and even worse one 
of them had participated in a lottery and lost two shillings. They did not return to the school until 
after bedtime. As a result of this incident, the governors decided to remove the boys’ badges in 
front of the whole school as punishment and then it was later decided to add expulsion to the 
previous punishment. However, a short time later five of the boys had their badges restored and 
despite the supposed expulsion, all seven of the boys were eventually apprenticed out.
132
  
Though Wood and Newton received more attention for the indiscipline of the students, it 
is not clear that the other teachers faired particularly better. For instance, while Peter Perkins is 
generally regarded as having been an effective teacher, in large part likely because he worked 
closely with Flamsteed on a number of experiments and died relatively soon after receiving the 
position and without a protracted illness. This combination meant that he did not have time for 
the school to go into ‘decline’ and then Flamsteed continued to support Perkins’s reputation for 
the next thirty years.
133
 Perkins, however, too found the boys difficult to manage at times. For 
example, a boy named Richard Wilkins was so troublesome that Perkins went before the Court 
of Governors to complain that Wilkins was refusing to do his lessons and had persuaded a 
number of his classmates to join him in his rebellion.
134
 Meanwhile, during the tenure of James 
Hodgson, a group of mathematical boys were called before the court due to “Rude and indecent 
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behaviour towards Mr. Mountfort the Gramar Master at the time of Catchchise.”135 Indeed, in his 
history of Christ’s Hospital, E.H. Pierce noted the mathematical students had an unruly 
reputation that lasted until the nineteenth century.
136
 
When the Royal Mathematical School was established, its founders were primarily 
concerned with the Navy. It was presumed that the mathematical students would be apprenticed 
aboard naval ships and begin a career in naval service. In a long discourse he wrote Christ’s 
Hospital’s governors in 1677, Samuel Pepys expressed particularly high ambitions: 
His Maj
tie
 designe a Nursery for persons of Art & such as may bee able to serve 
him & their Country, not by Rote & uncertainty, but with Method & Theory, able 
to inform and correct others, and this not barely as ordinary Seamen unfit for any 
other service then what is strictly confined with the Conduct of a ship, But as 
persons fitted (in faire writing Accounts and Language) to serve him in any 
negotiation at sea or in forrein parts, to treate with forrein Governors, To reside, 
as Consuls, To keep acc
ts
 as Purs
rs
, Clercks, or Other officers of the Navy, to serve 
as secretary, to Admiralls, & as they shall rise to it bee qualified for the Executing 
of duties of Commanders themselves, with an advantage of being able to draw or 
dictate Orders, Letters, Instructions, Articles of Treaty, and other works of 
Secretaries and Negotiation beyond what the ordinary Educaon of bare 
Tarpawling can ever arrive at.
137
 
The alumni of the Royal Mathematical School never achieved Pepys’s lofty dreams. The quality 
of their education might not have met Pepys’s satisfaction, but it was not the instruction that 
prevented the children from reaching such status. British society was deeply defined by class and 
the Navy was no different. Social connections were paramount for one’s ability to advance. 
According to Nicholas Rodger, “the most prominent social pattern in the Navy was not birth but 
connection.”138 As the Navy was “physical embodiment of England’s political and religious 
freedom,” and because Naval captains were often called upon to fill diplomatic functions, it 
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became increasingly imperative that officers were drawn from the class of educated gentlemen 
and would, therefore, be comfortable in such social settings.
139
 
 If they did not reach Pepys’s ideal, it is also unclear whether the more modest ambition of 
supplying the Navy with a sober, educated and competent compliment of navigators was attained 
either. Certainly, in its early days it was found to be very difficult to place boys on board ships. It 
was only after a fund was initiated to provide a payment to captains who took a boy as an 
apprentice that this difficulty became alleviated. While they were now able to find masters for 
the mathematical boys, these masters often did not live up to expectations. Indeed, the provision 
of money meant that those who took boys as apprentices had their motivations questioned. As 
Pepys put it, “these Children are sometimes put to Masters wch these Gentlem declare they would 
not put a Footman to, as having either no skill to examine them & then their Learning is lost, or 
are indigent & take y
e
 Boys onely for their Money.”140  
The Navy had been the intended destination; however, the Navy was not particularly in 
need of the boys until the early eighteenth century. Thus, the vast majority were apprenticed into 
merchant service. The East Indies was the most common destination for the mathematical 
students with the Caribbean, Virginia and the ‘The Streights’ (Straits of Gibraltar) as next three 
most frequent.
141
 As it was put in Christ’s Hospital’s committee book in 1690, “the chief source 
of foreign service for our boys came from the East India Company, who were long the Hospital’s 
‘tenants at a very low rate.’”142 The East India Company might have taken the most boys, but 
was only one of places where mathematical students found employment. Christ’s Hospital kept 
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relatively detailed accounts of to whom the different boys were apprenticed (see Figure 1.2 
below), which show that the mathematical students were widely dispersed amongst English 
ships. The proliferation of mathematical boys throughout the maritime world lends some 
credence to the assumption that the school was well-known and regarded. 
 
Figure 1.2: Destinations of Ships at Time of Apprenticeship, 1675-1702 
(LMA CLC/210/F/014/MS12875) 
Such a perspective can be seen in Harry Dickinson’s account of naval education in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Dickinson sought to challenge a standard view that on board 
schoolmasters were of little importance and that they were far more common than had typically 
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been believed. The position of schoolmaster was created in 1702 and added £20 a year to a 
midshipman’s pay; however, it had generally been held that few took the position until F.B. 
Sullivan’s analysis of the Trinity House and Admiralty records between counted 394 individuals 
who served as ship’s teachers between 1712 and 1824.143 Allowing for gaps and unofficial 
teaching, Dickinson suggests a figure of 500-600 to be closer to the actual number.
144
 This 
number is significant; however, it was spread out over the years between 1702 and 1824. 
Considering that the number of seamen in the English Navy grew from 33,000 in 1702 to 47,000 
between 1709-11 and had approximately 150 ships in service, the number of school teachers 
aboard naval ships remained quite small.
145
 Furthermore, it is unclear how useful their teaching 
was. For example, Captain John Cremer’s memory of his onboard education was highly negative 
saying “Wee all Leant to write, Read, Arrithmatick, and began Lattin,” but while all their 
“inclinations was for to learne Navigation, which was out of our Master’s knowledge. As for 
Lattin I mortally hated it.”146 That said, Cremer did obtain a reasonable level of literacy in 
English at least. 
Certainly, the number was well below what had been hoped. While the position had been 
created in 1702, until 1720 most vacancy remained unfilled. The Order of Council wanted ninety 
schoolmasters at any time, but the average between 1713 and 1720 was only twenty-five and 
after 1720 the numbers fell off significantly.
147
 Thus, while Dickinson has pointed to the Royal 
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Mathematical School as a major source of schoolmasters, it was clearly not the principal 
destination for most considering the school put over five hundred students into marine service 
between 1675 and 1732 alone. Though Dickinson has demonstrated that organized education 
was significantly more available in the Royal Navy than had been typically believed, he 
concluded that naval education remained generally informal and subsumed by a system of 
patronage that was fiercely guarded by officers.
148
 Even after the opening in 1733 of the 
Portsmouth Naval Academy, under the direction of William Haseldon (a product of Christ’s 
Hospital), as many as ninety-eight percent of officers bypassed the Academy and continued to 
proceed directly to sea through family connections.
149
 
Unfortunately, it has not been possible to this point to follow the mathematical students 
after they left the Royal Mathematical School and began their indentures. The vast majority did 
not obtain any fame and I have been unable to find records of more than a handful as adults. 
There is an asymmetry between the prominence accorded to the Royal Mathematical School and 
its actual results. The apparent obscurity of the mathematical boys upon leaving the school 
undermines the view put forward by Ellerton and Clements that the Royal Mathematical School 
played a defining role in the development of mathematical education. In particular, Ellerton and 
Clements point to James Hodgson as the key figure in the history of secondary school 
mathematics.
150
 
In its early years much attention was paid to the incompetence of its instructors and the 
dismal results of its students; however, after James Hodgson became mathematical master in 
1709 such complaints largely ceased. Perhaps this was due to his greater abilities as an 
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instructor. More important, however, was his social prominence in fashionable London. Unlike 
Wood, Pagett or Newton, Hodgson was a member of the Royal Society and frequently attended 
their meetings as well as being a regular in London Coffeehouses. Hodgson’s credentials were 
further bolstered by collaborations with Frances Hawksbee and contributions to the 
Philosophical Transactions. Furthermore, he was Christopher Wren’s nephew, a former assistant 
to the Astronomer Royal John Flamsteed and was married to Flamsteed’s niece.  
Hodgson, thus, was inherently in a much stronger position than previous mathematical 
masters had been. Hodgson’s credentials were strong as he had spent several years in London as 
a lecturer of experimental philosophy as well as having been Flamsteed’s assistant, though, like 
all the previous mathematical masters he too lacked experience at sea. Furthermore, he was a 
member of the Royal Society and a regular in London’s coffeehouses. Finally, the idea that the 
school should hire one of Flamsteed’s assistants for the job had been around for a while. 
Abraham Sharp, had been previously solicited for the position by Edmond Halley amongst 
others, which Sharp declined because he “had no inclination for so laborious a confinement, 
being better pleased with an easier though less advantageous employment.”151 Sharp’s response 
points to inherent difficulty faced by the school in that the most capable candidates for the job 
were likely to have better alternatives available to them.
152
 Halley, for example, aside from being 
wealthy enough not to need a job, especially one as demanding as schoolmaster at Christ’s 
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Hospital, would become Savilian Professor of Geometry at Oxford after John Wallis’s death 
1702. Similarly, the Oxford mathematician John Caswell had put his name in for the job in 1695 
he did not turn up for the interview, perhaps because he concluded he had better prospects if he 
stayed in Oxford.
153
 At any rate, Caswell, too, would later become a Savilian Professor (in 
Astronomy) at Oxford succeeding David Gregory in 1709. 
 After the tumult of the first thirty years, the Royal Mathematical School certainly appears 
to have been far more stable and effective under Hodgson, which has generally led to the 
assumption that the early mathematical schoolmasters were principally to blame for the 
difficulties faced by the school. Elleteron and Clements have put the argument most directly, 
arguing that “it was Hodgson who vindicated the faith of Samuel Pepys in the possible viability 
of the radical model that RMS's creation, in 1673, represented.”154 E.G.R. Taylor, however, 
suggested a somewhat different interpretation for the change in the school’s fortunes after 
Hodgson’s appointment. Rather than Hodgson being significantly more competent, she argued 
that it “was due in part to the change that had taken place in the status of mathematics,” a 
position that aligns well with Nicholas Hans’s thesis.155 Based on my investigation of the 
available institutional documents, it seems clear to me that, while the school became 
significantly more stable from the perspective of the continuity of its leadership, it continued to 
be plagued with difficulties. For example, the curriculum remained undefined and a matter of 
debate as late as 1729. In 1725, having already held the position for fifteen years, Hodgson 
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presented his two volume system of mathematics to be used by the mathematical students.
156
 
Hodgson’s scheme, however, was apparently overly ambitious for the school’s needs.  
As had consistently been the case for previous mathematical masters, Hodgson found it 
difficult to move the students through the mathematical school on schedule. Thus, the 
mathematical committee developed its own scheme of learning to serve as “a means to prevent 
the excessive ages which the Boys of that ffoundation are apt to Arrive,” which was approved on 
March 20
th
, 1728/29 and Hodgson was ordered to follow the new system: 
1
st
. Vulgar and Decimal ffractions with the Extraction of the Square and Cube 
Roots 
2
nd
. The Usefull Methods for finding the Golden number, Epact, Moons Age time 
of His Southing, as also the time of High Water in any Ports. 
3
d
. The Principalls of Geometry in the Delineation or Construction of such 
Problems as are usefull and necessary in the following Articles. 
4
th
. Plain and Sphereical Trigonometry Geometrically, Arithmetically, 
Instrumentally performed in all the various cases of Rectangular & oblique 
Angular Triangles. 
5
th
. The use of the Globes Celestial and Terrestiall. 
6
th.
 Spherical Triangles applyed to the Solution of such Problems in Astronomy as 
are necessary for finding the Suns Amplitude Azimuth Latitute of the [illegible] 
and Hour of the Day and Night. 
7
th
. Plain Sailing namely the working of Traverses, the Solution of all Plain 
Saleing Questions Geometrically Arithmetically and Instrumentally with the 
Application of Plain Triangles to Oblique Sailing and the Doctrine of Currents. 
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8
th
. Mercators Sailing to be don in all Respects as Plain Saleing in Article the 
Sixth. 
9
th
. The use of Instruments proper for observing the Altitude Amplitude and 
Azimuth of the Sun and fixed Stars such as the Quadrant, cross staff and Azimuth 
or Amplitude Compass with the use of the observations thus made in finding the 
Latitude the Ships is in and the variation of the Compass. 
10
th
. The Construction and use of the Plain and Mercators Sea Charts.
157
 
The rejection of Hodgson’s system in favour of this revised system points to a continuing tension 
between the mathematical school as being principally concerned with teaching practical skills 
versus one which emphasized mathematical theory.
158
 This conflict was at the heart of John 
Flamsteed’s criticism of the school. For Flamsteed, advanced mathematics and astronomy were 
crucial training because he hoped for the school to serve a role in the advancement of navigation 
as a science. Advanced mathematics and astronomy did not serve a purpose for navigational 
practice at the time, but were necessary for the development of astronomical theories needed for 
navigation to become more accurate. Foremost, this meant solving the longitude problem, but 
from a more immediate point-of-view was also necessary for the improvement of charts and 
maps as most of the ones in common use had significant inaccuracies. In many cases the latitude 
and longitude were not even known, which rendered the ability to find the ability to find the 
longitude at sea rather irrelevant.
159
 
Conclusion 
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The Royal Mathematical School was viewed by Nicolas Hans and more recently by 
Ellerton and Clements as representing a crucial shift in English education toward increasingly 
vocational and practical and the School has been cited as playing a key role in navigation in the 
eighteenth century. I would suggest, however, that it should be associated more closely with 
questions of charity, morality and regard for the poor in seventeenth and eighteenth-century 
England.
160
 A great number of influential members of London’s community of natural 
philosophers took an active interest in the Royal Mathematical School. Edmund Halley, Isaac 
Newton, John Flamsteed and Samuel Pepys all appear in the court minutes as having been school 
governors. Newton, Halley, Flamsteed and Hooke were all enlisted at one point or another to 
fulfill duties such as carrying out audits of the school.  
Following Hodgson’s death in 1755, a number of the mathematical masters had 
connections with important institutions of the day. For example, Hodgson’s immediate 
successor, John Robertson resigned from the position in order to take up the post of headmaster 
at the Portsmouth Naval Academy. Williams Dawes, meanwhile, had traveled to Botany Bay 
with the support of the Board of Longitude in order to carry out nautical and astronomical 
observations. Finally, William Wales had preceded his appointment in 1775 by observing the 
transit of Venus in 1769 from Hudson’s Bay and serving as the astronomer aboard the Resolution 
during James Cook’s second voyage. These later mathematical masters demonstrate that the 
school was eventually able to attract the kind of mathematical master Pepys had desired; 
however, it remains less clear to what extent these men, experienced in navigation and 
knowledgeable of astronomy and mathematics as they were, serve as a demonstration that the 
school was a training ground for the improvement of English navigation. Indeed, in a society that 
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did not provide social welfare and in which many aspiring members of the professional classes 
were in a constantly tenuous position, an institution such as the Royal Mathematical School 
might be better understood as another means of patronage. 
This chapter has provided a lengthy treatment of the Royal Mathematical School because 
the school has a rather unique position in the history of navigation and astronomy in early-
modern Britain. Though I am cautious about according the school a significant role in the actual 
development or even practice of navigation during the eighteenth century, the discussions around 
the school and controversies that it faced are highly instructive. One of the major themes that 
unite the different chapters of this thesis is that of institutional practice. I am particularly 
concerned to understand the contradictions between agency and actions within an institution 
versus expectations and the perspective toward the given institution from those on the immediate 
outside. In the next chapter, I will move from this single example of the navigational pedagogy 
to an account of the actual practice of navigation from the point-of-view of long-distance control. 
Thus, in keeping with the preceding discussion of the Royal Mathematical School, my analysis 
of eighteenth-century navigation will seek to place it within an institutional setting and focus on 
the tensions between navigation as a day-to-day practice versus the institutional needs of 
navigation as Britain became increasingly a naval, imperial and commercial power. 
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Chapter Two 
Expertise in Practice: Navigation and the Problem of Long-Distance Control 
In his journal the British Naval officer and future Baron of Longford Edward Pakenham 
described the 1758 wreck of the Lichfield, which he had witnessed from the Dunkirk: 
We thought we saw Land, but could hardly believe so as we were so far distant by 
our Reckoning, but in a few minutes as it grew lighter we found it really was the 
Land…If it had been dark a quarter of an hour longer, it would have been 
impossible for any ship in the Fleet to have escaped.
1
 
For Pakenham the accident was a clear result of navigational failure, which he demonstrated in 
the chart he drew to plot their error (see Figure 2.1).
2
 While “most People seemd to impute this 
error to the indraught of the Streights, if it was to that onely it must be much greater than is 
generally supposed;” Pakenham was “apprehensive that we were not sufficiently accurate in 
determining the variation of the Compass, an omission that is too common, and that we did not 
allow west variation enough.”3 The imprecision of navigation in the eighteenth century has long 
been recognized by historians as a significant problem in marine history and more recently to the 
histories of science and technology. Yet, it is less clear mariners in the eighteenth century 
regarded such limitations and imprecision to have been as significant as is commonly presumed 
to outsiders.  
                                                 
1
 “Journal, Vol I., of the of HMS DUNKIRK, NEPTUNE, TERROR, BLENHEIM, ROMNEY, Storeship, CROWN, 
BONETTA, SHEERNESS, AMERICA, ALEXANDER, 28 Mar 1758-Jun 1779,” 28 November, 1758, Caird 
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2
 Pakenham’s chart can be found in PAK/1, opposite f. 28. The image in this dissertation was provided by Richard 
Dunn. 
3
 PAK/1, f. 28. 
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Figure 2.1: Edward Pakenham's Chart of the Lichfield Accident 
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When Samuel Pepys traveled by sea to the Tangiers in 1683, he was shocked by the crudity 
of navigational techniques and described them as doing little more than keeping watch for land.
4
 
The reality, however, was that standard practice, which involved a combination of dead-
reckoning and the use of a variety of increasingly sophisticated instruments was far more 
effective than detractors would have had it.
5
 Moreover, methods that depended on greater 
mathematical and theoretical knowledge were no more accurate at the time and were very 
labourious and difficult to execute even on land. Responding to a query about the means by 
which the longitude problem would be solved, Isaac Newton noted that he had never met a ship 
captain who found the problem to be a grave concern. Moreover, in one of his draft replies, 
Newton wryly observed that he had never been to sea “& therefore my opinion is not much to be 
relied on.”6  
In this chapter, I seek to build upon the principles outlined in the first chapter in order to 
re-position the practice of navigation in the eighteenth century, and debates which surrounded it, 
as part of a larger narrative regarding the problem of long-distance control. That bureaucrats like 
Pepys, the Parliamentarians who established the Longitude Prize and astronomers such as John 
Flamsteed regarded navigation as a problem that needed to be solved, while practicing navigators 
largely did not is telling. Even more telling, I would argue, is the way in which the practical day-
to-day reality of doing navigation has been obscured by a heroic account of the overcoming of 
the inability to find the longitude at sea to the salvation of mariners world over. My aim is to 
emphasize the practice of navigation rather than the innovations of astronomical science and to 
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put debates such as the longitude problem into the context of the British state and the commercial 
economy of the early eighteenth century. 
As I discussed in the introduction to Part One, capitalism and global trade necessitated 
the further development of commercial technologies that could operate over long-distances. 
Thus, at the same time that experimental philosophy was developing new methods of 
establishing credibility, merchants were dealing with the same set of problems, but on a larger 
scale: how does one define credibility and assert authority over distance and outside of 
immediate personal experience?
7
 Navigation, as seen most clearly with the longitude problem, is 
fundamental to understanding the imperial bureaucratic view of the world. Long-distance control 
was an ideal that was never even close to being achieved; however, its pursuit would profoundly 
shape the way in which knowledge was produced, consumed and circulated. In the case of 
navigation, I argue that it was the challenge of long-distance control that made the longitude 
problem a cause celebre of the eighteenth century. In this chapter I engage with the specific 
dispute over authority between Edmond Halley and his first mate Edward Harrison for the 
purpose of taking the problem of expertise discussed in the previous chapter and demonstrating 
how these tensions played out in practice on board English ships. 
The Problem of Long-Distance Control 
 In a 1986 article, the sociologist of science John Law wrote that:  
Columbus’s discovery of the New World in 1492, when taken with the arrival of 
heavily armed Portuguese vessels in the Indian Ocean in 1498, clearly marks an 
important turning point in the balance of power between Europe and the rest of 
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the world. From that moment onwards until the very recent past the rest of the 
world has been under European control and domination.
8
  
Law argued that Portugual’s success—and European domination more generally—was due to it 
successfully managing long distance control and, therefore, created the conditions that made 
imperialism possible. Law’s view was consistent with Actor-Network Theory, of which he has 
been a key proponent, and the parallels between Law’s argument in this article and Bruno 
Latour’s model of centres of calculation as presented in Science in Action are clear. From the 
perspective of a historian, however, Law’s claims are problematic. Europe was neither 
economically or politically hegemonic prior to the late eighteenth century.
9
  
The third and fourth chapters of this dissertation will use some key examples from the 
English East India Company to demonstrate that the historical evidence does not support Law’s 
representation of Europe as a hegemonic power. Rather, the records indicate the weakness of the 
European position in the East at the time period being covered by this dissertation. It is my 
argument that an investigation of the archives of the English East India Company shows that the 
kind of metropolitan conceptions of the production and transfer of knowledge at the heart of Law 
and Latour’s Actor-Network Theory is untenable in terms of European globalization prior to the 
latter eighteenth century. Due to Law’s focus on the example of navigation, his argument is 
particularly significant for this chapter. Law wished to demonstrate a sociological theory and his 
evidence is macroscopic in scope. In contrast, this chapter takes a more microscopic approach 
and seeks to understand how navigation was executed on a day-to-day basis. 
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Navigation as Practice 
 Navigation in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was a site of contested expertise. 
Practicing navigators were not educated or elite. Navigators filled a necessary function, but their 
practice was not necessarily imbued with theoretical ambitions. As Margaret Schotte has argued, 
“navigators could be framed as authorities but were more frequently disdained due to their low 
status.”10 While the traditional practices of navigation have not always been accorded respect, 
they were indispensable to successful marine travel. I attempt to keep in mind the daily practice 
of navigation because doing so points to other possibilities for early-modern expertise; 
possibilities that challenge the tendency to emphasize elite education and privilege those who 
attained a greater social status. In this chapter I seek to offer an alternative account of the dispute 
between the Edmond Halley and his chief-mate Edward Harrison during Halley’s first Paramore 
voyage at the end of the seventeenth century. Instead of a fight between a ship captain and an 
insubordinate and jealous officer stirring up mutiny, which was how Halley presented the 
incident, I read the affair as being fundamentally to do with the contested nature of expertise and 
very real threats to Harrison’s claims to authority. That Harrison is remembered almost entirely 
according to Halley’s assessment of the man is telling about how expertise has been framed in 
science and technology studies. 
The controversy is valuable in this context because of both the way in which it 
illuminates issues of control and social order on board ships and because it was specifically 
about what constituted good navigational practice. Halley, moreover, is interesting in relation to 
the idea of the mundane daily practice because he was at the forefront of English astronomy and 
natural philosophy as a former protégé of the Astronomer Royal John Flamsteed—though the 
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two had fallen out around 1686—and close associate with Isaac Newton. Most significantly, the 
first Paramore voyage was explicitly conceived with the hope of improving navigation as Halley 
sought to complete an accurate chart of the variation of the compass. In the final part of the 
chapter I will return to the question of long-distance control with which the chapter opened and 
use the notion of the mundane daily practice of navigation. The example of navigation given in 
this chapter is intended to provide a robust pushback to John Law’s theory of long-distance 
control in order to suggest a more historically grounded account that more accurately fits the 
reality of the early eighteenth century. 
While logbooks were used to track the position of the ship that was only one of several 
purposes for which they were kept. The information entered into them varied, as did the way in 
which they were structured. Though the Navy increasingly standardized logbooks as the 
eighteenth-century progressed, they were often quite variable in practice and appearance.
11
 They 
necessarily recorded the same basic information. Most significantly were the regular record of 
the ship’s speed as measured by the log-line, the direction the ship was traveling, the direction of 
the wind and current. This information was used to estimate the current location of the ship by 
adding up the measurements of how the ship’s speed and off-setting that number with 
countervailing circumstances. Navigation was not the only purpose of logbooks as they also 
contained regular observations of the weather, accounts of disciplinary actions taken against 
crew members, the status of the rations on board the ship and any replenishing that was carried 
out, other ships they met, any illnesses and deaths during the voyage, and a great deal of other 
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valuable historical information.
12
 Thus, the logbook was not simply a tool for navigation, but 
was a complete record of the voyage. Indeed, as the accounts of punishments carried out on the 
ship makes clear, the logbook served an important disciplinary role. One of the arguments of this 
chapter is that all of the data entered in the logbook served a disciplinary purpose. Indeed, the 
logbook was a crucial tool in the effort by the centre to impose long-distance control against an  
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intransigent periphery. Thus, organizations such as the navy or the English East India Company 
explicitly required their crews to keep detailed records of every voyage, which were to be handed 
in upon the ship’s return to England. 
The logbook was only one of a litany of paperwork, much of which was not only tedious 
to keep, but frequently irrelevant as far as the captains were concerned. As J.D. Davies has 
observed, the Navy Board required regular muster books to be sent to London and did not make 
exceptions even when doing so was physically impossible. In her history of the early-modern 
logbook, Margaret Schotte argued “New centralized institutions allowed authorities to shape—
and to exploit—the logbook for their own interests.”13 Detailed accounts were demanded so as to 
demonstrate that the captain was following orders. Yet, in practice ship captains were frequently 
able to circumvent such strictures. Though the failure to comply with these strictures resulted in 
the withholding of pay, “captains frequently resisted and claimed they had ‘lost’ the required 
paperwork in various natural disasters or that they had never received the instructions or 
necessary books.”14 Global sea travel was a complex web of overlapping and frequently 
contradictory hierarchies of power.  
Thus, individual actors within the Admiralty were in conflict with each other, the 
Admiralty was in conflict with Parliament, individual captains were in conflict with the naval 
administration and the Admiralty and crews were in conflict with their officers. In this frequently 
messy environment, then, paperwork was intended to serve a necessary function of rendering 
transparent events that occurred outside of geographical and temporal control of the 
administration. In immediate terms, the naval administration or the East India Company could do 
little to insure their instructions were carried out by their agents. By demanding detailed records, 
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however, they were theoretically able to retain a degree of control. It is important to recognize 
that such institutions were not monoliths and represented a number of conflicting interests. 
Moreover, there was significant latitude for resistance and mariners frequently exercised their 
power. The example of the Paramore voyages of Edmond Halley usefully demonstrates many of 
the themes and arguments that have been made in the first section of this chapter while drawing 
the conversation into a broader account of the relationships between navigation and astronomy 
and between natural philosophy and the modern nation-state as described by John Brewer and 
Michel Foucault.
15
  
The Paramore Voyages 
 
Figure 2.3: Map of Halley's first Paramore Voyage, in The Three Voyages of Edmond 
Halley in the Paramore, 1698-1701, edited by Norman  J.W. Thrower (London: The 
Hakluyt Society, 1981). 
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In 1693 Edmond Halley and Benjamin Middleton proposed to the Navy Board that they 
would: 
Undertake a Voyage, wherein he [Middleton] proposes to incompass the whole 
Globe from East to West, in order to the describeing and laying downe in their 
true Positions, Such Coasts, Ports and Islands, as the Weather will permit to some 
of which possibly Advantageous Trade may be found. And to endeavour to get 
full information of the Nature of the Variation of the Compasse over the whole 
Earth, as Likewise to experiment what may be expected from Severall Methods 
proposed for discovereing the Longitude at Sea.
16
 
Halley was young, ambitious, skilled in astronomy and mathematics and well-connected as a 
member of the Royal Society and close associate of Isaac Newton, for whom Halley had just 
seen the Principia through the press. Moreover, unlike other leading English astronomers such as 
Newton or the Astronomer Royal John Flamsteed, Halley had first-hand experience with the sea 
as he had left Oxford in 1676 to travel to the South Sea and produce a map of the Southern Stars. 
Middleton, too, was a fellow of the Royal Society. His father had been Colonel Thomas 
Middleton, who had managed the dockyards at Portsmouth and Chatham and was a friend of 
Samuel Pepys.
17
 The project was approved and a ship, named the Paramore, began to be 
prepared for his use, but its ambitions would quickly be diminished from circumnavigating the 
globe to a voyage only to the South Atlantic. Ultimately, Halley would make three voyages 
aboard the Paramore between 1698 and 1701. The first two voyages were to the South Atlantic 
and resulted in Halley’s chart of magnetic variation, while the third remained closer to home as 
Halley surveyed the Channel and produced a tidal chart that would not be superseded for over a 
century. Thus, the third voyage was an unqualified success. The first two, however, were rather 
more controversial. 
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 The problems began for Halley from the outset and centred on the officers he had been 
provided by the Navy. As Alan Cook has pointed out, Halley was in a difficult situation as 
commander of the Paramore because his status was ambiguous. Halley had significant 
knowledge of seamanship due to his voyage to the South Sea, his hydrographic surveys of the 
Thames and the coast of West Sussex and his experiments with the diving bell and diving suit. 
He did not, however, have any experience in command. Thus, Cook argued that while John 
Flamsteed would denigrate Halley as drinking and swearing like a sailor because “he no doubt 
had the landsman’s idea of him as a tarpaulin,” his lieutenant “despised him for his ignorance of 
nautical terms” and “saw him as a gentleman commander.”18 The weakness of Halley’s position 
was further compounded by the ambiguity of his rank. After he had completed the three voyages 
and retired from seamanship to take up a professorship at Oxford, Halley was treated as a non-
active naval officer holding the rank of captain. When Queen Anne sent him to the continent for 
a diplomatic mission in the early 1700s, he was introduced as colonel, which was regarded as the 
equivalent rank as captain. Yet, his rank during his actual voyages is less clear and if he had been 
given a formal rank it was not one earned through experience. As Greg Dening has shown with 
the example of Captain Bligh, such ambiguities in status and rank could serve to create and 
exacerbate tensions on board a ship and to undermine the authority of the ship’s commander. 
Dening argued that the issue with Bligh’s language was not that it was obscene, but “that Bligh’s 
bad language was the ambiguous language of his command.”19 Certainly, Halley’s relationship 
with his officers was not strong when he set out on his first voyage in October, 1698. 
 Halley recognized the potential conflicts before the Paramore had even left England. 
Having immediately hit bad weather, the Paramore quickly showed itself to be leaky and he 
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noted in his journal that he found the crew to be weak.
20
 He wrote to the Admiralty to ask for an 
additional five sailors, but his request was denied.
21
 Instead, the leaks were patched up and 
Halley left English waters in early December. As the Paramore ventured further from home, the 
tensions between Halley and his officers began to manifest themselves more strongly. In 
particular, Halley and his lieutenant and navigator Edward Harrison found themselves at 
loggerheads. Harrison had written a short book on navigation a few years earlier, for which 
Halley had written a highly critical, though anonymously published, review. Alan Cook 
dismissively summarized Harrison’s book as “scientifically and technically…poor, second-hand 
and ill-digested. It is shot through with aspersions on mathematicians, the manner is aggressive, 
and it shows a deep inferiority complex.”22 Though Halley did not realise his lieutenant was the 
same Edward Harrison until after they had returned to England, it is not entirely surprising that 
the two would come into conflict. 
 Both Halley and Harrison made observations and plotted the Paramore’s location on a 
daily basis. As Flamsteed received a copy of Harrison’s journal and recorded his observations, 
Alan Cook was able compare Harrison’s observations with Halley’s. Halley and Harrison had 
good agreement on latitude and magnetic variation; however, on the longitude they diverged 
substantially. The differing observations point to the unreliability of navigation at the time. It 
was not uncommon for multiple members of the crew to make regular independent observations 
and to plot the ship’s location on a daily basis. Moreover, it was not unusual for these 
observations to disagree or for the disagreement to be known. For example William Ratcliffe, the 
chief mate of the East India Company ship the Loyal Bliss, noted the divergence between his 
own calculations and those of the board as to the ship’s longitude writing that he found himself 
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to be “6” to ye west of ye board.”23 While Ratcliffe continued to record his own observations 
where they disagreed with the log line, he does not appear in his journal to have been either 
surprised or concerned about the deviations. Halley and Harrison did not demonstrate the same 
equanimity. On April 2, 1699, Halley recorded that: 
We were so farr to the Southward, that we could Scarce see the Island bareing 
NNW. my Lieuten
t
. then haveing the Watch clapt upon a wind, pretending that we 
ought to goe to Windward of the Island, and about the North end of it, whereas 
the Road is at the most Southerly part almost. he persisted in this Course, which 
was Contrary to my orders given overnight, and to all sence and reason, till I came 
upon Deck; when he was so farr from excusing it, that he pretended to justifie it; 
not without reflecting Language.
24
 
Ratcliffe had noted the difference between his own calculations and those of the ship’s log, but 
he did not challenge the course. Ratcliffe was on board an East India Company vessel that was 
following a prescribed and regular passage that had been undoubtedly experienced many times 
before by the ship’s commander, while this was Halley’s first real voyage away from the English 
coast. There was, however, more going on. Halley’s justification for his role as commander of 
the vessel and for the voyage as a whole was directly tied to his supposed expertise as an 
astronomer and mathematician and his familiarity with the latest navigational practices and 
theories. Meanwhile, Harrison’s position on the Paramore was expressly tied to his experience 
as a navigator. Thus, their disagreement over the course of the ship was tied directly to the status 
of each aboard the ship.  
The example of Ratcliffe suggests that in normal circumstances one set of observations 
would be accepted for the purpose of the voyage. If the principal objective was simply to get 
from one place to another, then the exact location at a given time was not particularly imperative. 
Halley, however, was producing a chart of magnetic variation. If the chart was to have any value, 
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it was essential that he could prove himself able to plot his location accurately. As well, 
according to his instructions, he was to test the different methods of navigation. The problem 
was that Halley’s observations made at sea were not accurate. Indeed, his judgment was so far 
off that it was notable even considering the unreliability of navigation at the time. On March 5, 
1699 Halley was able to make an observation of an eclipse of the moon, with which he 
concluded their current longitude to be 36° West of London. This observation differed notably 
from the longitude he had derived through latitude and dead reckoning, which gave their location 
as being 26° West.
25
 Halley had previously observed the lunar position at sea on February 17 
when they were close to the island of Fernando Loronho and just off the coast of Brazil. Thus, 
Halley had erred by 100 miles in 220.
26
 Such an incident was hardly likely to convince the 
already difficult Harrison of Halley’s expertise or that Halley’s judgment ought to be regarded as 
superior to his own. 
Such a significant error was not an isolated event during the first Paramore voyage. In 
June Halley recorded that he found “by my reckoning that I am 48 Leags. before the Shipp.” He 
attributed this discrepancy to “the shortness of our Logg line, the halfe Minute glass being full 
Measure.”27 Dead reckoning was not expected to be especially accurate and errors and deviations 
amongst observations were common. The objective of navigation was not to know precisely 
where one was at a given time, but to know close enough so as not result in tragedy. Halley’s 
mistakes are notable partly because of their magnitude, but also because of who he was and the 
scientific objectives that justified his voyage in the first place. As Cook has pointed out, such 
frequent and significant errors in Halley’s reckoning raises serious questions about his magnetic 
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chart.
28
 More immediately for Halley, there was a correspondence between his inability to keep 
an accurate location and the insubordination of his officers. Harrison, in particular, had 
pretentions of expertise, as demonstrated by his book on navigation. According to his account, he 
had served on six previous ships and had found the state of navigation in the Navy to be sorely 
lacking.
29
 Thus, Harrison was unlikely to respond to Halley’s errors with equanimity. Halley, 
meanwhile, as a gentleman, Fellow of the Royal Society and highly regarded astronomer was not 
likely to regard Harrison’s interventions as positive. Their differences turned out to be 
irreconcilable and by April Halley, “finding it absolutely necessary to change some of my 
officers,” decided to return to England early in order to do so.30 
Upon his arrival in England, Halley attempted to court martial Edward Harrison. As 
Halley put it in his explanation to the Admiralty: 
A further motive to hasten my return was the unreasonable carriage of my Mate 
and Lieutenant, who because perhaps I have not the whole Sea Directly so perfect 
as he, has for a long time made it his business to represent me, to the whole 
Shipps company, as a person wholy unqualified for the command their Lopps 
have given me, and declaring that he was sent on board here because their Lopps 
knew my insufficiency. Your Honour knew that my dislike of my Warrant 
Officers made me Petition their Lopps that my Mate might have the Commison of 
Lieutenant, therby the better to keep them in obedience, but with a quite contrary 
effect it has only served to animate him to attempt upon my Authority, and in 
order therto side with the said officers against me. On the fifth of this month he 
was pleased  so grosly to affront me, as to tell me before my Officers and Seamen 
on Deck, and afterwards owned it under his hand, that I was not only uncapable to 
take charge of the Pink, but even of a Longboat; upon which I desired him to keep 
his Cabbin for that night, and for the future I would take the charge of the Shipp 
my self, to shew him his mistake: and accordingly I have wacht in his steed ever 
since, and brought the Shipp well home from near the banks of Newfound Land, 
without the least assistance from him. The many abuses of this nature I have 
received from him, has very sensibly toucht me, and made my voyage very 
displeasing and uneasy to me, nor can I imagine the cause of it, having 
endeavoured all I could to oblige him, but in vain. I take it that he envys me my 
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command and conveniencies on board, disdaining to be under one that has not 
served in the fleet as long as himself, but however it be I am sure their Lopps will 
think this intolerable usage, from one ought to be as my right hand, and by his 
example my Warrant Officers have not used me much Better; so that if I may 
hope to proceed again I must entreat their Lopps to give me others in their room.
31
 
The Admiralty acknowledged Halley’s complaint and instigated a court martial upon the 
Paramore’s arrival in the Downes.32 The Court Martials Enquiry, however, concluded that:  
Halley has produced nothing to prove y
t 
y
e
 said Officers have at any time 
disobey’d or denyed his Command thô there may have been some grumbling 
among them as there is generally in Small Vessels under such Circumstances & 
therefore y
e
 Court does Accquitt y
e
 S
d
 L
t
 Harrison & the other Officers of his 
Maj
ties
 Pink y
e
 Paramour of this Matter giving them a Severe reprimand for y
e
 
Same.
33
 
While Halley found Harrison’s behaviour to severely compromise his position, the Admiralty 
interpreted the officer’s actions as merely grumbling. Thus, Harrison and his co-conspirators 
were reprimanded, but the court martial demanded by Halley was denied. 
 Halley was not impressed with the result of the inquest. As he complained to the 
Secretary of the Admiralty, Josiah Burchett: 
Yesterday at the Court Martiall I fully proved all that I had complained of against 
my Lieutenant and Officers, but the Court insisting upon my proof of actuall 
disobedience to command, which I had not charged them with, but only with 
abusive language and disrespect, they were pleased only to reprimand them, and 
in their report have very tenderly styled the abuses I suffered from them, to have 
been only some grumblings such as usually happen on board small Shipps. My 
Lieutenant has now declared that I had signally disobliged him, in the character I 
gave their Lopps of his Book, about 4 years since, which therfor, I know to be the 
cuase of all his spight and malice to me, and it was my very hard fortune to have 
him joined with me, with this prejudice against me. Howsoever their Lopps may 
resent it, I am sure that never any man was so used by a Lieutenant as I have been, 
during the whole term of the Voiage, nor could I any wais help my self when 
abroad.
34
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This was the first time that Halley mentioned Harrison’s book. It appears that it was only at this 
point that he learned that the Edward Harrison who had written the book he had reviewed 
harshly a few years previously was the same Edward Harrison as had been his disagreeable first 
mate. Halley was, therefore, able to explain Harrison’s behaviour as having been the result of 
resentment. Such an explanation, however, does not address the root of Halley and Harrison’s 
original dispute—that is the views expressed by Harrison in his book and the response by Halley 
in his review. Moreover, regardless of cause, the incident is telling with regard to the problem of 
control and the relationship between control and expertise. The central claim of the remainder of 
this chapter will be to establish a correlation between the language and development of 
navigation as a science during the eighteenth century in opposition to navigation as an art or 
practice as had previously been the case and the rise of the centralized, bureaucratic control over 
long distances that was needed for the formation of global imperialism. 
Expertise Contested at Sea 
 Harrison’s attitudes are clearly spelled out in the preface to his book: 
Some Years ago, I presented a few Lines concerning this Art, to a Nobleman, or 
Person of Quality, which Lines he little understood, and less regarded; which one 
of my Friends understanding well compared to casting Pearl before Swine. I have 
been informed of one who pretended to find the Longitude, and requiring a 
Gratuity, was sent to Mr. _______ to have his Approbation; I think they might as 
well sent him to a been Rob'd; I Discoursed this Art with some Fellows of the 
R.S. whom I found too much aiming at their peculiar Advantage; therefore I 
resolved to appear on the Publick Stage in Print.
35
 
Halley fit the description of both a “Person of Quality” and a fellow of the Royal Society and 
Harrison might not have been inclined to view him favorably even if he had not negatively 
reviewed his book, though he did rely heavily on Halley as a source. The dispute between 
Harrison and Halley, thus, can be seen as part of the gentlemen/tarpaulin debates that were 
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ongoing at the time. As explained in the previous chapter, the debate featured a division between 
those who believed the English Navy was best served by genteel captains versus those who 
preferred the Navy’s officers to be made up of men of common stock who achieved their rank 
not through birth and connections, but on the strength of experience and merit. Before his death, 
the sociologist Norbert Elias was developing a thesis which argued that it was this very tension 
between genteel and tarpaulin officers that allowed for the English Navy’s fantastic rise from 
near irrelevance in the early seventeenth century to the world’s dominate sea power only one 
hundred years later. As Elias put it, “only the rivalry between the two socially divergent groups 
could result in a fusion of military and nautical skills, or, in other words, the sociogenesis of the 
naval officer.”36 While the historian of the seventeenth-century British Navy J.D. Davies has 
argued that the gentlemen/tarpaulin debate was largely a rhetorical invention of reformist 
bureaucrats such as Samuel Pepys, the Halley/Harrison dispute demonstrates that such tensions 
were a reality on board ships.
37
 
 In the example of Christ’s Hospital discussed in the previous chapter, John Flamsteed 
condemned the education provided to the mathematical boys in part because the school failed to 
teach the level of mathematics and astronomy that would lead to the advance of navigation. For 
Flamsteed, the fundamental problem regarding navigation was theoretical. Essentially, 
navigators lacked the mathematical and astronomical competence. Navigation would, therefore, 
remain problematically imprecise unless the longitude was solved at an astronomical level and 
navigators in the English Navy possessed the level of mathematical skill required to carry out the 
difficult calculations necessary after an astronomical observation has been taken. Harrison, too, 
considered the quality of navigators in the English Navy to be deeply deficient, but on 
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importantly different grounds. Their problem was not that they were poorly instructed in 
mathematics, but that they were deficient in the practical skills obtained through experience. “It 
troubles me to think what Ignorant Persons are Masters of Ships,” wrote Harrison in his 
discussion of magnetic variation, which he followed up with a couple anecdotes to illustrate the 
great ignorance he had found regarding the use of compasses for navigation.
38
 According to 
Harrison, he had “belong'd this War to Six several Rates in the Navy, and never saw an Azimuth 
Compass Aboard any of them.”39 Most ships were not lost due to the inability to find the 
longitude; rather, they were lost as a result of accidents such as storms. While Harrison regarded 
there to be significant deficiencies on board Naval ships, in most cases experience made up for 
ignorance regarding technical matters.
40
 Thus, as well as Halley knew his mathematics and 
astronomy, Harrison found him to be deeply lacking when it came to technical matters that could 
only be mastered through long experience at sea. From Halley’s point-of-view, Harrison 
undermined him out of envy that Halley had been given the command despite having much less 
experience at sea than Harrison, which was evinced by Halley’s ignorance of nautical terms.41 
 Halley represented the technocratic elite. Well-bred, well-educated and well-connected, 
he was a perfect representative of the rising bourgeoisie who were increasingly coming to the 
fore as England urbanized, its governance became more centralized and bureaucratic and its 
economy more market-based and capitalist. The crux of the gentlemen/tarpaulin debate, from the 
perspective of those who supported the tarpaulins, was that well-bred, but ignorant, gentlemen 
would receive commands on the basis of their social class and family connections and would 
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lead their men into disaster as a result of their ignorance of seamanship. Halley was obviously 
not ignorant since his astronomical skill was widely recognized and he had a reasonable amount 
of marine experience. His threat was not really that he might bring his ship to ruin as a result of a 
lack of knowledge. Rather, I would argue that Halley challenged the order of things and 
threatened the internal structure of the naval hierarchy. It was this same tension between 
experience as local knowledge of a set of skills gained through experience and expertise as 
possession of universal knowledge that could be applied as a tool that could be applied in any 
specific circumstance that was seen in the tensions surrounding the Royal Mathematical 
School.
42
  
The mathematical boys were meant to be exemplars of bourgeois values (literate in both 
the vernacular and in Latin and Greek, well-spoken, versed in the classics and—most 
importantly—pious and devout) as well as skilled mathematicians and capable navigators. Thus, 
they represented a belief that education and a middle-class morality was more important than 
practical experience and seniority. Indeed, these were points emphasized by Samuel Pepys when 
he presented his vision of what the Royal Mathematical School’s goals ought to be: 
Persons fitted (in faire writing Accounts and Language) to serve him in any 
negotiation at sea or in forrein parts, to treate with forrein Governors, To reside, 
as Consuls, To keep acc
ts
 as Purs
rs
, Clercks, or Other officers of the Navy, to serve 
as secretary, to Admiralls, & as they shall rise to it bee qualified for the Executing 
of duties of Commanders themselves, with an advantage of being able to draw or 
dictate Orders, Letters, Instructions, Articles of Treaty, and other works of 
Secretaries and Negotiation beyond what the ordinary Educaon of bare 
Tarpawling can ever arrive at.
43
 
In other words, what was under threat was control over who was allowed to define expertise. As 
the Navy became increasingly bureaucratized, it was ever more difficult for its seamen to 
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maintain their trade as autonomous and defined according to their rules rather than those 
imposed by civil servants who were ignorant of practical matters relating to the sea and whose 
concerns were rather more logistical. 
One of the guiding hypotheses of this dissertation is that a centralized, bureaucratic state 
necessarily requires the creation of a standardized definition of expertise that can be controlled 
by the centralized institutions through specialized education or training.
44
 This argument can be 
found to some degree in Theodore Porter’s study of the relationship between numeracy, statistics 
and trust in the institutions of nineteenth and twentieth century France and the United States. 
Porter emphasized that reliance on statistics represents institutional weakness rather than 
strength. For example, the French military engineers resisted standardization successfully 
because their status as experts was already secure and to concede the ability to define what 
constituted such expertise would have resulted in undermining their authority.
45
 In contrast, 
disciplines whose position is weaker are more likely to use numbers and externally validated 
standards of expertise in an effort to strengthen their position. Scholars of the professions have 
argued that a fundamental characteristic of a profession is that it is self-regulating. As the 
sociologist Terence Johnson put it, “a profession is not, then, an occupation, but a means of 
controlling an occupation.”46 In reference to the recent trend of non-academic, ex-politicians 
being hired as university presidents for political reasons, Mark Paschal has argued that such 
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encroachment by outsiders is a threat to the professional autonomy of the academy.
47
 Yet, both 
Theodore Porter and this chapter demonstrate that the regulatory boundaries are often fuzzy and 
contested. Thus, professionalization has much to do with class and power.
48
 
Halley did not represent a radical change in terms of how he actually practiced 
navigation. He continued to rely primarily on dead reckoning. While he was more 
knowledgeable about astronomical theory and practice, the evidence of his difficulty keeping an 
accurate longitude makes it clear that he was not a better navigator than his contemporaries. 
What he did represent, however, is an externally validated expert who threatened to undermine 
the existing structure of accrediting authority as a navigator. This was not a new threat. Samuel 
Pepys had spent his entire career at the Admiralty trying to impose standard definitions of 
expertise; hence, his instigation of an examination for would-be officers in 1677 and his 
continuous efforts to improve naval education. Unfortunately, there does not appear to be any 
existing copies of Halley’s review of Idea Longitudinis, though there is a surviving review by 
Richard Waller of another of Harrison’s papers from a couple years earlier in which Waller 
concluded by saying “I see nothing in the Paper but what is better explained in the places I have 
above quoted.”49 As Kate Morant has pointed out, Harrison’s chapter on magnetic variation 
opens with lines copied almost word-for-word from an article on the same subject that Halley 
had published a decade earlier. Halley’s 1683 article opened: 
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The Variation of the Compass (by which I mean the deflection of the Magnetical 
Needle from the true Meridian) is of that great concernment in the Art of 
Navigation that the neglect thereof, does little less than render useless one of the 
noblest Inventions mankind ever yet attained to.
50
 
Harrison’s chapter, meanwhile, began: 
The Variation of the Compass (by which I mean the deflection of the Needle, 
from the true Meridian) is of that great concernment in the Art of Navigation, that 
the neglect thereof does little less then render useless, one of the noblest 
Inventions Mankind ever attain'd to.
51
 
Setting aside the plagiarism, Harrison devoted his efforts primarily to describing the general 
problems that existed, but offered very little by way of solutions as his book did not contain 
much that could not have been found elsewhere. Perhaps even worse, he provided nothing by 
way of technical explanation. Harrison may have believed that navigation was learned primarily 
through experience; therefore, it was not particularly useful to provide the specific details of how 
to carry out particular practices. Rather, the important thing was to establish institutional and 
cultural barriers that Harrison believed to be impeding navigation in the English Navy. It might 
have simply been, however, down to Harrison lacking the technical expertise necessary to 
explain such issues at a detailed level and, similarly, did not possess the financial resources to 
publish a longer book that such additional material would have required. Ultimately, then, 
Harrison’s short book tells its reader a great deal more about Harrison’s character than it does 
about navigation in the late seventeenth century.  
The dispute between Halley and Harrison was motivated in part by the tensions that I 
have been describing; however, it must be recognized that the situation was more complex. 
Harrison’s book was not a defence of the status quo. Indeed, he justified his writing it by 
claiming endemic incompetence and ignorance in the English Navy. Meanwhile, Halley does not 
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appear to have been interested in challenging established naval practices or its existing 
hierarchical structures. However, his productions of a map of magnetic variation and an 
improved tidal chart were part of an ongoing effort to establish a centralized, ‘scientific’ vision 
of the world. As has been shown by scholars such as Matthew Edney and Benjamin Schmidt, 
such ambitions would come to be integral to the imperial project.
52
 Harrison presented himself in 
grand terms (comparing himself to Columbus for example), but his book was of little practical 
value and was instead primarily a failed attempt at self-promotion. Scholars such as Morant and 
Cook who have commented on Harrison’s book have generally concluded that Harrison was a 
vainglorious man who nursed a grudge against Halley for reviewing his book poorly. I do not 
dispute much of this reading; however, I hope that in placing the matter into the context of the 
gentlemen/tarpaulin debates and concurrent changes in how expertise was understood and 
defined, I have provided a more nuanced consideration of the controversy than has typically been 
the case. A central approach of this dissertation is to consider debates such as the 
gentlemen/tarpaulin one in relation to the larger societal transformations that were occurring as 
English governance became increasingly centralized and the economy globalized and 
capitalistic. The next section of this chapter will turn to the example of the Board of Longitude 
and the search for a solution to the longitude problem in order to push this claim further. 
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The Longitude Problem and the Problem of Expertise 
 
Figure 2.4: William Hogarth, A Rake’s Progress, Plate 7 
In his famous series of eight paintings, Hogarth depicted the decline and fall of 
Tom Rakewell. In the seventh plate, Rakewell is shown incarcerated in the 
Fleet debtor's prison and beginning to go mad, with his madness indicated by 
the presence of a telescope (a reference to the Longitude prize) and an alchemy 
experiment in the background. 
 Finding the longitude at sea was the defining limitation to navigation at the beginning of 
the eighteenth century. The latitude—that is, how far north or south you are—is relatively 
straightforwardly determined from the height of the sun in the sky. The longitude—how far east 
or west you are—lacks a natural reference point like the equator and is significantly more 
112 
 
difficult to ascertain. Indeed, many regarded finding the longitude at sea with any certitude to be 
as impossible as perpetual motion machines and the search for a method to be every bit as 
foolish, as can be seen in the reference to the longitude in William Hogarth’s famous work “A 
Rake’s Progress.” (Figure 2.4)53 While a workable method to find the longitude at sea might 
have been widely regarded as a fool’s errand, there were three methods that were theoretical 
solutions to the problem. The first was the lunar method. The lunar method relies on the quick 
movement of the moon across the sky as it will move about half a degree in one hour. Thus, a 
navigator could measure the angle between the moon and another body. In theory, this method 
can be used to compare against a known time (e.g. Greenwich Time) for that observation. 
Knowing both Greenwich and local time would then allow the longitude to be calculated. The 
second method involved observing Jupiter’s four brightest moons in order to determine the time 
and calculate the longitude. The third method was the timekeeping method. Instead of requiring 
precise astronomical observations and difficult calculations, the timekeeping method involved 
carrying on board the ship a timepiece set to the exact time of a location where the longitude is 
known. As the degree of longitude corresponds to a unit of time (a minute of time equals a 
minute of distance and a degree an hour), all one needs to do is determine the time at the current 
location and calculate the difference compared to the time shown on the clock. 
 All three of these methods were faced with significant problems that rendered them 
deeply unreliable at best prior to the mid-eighteenth century. The lunar-distance method required 
three things in order to be possible: an accurate star catalogue, instruments capable of making the 
angular measurements required with the precision required, and, finally, the ability to predict the 
                                                 
53
 On satirical depictions of the longitude, see Katy Barrett, “The Wanton Line: Hogarth and the Public Life of 
Longitude,” PhD. Diss. University of Cambridge, 2013. See also, Owen Gingerich, “Cranks and Opportunists: 
‘Nutty’ Solutions to the Longitude Problem,” in The Quest for Longitude: Proceedings of the Longitude Symposium, 
edited by W.J.H. Andrewes (Cambridge, MA: Collection of Historical Scientific Instruments, 1996). 
113 
 
motions of the sun and moon several years in advance. At the time Newton wrote his letter none 
of these ingredients were in place; however, Flamsteed’s star catalogue would partly satisfied the 
first and John Hadley’s reflecting quadrant meant the second requirement was satisfied in the 
1730s. The third would not be solved until Tobias Mayer’s lunar tables were sent to the 
Admiralty in 1755 and, then eventually tested conclusively by Nevil Maskelyne in 1761 that the 
problem was effectively solved.
54
 As Derek Howse pointed out, Maskelyne was not the first to 
successfully use the lunar-distance method at sea as the Abbé Nicolas-Louis de Lacaille had 
made such observations on his voyage from the Cape of Good Hope to France in 1753-54; 
however, Maskelyne became the Astronomer Royal in 1765 and was able to use his position in 
support of publicizing the lunar-distance method and, most importantly, making it viable for use 
by navigators.
55
 Thus, Maskelyne devoted much of the Royal Observatory’s resources to the 
continued production of the necessary predictions and employed a large number of computers to 
carry out the difficult calculations needed.
56
 The result of this effort was the Nautical Almanac, 
which was published annually from 1767 onward. 
The second method was the only one that was practical for finding the longitude while on 
land and, thus, was the one used by astronomers such as Flamsteed or Halley; however, because 
of the limitations of chromatic lenses, a twenty foot telescope was needed in order for it to be 
powerful enough to observe Jupiter’s moons. It was impossible to make an accurate observation 
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with a telescope of such length while at sea considering the constant motion of the ship. Finally, 
the third method can only be relied on if the clock in question is very accurate. Even the best 
mechanical clocks at the time were not particularly good at keeping the time and their 
performance was further challenged by the conditions on board a ship as air pressure, salt water 
and rough treatment from the crew, weather and waves all conspired to make the task of keeping 
the time quite difficult. As any time lost resulted in a corresponding misrepresentation of the 
longitude, reliance on a clock was likely to result in a very unreliable longitude. As the example 
of the magnetic variation shows, other methods were proposed and investigated; however, they 
generally proved to be even less successful than the existing methods. Thus, the most reliable 
means of navigation remained the same as had been used for a number of centuries: dead-
reckoning.  
Dead reckoning involved carrying a length of rope on board the ship with a series of 
knots tied at established intervals. The rope would be tossed overboard and a period of time 
measured through the use of an hour glass while someone counted the number of knots that 
passed over the side of the ship. By this method, sailors were able to approximate the speed of 
the ship. The speed, wind strength and direction and the direction the ship was traveling were 
recorded at regular intervals and from there an estimate of how far they had travelled in a given 
day was made. Dead reckoning is not particularly reliable if one needs to know precisely where 
one is, but it was generally adequate for getting to the intended destination.
57
 As well, the 
knowledge of experienced seamen and the ability to determine the latitude meant that generally 
navigators knew where they were well enough that in normal conditions the ship was unlikely to 
run aground and usually did not get hopelessly lost. In the instances where such significant 
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failures of navigation did occur, there were often circumstances such as bad weather or gross 
incompetence that would not have been solved by there being a solution to the longitude 
problem.
58
 
 For reasons that are unclear, in 1714 the British Parliament established the Longitude 
Prize which promised to reward anyone who solved the longitude problem to a close enough 
degree of accuracy would be rewarded a prize of £20,000. The creation of the prize has generally 
been attributed to the Cloudesley Shovell disaster of 1707 in which a fleet of naval ships under 
the admiral’s command ran aground and some 3000 sailors were lost and to the publication of a 
pamphlet by William Whiston and Humphrey Ditton in 1714 in which they suggested a method 
of finding the longitude.
59
 Whiston certainly was aggressive at self-promotion and quite possibly 
lobbied for the creation of a prize, which he could then claim for himself (Ditton died in 1714).
60
 
However, Whiston was a known heretic who had lost his position as Lucasian Professor at 
Cambridge due to his public anti-Trinitarianism and millenarianism. These controversies had led 
to Newton disavowing Whiston, whom he had previously chosen to be his successor at 
Cambridge, and left Whiston a rather isolated figure for the rest of his life.
61
 It seems unlikely, 
then, that Whiston would have possessed the political clout to get such a significant prize 
established by Parliament. Moreover, Whiston and Ditton’s solution was deeply impractical and 
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generally subjected to mockery as can be seen by the references to it in the correspondence 
between John Flamsteed and his former assistant Abraham Sharp. This was because what they 
proposed was that a network of ships be set up along the coasts which would then fire cannons at 
prescribed times so that sailors would be able to see the fire of the cannons and hear the 
explosions and thus be able to determine how close they were to shore. While such a system 
might have been of some merit for marking the coasts of England, it did not actually address the 
problem of finding the longitude. 
 The mystery of the longitude prize is further compounded by the fact that no one affected 
particularly seems to have wanted it. The Act which created the prize also established a set of 
commissioners who were to adjudicate submissions and determine when and if the prize was to 
be awarded. These commissioners were men drawn from logical sources such as the 
mathematical professors at Oxford and Cambridge, the astronomer royal at Greenwich as well as 
from the admiralty. Those who were named commissioners do not seem to have been asked 
before being named. Certainly, Flamsteed and Newton both found the whole thing to be an 
annoying waste of their time and Flamsteed devoted most of his efforts as a commissioner to 
convincing those who came to him with schemes to leave him alone. Newton was consulted 
before the Longitude Act was passed, but does not seem to have been listened to since he had 
little interest in the prize and did not regard finding the longitude at sea to be particularly 
important. Newton’s opinion on the matter can be seen in an unsent draft of a letter written in 
1721 in reply to the secretary of the admiralty Josiah Burchett regarding the solutions to the 
longitude problem in which Newton concluded with “But the chairman of the Committee of the 
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House of Commons being a seaman represented that they did not want the longitude, & so far as 
I can observe the seamen are generally of that opinion.”62  
For Newton, the longitude was an astronomical problem that was not particularly 
pressing and the longitude prize mostly resulted in him being irritated by people like Burchett. 
Even if navigation could be perfected, the maps and charts on which mariners depended were 
both highly incomplete and frequently inaccurate. As Edmond Halley noted, “it would be 
needless to enquire exactly what Longitude a Ship is in when that of the Port to which she is 
bound is still unknown.”63 The records of the Board of Longitude indicate that it was not 
regarded as a particularly pressing or serious endeavour in its early years. According to the 
historian Alexi Baker, the commissioners did not meet until 1737, by which time nearly all of the 
original commissioners named in the Longitude Act were dead. Baker has argued that in reality 
the Board of Longitude was invented by Nevil Maskelyne, Astronomer Royal from 1765 to 
1811, for the purpose of re-establishing the Royal Observatory as the centre of astronomy in 
Britain and that he used the Board to consolidate and strengthen his own personal power.
64
 
 It is not clear what the longitude problem even actually was because the answer to that 
question depended on personal interests. The most basic purpose of navigation is that it enables 
one to arrive at one’s intended destination safely and efficiently. Thus, improving navigation had 
potential commercial benefits. Indeed, the commercial implications of finding the longitude were 
emphasized in the Longitude Act itself, which noted that “such a Discovery would be of 
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particular Advantage to the Trade of Great Britain.”65 For astronomers such as Newton or 
Flamsteed that did not address the crucial problem. As Flamsteed noted to Sharp regarding 
Whiston and Ditton’s proposal, they “tend onely to finding the distance of a ship at sea from any 
mark or coast from whence they can see the fire and hear the noyce of a gun shot at 12 a clock at 
night” thus “their proposal sinkes from finding of the longitude to finding of the distance of the 
ship from a seamark.”66 To which Sharp responded by opining that “some considerable part” of 
the longitude prize ought to be given to Flamsteed “enabling you to carry on and compleat your 
laudable designes which will undoubtedly more effectively contribute to the obtaining the 
Longitude universally than any thing the best of these petty projectors have or can offer.”67 
Meanwhile, Newton wrote to Burchett that the longitude: 
Is not to be found at sea by any method by wch it cannot be found at land. And it 
is not yet found at land by watch-work. The method of finding it at land must be 
improved before it be fit for sea. A good Watch may serve to keep a recconing at 
Sea for some days & to know the time of a celestial Observ[at]ion: & for this end 
a good Jewel watch may suffice till a better sort of Watch can be found out. But 
when the Longitude at sea is once lost, it cannot be found again by any watch. By 
Astronomy it may be found at land without erring a quarter of a degree & by this 
method the longitude of the Harbours in ye world may be settled.
68
 
Both Flamsteed and Newton, thus, saw a distinction between finding the longitude and keeping 
the longitude. Finding the longitude implied, as Sharp notes, a universal method that can be 
executed anywhere on the globe. More importantly, it meant finding the longitude when the 
longitude was lost or not already known. Keeping the longitude, on the other hand, required only 
that the ability to maintain a longitude that had already found. Thus, Newton disregarded 
timekeeping as a real solution to the problem and pronounced that improvement for finding the 
longitude “must be made at land, not by Watchmakers or teachers of Navigation or people that 
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know not how to find the Longitude at land, but by ablest Astronomers.”69 Finally, Edmond 
Halley observed that the coordinates for a great number of ports had not yet been calculated, 
which rendered the question of finding the longitude at sea rather moot.
70
 
 Simon Schaffer has noted a dichotomy between “interest” and “curiosity.” The former 
points toward “the importance of economic, military, and political factors” while the latter “is 
often used to describe the scientific motives at work in the voyages of the late eighteenth century 
and after.”71 In other words, interest connotes the words monetary definition as it relates to 
investment and finance. Curiosity, on the other hand, maintains an air of dispassionate 
observation in which the curious is not motivated by expected reward. The longitude prize stood 
in sharp contrast to such ideals.
72
 The longitude problem, however, points to a different, though 
related, tension. In rejecting the timekeeping method as failing to solve the problem because it 
only kept the longitude and did not give the navigator the means to find it again should it become 
lost, Newton represented a view which prioritized universal knowledge.  
Yet, from a practical standpoint, seamen were unlikely to be concerned about the 
distinctions between finding the longitude and keeping it as long as they were able to better get 
to where they were going. Sailors were indifferent or even antagonistic to efforts to solve the 
longitude problem because the solutions did not seem to promise to improve the day-to-day art 
of navigation. One of the principal groups of people who were invested in the longitude problem 
were the projectors who hoped to get rich off their schemes to solve it and it has often been these 
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individuals who have received the most attention.
73
 Such a focus, however, leaves unaddressed 
the question of why was the longitude prize offered in the first place? Nobody involved in the 
navy or astronomy seemed particularly to want it and the person for whom there is the most 
extant evidence of lobbying for such a prize is the outcast heretic William Whiston. There was, 
however, another interested party who would have found the need to solve the longitude problem 
to be at least somewhat pressing: the growing managerial class of professional civil servants and 
bureaucrats. By solving the longitude the definition of navigational expertise would be, 
theoretically, removed from the possession of seamen into the hands of these same bureaucrats. 
Knowledge, then, would be centralized and standardized so that it would both conform to a clear 
set of rules and would be able to be managed and tracked from a central location. 
 The historian of the seventeenth-century English Navy, J.D. Davies, has observed how 
much popular perception of the Navy has been dominated by Samuel Pepys.
74
 Pepys is one of 
the earliest representatives of the bourgeois, professional class of civil servants who would 
become increasingly important as the governance shifted from the cult of the monarch to its 
modern, more insidious form as famously described by Michel Foucault.
75
 Pepys was 
characterized by his obsession with rules and procedure, his pursuit of self-improvement (for 
example his efforts to teach himself mathematics or his long involvement with the Royal 
Society) and, perhaps most significantly, his enthusiasm regarding examinations.
76
 Davies has 
noted that these characteristics are demonstrative of Pepys’s upbringing and social class. It is 
notable, and perhaps surprising, that it was the gentlemen officers who were regarded as having 
the corrupting effect on the Navy as they were portrayed as “vicious, arrogant, ‘gentlemen’ who 
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brought into the fleet such vices as drinking, swearing, whoring, and effeminate clothing” and 
supplanting the “rough, brave, tarpaulin captains.”77 It is important to remember that Pepys was 
thoroughly middle-class, Cambridge educated and a life-long civil servant. In other words, the 
standards of behaviour and understanding of credibility he sought to impose on the Royal Navy 
were products of his social milieu. Davies’s thesis was that Pepys, due to the significant amount 
of well-organized and easily accessed material that he left behind and because of his charismatic 
voice both in the archive and his famous diaries, had caused historians to neglect other sources of 
naval history that, it turns out, challenge Pepys’s authority. Thus, Davies rejected the 
gentlemen/tarpaulin debate as overplayed with regard to naval history.  
The tension between gentlemen and tarpaulins may have been overemphasized in terms 
of naval practice; however, it was a significant early skirmish in the battle between practice and 
expertise. The dispute was not over whether the navy was best served by gentlemen officers or 
officers who earned their status through years of experience, but over management.
78
 What the 
reformers such as Pepys sought to do was to take away from the mariners the authority to define 
expertise by redefining it in a narrower, standardized manner that obscured the role played by 
social factors. Thus, Pepys theoretically sided with the tarpaulins over the gentlemen in that he 
argued naval officers ought to achieve their rank through merit, which could only be obtained 
through experience. However, as an advocate of examinations and in his support of the Royal 
Mathematical School, he attempted to put into place structures that would undermine the existing 
naval hierarchy in favour of practices that would strengthen the power of the Admiralty office at 
the expense of the officers. The central tension, then, for the Royal Navy as Britain grew into an 
imperial power was that of how best to wield command over such vast distances? As a later 
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chapter will argue with the example of the English East India Company, the tension was between 
attempts to exert power from the metropole over actors in the so-called periphery. The issues that 
dominated scholarly concerns regarding navigation are, I believe, particularly instructive relating 
to these larger issues in imperialism. 
 The popular historian Dava Sobel subtitled her hagiography of John Harrison “The True 
Story of a Lone Genius Who Solved the Greatest Scientific Problem of His Time,” a heroic 
assessment that is not entirely borne out by the historical evidence.
79
 As Katy Barrett has 
observed, “Harrison could be presented as a genius, but he could also be presented as a projector, 
or worse as a madman, as, precisely, our longitude lunatic.”80 In her best-selling popular history 
Sobel took the side of Harrison and assigned to Nevil Maskelyne the role of villain. Historians of 
science have tended, especially in recent years (in explicit response to Sobel’s book), to be more 
sympathetic toward Maskelyne and more critical of Harrison.
81
 Harrison first came to the 
attention of Halley around 1730 and it was due to his first timekeeper that the first meeting of 
what became the Board of Longitude was held in 1737; however, it took him another thirty years 
of labour to perfect his chronometer to where it satisfied both his and the Longitude Act’s 
qualifications. Yet, even the final version did not officially receive the prize, though Harrison 
was eventually given money the more or less equalled the £20,000. As Rebekah Higgit has 
pointed out, rather than being completely unsupported and at odds with the elites of the Board of 
Longitude, Harrison was in fact given unprecedented levels of financial support.
82
 For Sobel, 
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Maskelyne’s antipathy toward awarding the prize to Harrison is what defines Maskelyne of the 
villain in the story. Certainly Maskelyne was motivated in part by the recognition that if the prize 
was awarded the Board of Longitude would cease to have its primary purpose. As Flamsteed and 
Newton both argued, however, there was a reasonable case to be made that the time-keeping 
method did not actually solve the longitude problem since if the time was lost the navigators 
would not be able to regain the longitude without resorting to an astronomical approach. Thus, 
rather than bringing about the end of the Board, Maskelyne was able to expand the scope of the 
Board.
83
 In order to improve the usage of the lunar distance method, in 1767 the Nautical 
Almanac was established and Maskelyne devoted significant resources toward its annual 
production, including the employment of a number of human computers who were tasked with 
completing the difficult calculations required.
84
 
Long-Distance Control in Practice 
 At the beginning of this chapter, I introduced a classic article by John Law to serve as a 
provocation for what would follow. Law presented Portuguese expansion in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries as a case-study for the network approach to science and technology studies 
that was being pioneered at the time by scholars such as Bruno Latour, Michel Callon and Law. 
Law argued for an approach that stressed heterogeneity, complexity and interrelation and the role 
of conflict for solving problems. The problem Law wished to solve was what made Portuguese 
expansion successful in the sixteenth century and European imperialism more generally? The 
answer, for Law, was technological. The Portuguese prevailed over their non-European 
adversary because they had technological advantages. European ships, built for northern 
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climates, were more durable. European guns were more devastating. Finally, when Portuguese 
mariners set out into open water they were confronted with the need to improve navigational 
techniques if such trans-oceanic voyages were to be viable as regular endeavours. Thus, 
navigation became more technical and the instruments used more advanced. Moreover, 
navigation was transformed from a practice that was inherently local in context to that of a 
universal science. In other words, before the Europeans began to make voyages across the 
Atlantic and around the south of Africa and into the Indian Sea, ships tended to follow coasts and 
stay close to land. Thus, navigation operated primarily in terms of know-how and experience. 
Rather than needing to know astronomy or mathematics, a good navigator relied on knowledge 
of things such as the coasts, currents or weather—that is, local knowledge gained through 
experience. 
The crucial assumption upon which Law’s argument was built was that a transition from 
tacit knowledge to something more rigorous and universal happened. While Law accepted that it 
was imperfect and that the new method of navigation was difficult for most mariners and not 
fully understood by many, including Christopher Columbus, he contended that the end result was 
the creation of a new social group: the astronomical navigator.
85
 The new astronomical methods 
of navigation are seen by Law as more advanced and superior when the navigator possessed the 
proper skill. As this chapter has hopefully demonstrated, the reality was rather less teleological. 
Navigation remained highly dependent on the local context and continued to depend primarily on 
non-astronomical methods such as dead-reckoning for the entire period from the Portuguese in 
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the fifteenth century right through into the nineteenth.
86
 Moreover, historians such as Alison 
Sandman have convincingly shown that the transition toward the astronomical navigator, 
inasmuch as it occurred, had more to do with political contests between pilots and 
cosmographers as it did with technological superiority.
87
 
 While Law acknowledged the merits of the social constructivist approach, he did not take 
politics into account or investigate his actors within historical context. Sandman, on the other 
hand, did just this and in considerable detail. Thus, what was for Law primarily a story of broad 
contests leading toward technological innovation was, to Sandman, a complex tale of power 
struggles between actual people. According to Law, “when success is achieved, it is obvious” 
because “If one arrives at one’s port of destination (or for that matter runs aground on the reefs 
of Cape Bojador), the success (or failure) of the enterprise is readily apparent to all.”88 The work 
of Sandman suggests that this is not actually true. Most of the time one did arrive at one’s 
destination regardless of what navigational methods were used and when one did not it was not 
necessarily readily apparent why one failed. As the example of Halley shows, the most advanced 
methods of navigation were not necessarily the most accurate. As Halley also demonstrates, 
despite making catastrophic errors in which he was over one hundred miles out in his reckoning, 
he made the circuit to the South Atlantic, up the American coast to Newfoundland and back to 
London without any problems. Indeed, he specifically pointed to how he had brought his crew 
back in unusually good health when he made his case for a second voyage.
89
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The argument made by Sandman, and by this chapter, is supported by the work of 
Theodore Porter. As Porter has contended, disciplinary authority relies heavily on social power. 
Thus, the Spanish cosmographers described by Sandman triumphed because they possessed 
social advantages that the less educated pilots did not. Porter illustrated his argument with the 
contrasting examples of Corps des Ponts in nineteenth-century France and cost-benefit analysis 
in twentieth-century American army engineering. Pressures such as public responsibility and 
local political debate would “inspire a monumental attempt to reduce cost-benefit analysis to 
firm rules” in the American army; however, this never occurred with the Corps des Ponts. Unlike 
the Americans: 
The Ponts engineers never had to pretend that calculation was simply a matter 
of following unambiguous rules. Given the institutional autonomy and elite 
standing of their Corps, it was quite inconceivable that these engineers could 
have been deprived of the ability to exercise discretion.
90
 
In other words, reliance on externally validated numbers is a sign of disciplinary weakness. A 
given discipline does not necessarily establish its authority on the basis of its actual competence 
so much as a result of winning a political struggle in which competence is only one of the factors 
under consideration and, moreover, can often be defined in contradicting ways. 
 As Sandman has argued, elite tools serve as instruments of power. As she explained, the 
cosmographers “used their nascent power over the tools used by the pilots—the charts, 
astrolabes, regiments, cross-staffs, and compasses—to try to control the behavior of the pilots at 
sea.”91 Such attempts at imposing long-distance control are typically resisted and in the example 
of navigation such resistance was largely successful. In his study of British naval education in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Harry Dickinson showed that persistent attempts to 
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create a standardized, centralized naval academy to train officers consistently failed.
92
 The 
example of the dispute between Edmond Halley and Edward Harrison illuminates some of the 
tensions between elite technocratic preferences and established practice; moreover, the lenient 
judgement by the courts martial initiated by Halley against his officers is a significant reminder 
that the Royal Navy, as an institution, was also engaged in the same political struggle. Indeed, 
the push toward technological and navigational standards was a move that would have 
undermined the Navy’s ability to govern itself and came at a time when the Navy was already 
engaged in a struggle with Parliament to maintain its political status and relevance after the 
Glorious Revolution in 1688. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have sought to discuss navigation with the emphasis on how it was 
actually practiced in the early eighteenth century and without over-reliance on theoretical 
developments. In particular, I have resisted a narration that placed the solution to the longitude 
problem at the heart of the story. As was discussed at length in the first chapter, one of the ways 
in which the history of early-modern navigation has been told has been through the lens of 
mathematization. The longitude, thus, can be read as the central problem of early-modern 
navigation. It was the inability to find the longitude that prevented navigation from becoming 
‘modern’ because such technical limitations enabled navigators to continue to rely on ‘primitive’ 
techniques such as dead-reckoning. Yet, the practice of navigation in the eighteenth century fails 
to provide clear support for such a straightforward teleology. Indeed, an investigation of the 
founding myth of the Longitude Prize itself offers a different story. W.E. May’s study of the 
surviving logbooks from the Cloudesley Shovell disaster questioned nearly every one of the 
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basic premises upon which the myth rested. Most significantly, May suggests that the want of the 
longitude was not the cause of the accident.  
While the logbooks demonstrate a significant degree of variation in their measurements, 
the variation in longitude was not the specific problem. Instead, due to the inconsistencies found 
in the navigational texts available, the expected location of the Isles of Scilly varied importantly 
depending on which charts were being used. As the charts were not graduated for longitude, 
recourse had to be made to the latitude and longitude tables available in navigational manuals; 
however, the manuals differed among themselves in important ways. For instance, the prime 
meridian was not the same in every book. Moreover, the officers frequently had the wrong 
latitudes, which could be accurately measured. May's argument was that the accident was not 
entirely the product of poor navigation, rather “the errors in longitudes in the accepted text-books 
must have introduced a danger just as great as any errors in reckoning the longitude.”93 This 
revision of the Shovell disaster points to the wide range of challenges still faced by navigation in 
1707. Longitude was but one of these difficulties and sailors themselves did not actually regard it 
as being the most significant problem to be addressed. Though the Shovell disaster tends to be 
told as directly leading to the establishment of the Longitude Prize seven years later, the link 
between the two events is tenuous at best.  
Much like in the previous chapter, I have found the story of navigational practice to be 
one of a tension arising over the concept of expertise. How was expertise to be defined and who 
was best to provide accreditation? Thus, it is a story of the contest of power between those who 
practiced navigation and those who wished to reform marine practice to better suit what they 
perceived as the modern world. Navigation, then, is part of the broader story of the rise of 
capitalism, the bureaucratic state and the birth of the modern world. It is a story of capitalism 
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because navigation rose to greater prominence as Europe began to expand its economic reach 
around the globe. Indeed, it is the need to improve and protect trade that the Longitude Act 
points to in support of the prize. The forces of capital should not be viewed in a deterministic 
way. While not discounting the significance of extra-human forces in history, this dissertation 
seeks to recognize and support individual agency. The first two chapters of this thesis have used 
the example of navigation around the turn of the eighteenth century in order to discuss disputes 
over the notion of expertise and to introduce the problem of long-distance control. The final two 
chapters will turn from navigation to the English East India Company in order to continue to 
pursue the theme of long-distance control and the contradictions between individual self-interest 
and the institutions of the state and commerce. 
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PART TWO 
India and China 
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In Part One I demonstrated that “expertise” and “long-distance control” were both interrelated 
and contested in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As such, we cannot view the history of 
the seventeenth century as part of a progression toward a quantitative expertise in support of 
strong administrative control in the eighteenth century. Such a position risks obscuring the 
existence of alternative forms of expertise and knowledge practices and reducing the significance 
of these alternatives. The contested reality of expertise and the severely limited quality of long-
distance control have consequences for the history of science and empire in the eighteenth 
century. The problematic nature of expertise has to be taken into account when addressing the 
production and diffusion of knowledge. Science studies have often privileged the perspective of 
science in its historical accounts. What this has meant, in practice, is that there is built-in 
teleology and an assumption that scientific methods and knowledge are more modern and, 
therefore, better. At the core of this has been the post facto imposition of asymmetrical power 
relationships that favour Euro-American knowledge practices. The argument of Part Two is that 
much of our understanding of European and non-European power relations has been coloured by 
nineteenth-century imperialism. Thus, I have sought to develop the two chapters in Part Two 
from a perspective that does not read backward from the establishment of the English East India 
Company as a colonial power at the end of the eighteenth century and, instead, emphasizes the 
practices within the Company during the first part of the century. 
 By connecting the history of expertise in Britain to the early endeavours of the East India 
Company, this dissertation offers a fresh perspective on science and imperialism and the history 
of the Company in the eighteenth century. In Chapter Three I will take up the issue of the East 
India Company as a bureaucratic institution. Bureaucracy is significant because paperwork has 
been regarded as one of the crucial features of the Company’s history and to the establishment of 
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British rule in India. Through an examination of the surviving correspondence, what I aim to 
show is that the Company’s paperwork practices were neither consistently followed nor part of a 
direct progression toward bureaucratic control. Indeed, long-distance control from the 
Company’s headquarters in London to its operations in Asia did not meaningfully exist at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century. The lack of long-distance control has purchase for science 
and technology studies because it challenges the notion of centres of calculation and brings into 
question the standard view of the metropole and periphery.  
 Thus, the third chapter makes an argument against a deterministic approach to the history 
of the East India Company that takes for granted what the Company would eventually become 
after 1780 and the fourth and final chapter of this dissertation builds on this claim while putting 
it directly into the context of the scholarly discussion about centres of calculation and the 
circulation of knowledge. While the Company extended its power throughout the eighteenth 
century, its position was never uncontested or hegemonic. Instead, the bureaucratic practices 
such as paperwork and expertise served, and continue to serve, as a means of masking British 
weakness rather than as demonstrations of strength. In order to understand how knowledge 
circulated, we need to have a clear picture of the relationships between Europeans and non-
Europeans and between institutions such as the East India Company, on the one hand, and the 
Qing administration on the other. It is necessary that we understand these relationships and 
power dynamics so that our history does not become over-determined. If the history of science is 
to be global we cannot presume the outcome or allow the success of science to erase alternative 
practices. 
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Chapter Three 
Bureaucratic Practice: Institutional Knowledge, Local Practice and the Problem of Long-
Distance Control 
 
 In a 1692 memorandum to the President of the English East India Company’s Bombay 
factory, Bartholomew Harris, his assistant John Vaux expressed his dissatisfaction with his 
current status.
1
 The point of contention was over the use of the Company’s horses. Vaux wrote 
that he was “given to understand that neithr my self nor others shall have ye use of either Coach 
or Horse without comming first to ask [Harris’s] leave” and wished to inquire “know whethr you 
pay for Coaches or Horses or the Comp
a.” If the horses belonged to Harris, Vaux assured him 
that he would trouble Harris no further; however, if they were the Company’s horses, then Vaux 
believed he had “as much right to make use of a Coach in my Station as a great many that eates 
the Comp
as
 bread.”2 
 Upon establishing that the horses were, indeed, paid for by the East India Company and 
not by Harris, Vaux sought to press the matter further. He followed up his initial inquiry by 
asking whether Harris was familiar with the customs of the factory in Surat and, “if not I shall 
acquaint you in all Sincerity.”3 Vaux proceeded to explain that he had investigated the 
established customs regarding the use of horses and had been “well assured & inform’d is 
otherways managed then formerly by the knowledge of men of ancienter standing then your Hon
r
 
or I am” that his understanding of the situation was correct. 4 Harris, Vaux contended, was 
violating the established conventions of the East India Company in Surat with his insistence on 
maintaining direct control over who used the horses and when. At this point, Vaux had finally 
                                                 
1
 Bartholomew Harris was technically President at Bombay 1690-94. The East India Company shifted its main 
holdings from Surat to Bombay in 1687; however, due to plague and cholera the move did not actually take place 
until 1708 so Harris and Vaux both were based in Surat, see Jerry Dupont, The Common Law Abroad: 
Constitutional and Legal Legacy of the British Empire (Littleton, CO: F.B. Rothman Publications, 2001), 564. 
2
 John Vaux to Bartholomew Harris, June, 1692, IOR/E/3/49, f. 82r. 
3
 Vaux to Harris, June, 1692, IOR/E/3/49, f. 83r. 
4
 Vaux to Harris, June, 1692, IOR/E/3/49, f. 84r. 
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gone too far and Harris was forced to assert his authority. Harris rejected Vaux’s appeal to the 
authority of men “ancienter” than Harris informing Vaux that “As to wt you wrote me last night 
of yo
r
 being informed by those of ancienter standing then I about y
e
 Customs & Rules of y
e
 
factory, I know of none y
t
 can pretend to it except one, who is not one of y
e
 Comp
as
 Serv
ts.” 
Harris assured Vaux that there had been no change in policy and that “there has been as worthy 
second as yo
r
 selfe formerly in place y
t
 did acquist in y
e
 same.” Moreover, while Vaux had 
presented the complaint as if he had been denied access to the horses and carriage, Harris denied 
this had been the case. Harris insisted he “never will deny you Horse or Coach when yor 
Occassions require it if mine does not.”  
Far from having been deprived use of them, Harris observed, instead, that: 
Its very strange to me y
t
  you should write me abot y
e
 Horses & Coaches & at y
e
 
same time they were both up & Imployed with both or Wives & another 
Councillers wife Madm Aleyn & one of ye Concsell & Minister & you yor self 
had taken Physick so by Consequence cod not go abroad & I would not goe so y
t
 
if or Wifes are accomadated in y
t
 manner there needs noe such grumbling so y
t
 
you cannot appear to me any otherways but a design to Quarrell.
5
 
The incident, as Harris saw it, had nothing to do with Vaux’s use of the Company’s horses. 
Rather, Harris interpreted Vaux’s complaint and subsequent letters as an attempt by Vaux to 
undermine his authority in order to supplant him as governor. Particularly telling regarding 
Vaux’s intentions is that on two separate occasions he “granted” Harris permission to register his 
letters in the Company’s consultation book “that our Rt Honble Masters may be judges of the 
case” and that the issue be in “the publick view.”6 In doing so, Vaux sought to take the dispute 
out of the private sphere and put the Company’s bureaucratic practices to work for him. The 
controversy has much to say about the operations of the East India Company due not only to its 
concern with rules and rights versus power and control, but also with individuals acting outside 
                                                 
5
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6
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of their supposed limitations. While bureaucracy is often regarded in hegemonic terms and 
represented in terms of its impenetrability, in this chapter I seek to attend to the concept of 
bureaucracy from the inside rather than the outside. Moreover, I wish to pay particular attention 
to individual action within a functioning bureaucracy and not to regard it as a depersonalized 
monolith. Monolithic interpretations of bureaucracy have epistemic value; however, a 
bureaucracy remains made up of people. Though the bureaucracy presented restraints to human 
agency, I argue that its structures also offer opportunities for the individual actors who comprise 
it to advance their self-interests. A bureaucracy might appear from the outside as an impenetrable 
glacier inexorably advancing; however, the internal view shows, instead, a complex web of 
actors who often possess competing interests and concerns. 
In Part One I showed how debates over expertise played out on-the-ground and how this 
challenges some conceptions of long-distance control in the context of the English Navy. These 
issues become even more pertinent when we move our view further afield from London. In this 
chapter I use the questions raised regarding long-distance control to investigate and better 
understand the administrative practices of the English East India Company and to put the 
development of the Company’s institutional and imperial practices in a historical context. The 
vast bureaucracy that developed under Company rule (1757-1868) and formed the basis of the 
British Raj (1858-1947) was not in place in the early eighteenth century. Though the Company 
did maintain extensive correspondence and promulgated considerable records, the detail and 
organization of the paperwork was inconsistent and decentralized circa 1700 compared to what it 
became. Much of the history of the English East India Company has focused on the period after 
1780 when its bureaucratic power had been firmly established. This emphasis on the later period 
risks the danger of an over-determined historical trajectory toward Company rule. In an effort to 
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counter this teleology I am approaching the paperwork practices of the East India Company in 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries without reference to the vast intelligence 
network that later developed; instead, I focus on how individuals within the Company used 
paperwork to further their own interests. In doing so I further challenge the concept of long-
distance control that was introduced in the previous chapter and demonstrate its weakness in the 
East India Company. 
Bureaucracy and Historical Considerations 
There was a correlation between the rise of capitalism and the scientific fact because, as 
Harold Cook has argued, capitalism spurred the development of consensus and restricted 
practitioners' attention to empirically verified facts. At the same time, however, commercial 
networks not only provided the infrastructure for long-distance scientific exchange, they shaped 
how it was done.
7
 Dániel Margócsy, meanwhile, has questioned some of Cook’s argument and 
contended that “mercantile capitalism only enabled the development of a unified infrastructure 
for circulating facts, images, and material objects.”8 While the infrastructure of global capitalism 
was crucial for scientific exchange, it was developed for commercial reasons and was executed 
primarily by merchants whose principal interest was trade and not scientific knowledge. Thus, 
this chapter seeks to understand the infrastructure of the English East India Company from the 
perspective of institutional practices of the Company’s servants in India. Because global trade 
and scientific exchange were closely interrelated, a better understanding of how global 
commerce functioned in practice enables greater knowledge of the role played by the non-
European world in the history of eighteenth-century science. 
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8
 Dániel Margócsy, Commercial Visions: Science, Trade, and Visual Culture in the Dutch Golden Age (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2014), 15, 17. 
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The historian John Brewer has presented a compelling argument relating eighteenth-
century military developments to the formation of the centralized, bureaucratic nation-state.
9
 
Essentially, through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, European warfare underwent 
significant changes as technology advanced and the scale of warfare grew. These transformations 
meant that decentralized, feudal military structures were no longer suitable and the central state 
increasingly claimed a monopoly on the capacity to execute warfare. What this also meant was 
that, with wars becoming increasing large in scale, they also became ever more expensive to 
carry out. Thus, not only were feudal structures insufficient as a means of ordering warfare, but 
such institutions were also inadequate to support financially the needs of the state. Thus, 
according to Brewer, the changing needs of the military led to the formation of the modern fiscal 
state. Brewer sought to show how the British state in the eighteenth century, in order to support 
its growing military needs, came up with new means of raising revenue in the form of 
increasingly complex forms of taxation such as the customs and excise. Unlike previous taxes, 
these new taxes required the centralized, bureaucratic institutions. Thus, in order to raise the 
revenue needed to carry out wars, bureaucratic institutions were formed, which in turn fed into 
the continued expansion of the British military and, thus, the perpetuation of new, larger and 
ever more powerful state institutions. 
Michel Foucault viewed history through the lens of power and saw the modern episteme 
as one in which state power shifted from a public performance to private and insidious.
10
 Such a 
                                                 
9
 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power. D.A. Washbrook has told a rather similar narrative about the relationship 
between an increasingly expensive military apparatus and the formation of a new fiscal state in eighteenth-century 
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concept of history, thus, has tended to regard the state in hegemonic terms. In keeping with such 
a point-of-view, Brewer’s approach was telescopic in scope and, therefore, he did not provide 
close analysis of the institutions so important to his story. Doing so would not necessarily have 
negated Brewer’s claims, but it would seem to complicate the picture considerably. He presented 
a picture of eighteenth-century Britain that assumed coherence within the instruments of the 
British state that did not exist at the time. Indeed, studies of Britain’s institutions in the twentieth 
century have demonstrated that such coherence has never been obtained.
11
 In his detailed 
investigation of the history of the customs and excise in Britain between the seventeenth and 
nineteenth centuries, the historian of science, William Ashworth has shown the difficult reality 
of the institutions involved.
12
 The history of the fiscal state turns out to be both messier than 
Brewer would seem to imply and less straightforward in its development. A significant limitation 
of Foucault’s conception of power is that he left very little room for human agency. What 
Ashworth’s study has shown is the possibility of agency and the ways in which it affected the 
institutional history. Thus, while Brewer’s work has a lot to recommend it, he did not fully 
capture the experiences to be found within the institutions that made up his fiscal-military state. 
Such attention to the role of people can also been seen in Andre Wakefield’s account of 
cameralism in the Germanic states during the eighteenth century. Responding to a seminal work 
by Marc Raeff, Wakefield refused to take the cameralist theorists at their word and instead 
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looked at what they had actually done.
13
 Instead of Raeff’s well-ordered police state, Wakefield 
found that the cameralists, on the occasions when they were put into positions of power, 
frequently failed to live up to their ideals. Cameralism, it turned out, was rather more successful 
in theory than practice. Raeff saw cameralism as representing the “authorities’ conscious desire 
to transform society,” which “resulted in the development of administrative and legal tools that, 
in turn, displayed their own inherent dynamic.”14 The end result being the formation of a “well-
ordered police state” in Western and Central Europe that “not only brought about great material 
and cultural progress but also stimulated and strengthened individual initiative, enterprise and 
rational or critical constructivist features of intellectual life.”15 Raeff relied “almost exclusively 
on ordnances and laws that were actually implemented” and, in doing so, assumed that they were 
enforced.
16
 Wakefield, on the other hand, did not assume that any of these laws were actually 
enforced and went beyond the ordnances and laws themselves to investigate their actual 
implementation.
17
 What he learned was, in fact, they frequently were not. Thus, Brewer has 
offered a valuable means to think about relationships between the major events of eighteenth-
century British history and the formation of the modern, British state, while Ashworth and 
Wakefield provide excellent examples from which to move from Brewer’s telescopic perspective 
to the microscopic while still maintaining a larger historiographic concern. 
As the example of John Vaux has shown, bureaucratic systems of paperwork suggest the 
possibility of empowering individual action within the bureaucracy. Vaux’s case also 
demonstrates limitations to such agency. Taking the example of French institutions leading up to, 
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during and after the French Revolution, Ben Kafka has developed such themes. Paperwork, 
Kafka argues, is unpredictable and “this unpredictability is frustrating,” with the result being that 
“modern political thought was both founded and confounded by its encounters with 
paperwork.”18 According to Kafka, it had the ability to “defer and displace the object of power.” 
While, in one of Kafka’s examples, the chief of the General Police Bureau, Augustin Lejeune 
might not have intentionally slowed down the pace of political violence or halt it altogether by 
burying the paperwork itself, Kafka argues that he could have. As Kafka explains, Lejeune, 
“seems to have realized, if only belatedly, that the proliferation of documents and details 
presented opportunities for resistance, as well as for compliance.”19 While paperwork and 
bureaucracy might be used to resist power, it also can serve to stymie individual ambition, as 
Kafka shows in another example of Edme-Etienne Morizot’s attempts to get back his job as a 
clerk in the Ministry of Finance after he was replaced in September of 1788.
20
 Morizot was told 
he had lost the job due to financial problems in the administration. The financial problems did, 
indeed, exist; however, they were not actually the reason Morizot lost his job. When Morizot 
pressed, his supervisors admitted that the reason they had given had been a lie. Morizot had not 
been let go to cut costs. In fact, he had been replaced by the son-in-law of the king’s aunt’s 
chambermaid. Morizot had lost his job for a more straightforwardly human reason: he was 
impossible to get along with. In response, Morizot decided to sue. As an experienced civil 
servant who understood how the system worked and knew from whom to get favours and how to 
ask for them, he had every reason to expect to recover his position. Instead, he would fail 
miserably. All the actors involved in the incident accepted the legitimacy of his complaint, yet he 
found himself forced to wander from one clerk to another producing seemingly endless 
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paperwork. What Morizot wanted was “to petition deputies the way he had once petitioned the 
king, but they could no more decide his case on their own initiative than they could cure his 
scrofula by touch…What he needed was the right signature on the proper letterhead.”21 
According to Ben Kafka, it was not a coincidence that Morizot’s case occurred when it did—as 
the ancien régime was about to collapse. As Kafka put it, “a world of privilege was becoming a 
world of rights; the personal state was becoming the personnel state.”22 
In his classic study of the Newcastle papers and the English electoral machine in mid-
eighteenth century, Lewis Namier re-evaluated a political system remembered primarily for its 
rotten boroughs, the ubiquity of graft, quid pro quo patronage appointments and general 
corruption.
23
 All of these charges certainly did accurately describe English politics at the time; 
however, Namier argued that, rather than being an inhibition, such so-called corruption in fact 
was what enabled the whole system. As representative democracy, the English government was 
sorely lacking; however, what it did offer was opportunities for a class of educated professionals. 
Corruptions such as patronage positions and the so-called secret service money, “was more 
jobbery, stupidity and human charity about it than bribery.” In absence of organized social 
welfare, it provided one measure of protection for members of the tenuous middle-class. In turn, 
these would-be bourgeoisie worked to maintain the system that actively disenfranchised them 
and which disregarded the “moral and uplifting of the electorate” in favour of the crass collection 
of seats and hence political power for those who commanded them.
24
  
Thus, as Namier, Kafka, Wakefield and Ashworth all demonstrate, “bureaucracies” serve 
a multitude of purposes. While the electoral machine and the cynical alliances of parliamentary 
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politics in eighteenth-century Britain emphatically did not serve the interests of the vast majority 
of the populace, they did what they was intended to do, which was to advance the interests of the 
bourgeoisie and to protect those who belonged to the system. As Wakefield observed, the 
cameralists he “knew” were “not very well behaved.” Instead of being models of the ideal civil 
servant, in practice “they lied, connived, cheated and embezzled.” At the same time, however, 
“they also painted beautiful pictures of well-ordered police states.” These well-ordered police 
states were creations of the cameralists in order to address a need specific to the cameralists: 
“their lives depended upon it.”25 The cameralists needed to make money and projecting their 
expertise and the fashionableness of their knowledge was a means for them to do so. Wakefield, 
thus, reminds us of the mundane motivations upon which history rests. Though he wrote about 
the German speaking states, while this dissertation looks at the English, his insights into the 
nature of bureaucracy and statecraft are transferable. Rather than any kind of clear trajectory 
toward a strong, centralized state the history of institutions in eighteenth-century Britain is more 
accurately understood as a series of self-interested actions taken by a large number of individuals 
over the course of a century. To the degree that these actions led to the expansion of such 
institutions, it can hardly be a great surprise as such reification and growth was obviously in the 
interests of its agents. 
Paperwork was at the heart of the enterprise of the English East India Company and the 
British colonialism that grew out of it in the nineteenth century. Indeed, the Company’s 
employees were called writers for a reason. The Company did not only generate great wealth for 
select members of its service, but also great, massive reams of papers. Its archive in the bowels 
of the British Library is measure literally in miles and comprises of millions of documents. The 
geographer Miles Ogborn has regarded this emphasis on paperwork as the technology that 
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allowed the Company to maintain a centralized authority that ensured the directives in London 
were executed thousands of miles away in Southeast Asia. Ogborn made much of the letters sent 
on ships and argued that “these letters and the writing that traveled alongside them were a vital 
part of making the relationships necessary to establish a global network.”26 Yet, the degree to 
which the Company was ever able to dictate orders to its distant operations is somewhat unclear. 
As Jon Wilson has put it, “The British used paper as a surrogate for authority.”27 Certainly in the 
period covered by this dissertation the Company’s influence from London was quite limited. 
Moreover, the paperwork and archival practices that define much of how the East India 
Company and the later India and Colonial offices have been understood were much less clearly 
defined circa 1700.  
From an epistemological standpoint, bureaucracy is a product of the nineteenth century. 
The word bureaucracy was first used by Vincent de Gournay (1712-1759) and entered the public 
domain in the July, 1764 issue of Correpondence littéraire, but it was not for another fifty years 
that it widely entered the literary domain.
28
 According to Martin Albrow, the concept was 
principally a product of the nineteenth century and presumed a continental phenomenon.
29
 It has 
been indicated that it was the collapse of the ancien régime at the French Revolution and the 
reformulation of the French state that followed that really brought bureaucracy to the fore. 
Locating bureaucracy as a nineteenth-century epistemological concept has obvious limitations. It 
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arguably fails to recognize the well-developed court bureaucracies that predate the French 
Revolution by several centuries and the growth of the centralized fiscal-military states from the 
mid-seventeenth century onward, especially in England and France.
30
 These structures could be 
regarded, however, as proto-bureaucratic and, moreover, that such structures existed does not 
mean that bureaucracy had been developed as a concept. More problematic to locating 
bureaucracy as a category of inquiry only beginning in the nineteenth century is cameralism, on 
which there was an extensive literature before the term bureaucracy had even been coined. While 
Albrow regarded bureaucracy as essentially Germanic in its construction, most of the classic 
references prior to Weber appear to be French.
31
 Partly to blame has been the tendency to write 
the intellectual history of eighteenth-century Europe so that Germanic history has been separated 
from that of Britain and France.
32
 Such segmentation has meant that German history has often 
been treated as less relevant to intellectual history and as having made little contribution to what 
has been regarded as the Enlightenment, which remains associated with the French philosophes 
of the mid-eighteenth century despite the best efforts of many specialists on the subject.
33
 
                                                 
30
 On paperwork in France during the reign of Louis XIV, see John Rule and Ben Trotter, A World of Paper: Louis 
XIV, Colbert de Turcy, and the Rise of the Information State (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014). 
31
 Albrow, Bureaucracy, 16. 
32
 Such emphasis on France being most evident in Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment,  translated 
by Fritz C. A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951) and Peter Gay, The 
Enlightenment: An Interpretation (New York: Knopft, 1966-69). Roy Porter and Roy Porter and Mikulás̆ Teich, The 
Enlightenment in National Context (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1981) sought to widen the field of 
inquiry by recognizing that the Enlightenment occurred outside of the France of Voltaire, Diderot and Rousseau and 
the Germany of Immanuel Kant. The approach taken by Porter and Teich was limited by its focus on national 
context, which was not always the most effective model in an era where national boundaries were less defined than 
they have since become. William Clark, Jan Golinski and Simon Schaffer, eds., The Sciences in Enlightened Europe 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) has provided an essential update to Porter and Teich that has built on 
the national context approach while developing sophisticated historiographical responses to the criticisms leveled at 
Porter and Teich. See also, Kostas Gavroglu, ed., The Sciences in the European Periphery During the Enlightenment 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999); Richard Butterwick, Simon Davies and Gabriel Sánchez Espinosa, 
eds., Peripheries of the Enlightenment (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2008). 
33
 The repudiation of the segmentation of the history of the Enlightenment into national contexts and the emphasis 
on the French Enlightenment was at the core of Jonathan Israel’s ambitious three volume history of the 
Enlightenment. Fundamental to Israel’s approach was that historians of the subject must be cognizant of 
developments and intellectual movement from a global perspective. For Israel, the history of the subject could not be 
treated with justice if one confined one’s attention to a single region. Israel’s account offered a genealogy of the 
145 
 
The bureaucracy has been a common target in literature and film. While Franz Kafka’s 
depictions are the most famous and enduring, bureaucratic stereotypes are a frequent trope in 
film and literature. A good example can be seen in the dystopia envisioned by Terry Gilliam in 
his film Brazil. To be a bureaucracy is to be large, obtuse, anonymous, and bewildering to the 
outsider. Such institutions are compartmentalized so that every task has its own department and 
each department operates as a fiefdom looking to defend itself against the encroachment of the 
other organs of the bureaucracy. As a structure, bureaucratic departments are often seen as 
having a primary objective of expansion, entrenchment and self-protection. From an operative 
perspective, then, efficiency and governance would not be the most significant concerns for the 
bureaucracy; indeed, an efficient, productive system might even be counter-productive to its 
aims.  
While the modern state has been regarded as possessing a monopoly of force; the 
bureaucracy’s greatest power lies in its monopoly over access to information. As the sociologist 
Norbert Elias observed, “The society of what we call the modern age is characterized, above all 
in the West, by a certain level of monopolization.”34 The accusation at the core of much of the 
negative portrayals of bureaucracy has been to blame it for red tape, inefficiency and to assert it 
as resulting in a significant cost due to a loss of productivity caused by bureaucratic inertia and 
interference. Though the bureaucracies of the real world do not reach the extremes of those 
described by Terry Gilliam or Franz Kafka, anyone who has had to negotiate the labyrinth of 
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government or university bureaucracies can likely see a reflection of their own experiences. 
However, to define bureaucracy in such terms is a caricature.  
What has been parodied as an absurd rigidity and opaqueness was rather regarded by 
Max Weber as giving it an inherent efficiency. Indeed, when Weber regarded the bureaucracy as 
emblematically modern he did not see this as pejorative.
35
 Moreover, it pretends the bureaucracy 
to be an autonomous entity and gives it anthropomorphic qualities that actually serve to further 
erase the agency of its component parts. As John Rule and Ben Trotter put it in their study of 
French bureaucracy in the seventeenth century, “bureaucracies are organizational structures that 
can appear as machines, but in truth they are at most machine-like and are always made up of 
humans.”36 The multi-headed hydra of modern democracy might seem intentionally 
impenetrable; however, it is also a guardian of expertise as it allows talented individuals to 
develop significant specialist skills without which modern governance and corporate capitalism 
would not be able to function in its current form. 
Taking the modern research university as his subject, the historian of science and the 
Enlightenment William Clark traced the development of the academic from the medieval to 
modern in order to cast light on bureaucratization and commodification—“the twin engines of 
rationalization and the disenchantment of the world.”37 The English East India Company was 
part of the same historical process that Clark described. While it was organized into segmented, 
specialized departments that were structured in what was nominally a hierarchical form and 
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propagated a great deal of paperwork, the Company was both too small at the management level 
and too linear in its chain of command to be fully regarded as bureaucratic. Unlike, for instance, 
Colbert in France, the English East India Company often lacked strong leadership figures in 
London. What this meant in practice was that strong personalities in its foreign outposts were 
able to dominate much of the Company’s operations during the eighteenth century.38 Clark’s 
argument centered on the concept of academic charisma because it allowed him to push his 
argument beyond a narrative that supposed the oral and traditional was superseded by the 
rational and the visible in the formation of the modern order.  
As the East India Company, too, was part of the formation of the modern order, the 
tension between orality and textuality needs to be recognized. The Company was not a 
bureaucracy per se in the period in which this dissertation covers, but it would have to become 
one for the colonial project to succeed. It is crucial to keep in mind that establishing the 
Company as an imperial power in India was not an intended goal for most of its directors and the 
expansion of the Company as a political power in India was driven by the personal interests of 
charismatic Company representatives in India. The Company’s concerns were divided between 
the Company as a commercial enterprise and the more individualistic interests of private 
members who were looking to expand their own personal political power. These tensions played 
a crucial role in the development of the English East India Company during the eighteenth 
century.  
East India Company Practice 
Despite its best efforts to establish institutional controls and to direct its affairs from 
London, Company employees had considerable ability to take independent action due to the 
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weakness of institutional authority. The English East India Company did seek to strengthen its 
control over distant agents. For example, there was considerable emphasis on the maintenance of 
detailed records of the individual accounts for each factory and there was an extensive chain of 
communication. In theory, the governing bodies at each factory were required to provide regular 
and detailed accounts of their activities and were not to take action outside of their established 
purview or against the Company’s best interests. On the other hand, these records not always 
orderly or maintained and the chain of communication did not necessarily mean a successful 
chain of command. It was not always easily established what the best interests of the Company 
meant. Furthermore, the Directors only received reports after-the-fact because the 
communication times involved made it impossible for the Directors to intervene in decisions in 
real time. Similarly, the transition from the oral to the paperwork and archive represented by the 
East India Company implies a permanence that does not entirely stand up to the historical record. 
The structure of the East India Company was nominally hierarchical. In London the 
Company was managed by the Court of Directors. In India there were three Company outposts, 
called factories, each of which was responsible for the trade in its specific region. These factories 
were located at Madras (Fort St. George), Bombay and Calcutta (Fort William) (see Figure 
3.1).
39
 Bombay and Calcutta were in the north, closer to the centre of power for the Mughal 
Empire. The two factories, thus, gave the Company access to the Empire, but, because they were 
so close to it, also meant that the Mughal Empire was able to regulate the English traders. 
Madras, on the other hand, was on the southern fringe of the Empire, which gave the Company 
greater operational freedom. At each factory the Company appointed a council of traders, which 
was headed by a president. Thus, the factory bureaucracy was known as a presidency. Prior to   
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the middle of the eighteenth century, each presidency was functionally distinct and 
administratively none were responsible for the others. Indeed, they were more often in 
competition with each other than then in cooperation. Of the three presidencies, Madras was 
considered to be the principal one due to its beneficial geography, which was also noted by the 
Figure 3.1: Map of the East India Company Factories 
(Uwe Dedering CC BY-SA 3.0. Annotated by Author) 
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French who followed the English example and established a factory of their own a few miles 
from Fort St. George.
40
  
In principle there was a clear chain of command. The Court of Directors chose the 
councils and picked the president and sent detailed instructions they expected their chosen 
governing bodies to execute. In practice, however, there were complications. To begin with, the 
presidencies frequently operated with relative autonomy and the high mortality rate of English 
traders in India meant that the man acting as president was frequently not actually the man who 
had been chosen for that role. Furthermore, as the example of John Vaux demonstrates, the 
relationships within the presidencies were often complicated and subject to negotiation between 
the various actors. As well, the actual structure of the Company itself contained a large number 
of interested actors whose location in the hierarchy is not easily defined. For instance, it is not 
entirely clear where the shareholders fit in the general scheme, nor where those whose 
relationship with the Company was more tenuous—for instance, ship’s captains and their crews 
or supercargoes like Robert Douglas. The fate of these individuals was closely tied to the 
Company, but they lacked the same degree of institutional support compared to those based in 
established factories. Moreover, this schema does not take at all take into account native actors. 
European trade in Southeast Asia involved European marine enterprises plugging themselves 
into networks of trade that already existed prior to their arrival. Thus, there were established 
structures for trade and the European trading companies such as the East India Company 
constantly had to negotiate their place in the system.  
As the political situation was complicated and India was not a homogenous political 
entity, this meant that the different European nations involved in the region needed to establish 
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and maintain a number of relationships. Moreover, the different political factions meant that one 
was necessarily coopted into local political rivalries.
41
 The instability of these relationships can 
be seen by the frequent revolts against the Company. James Pound described one such incident 
in a letter to John Flamsteed: 
On the third of March last about the dead time of night, our black Soliders at 
Condore set upon us with fire and sword, and killed our Governour with about 
twenty others as they endeavoured to come out of their Houses which were set on 
fire…I with 10 more made our escape from Condore by getting aboard a small 
sloop, we had scarce cloths to cover our nakedness, having no time to take cloths 
or any thing else out of our Houses; we leap’d out of our beds with the surprize of 
the fire, and did not think any thing of villainy; but soon found that we were beset 
with a worse enemy than the fire; the Governour was both shot, and stabb’d with 
a poysond Cress, amany others had the same fate, it was done by Macassars 
which were entertained as Soliders in our Service. The Fort was intirely burnt to 
the Ground; My house was a little without it, and I did not see it fired so Long as I 
was in sight of it. In so great a surprize we who escaped having neither Arms nor 
force to make any resistance could think of nothing but saving our lives; so that 
my Money, Goods, Books, Papers, Instruments, Cloths etc were all left behind 
and I never expect to see any of it more: but I am just now setting out from hence 
in the Caesar for Condore to see if there be any more English who escaped, or any 
Goods to be recovered.
42
  
Finally, indigenous actors were not only engaged with the East India Company from the outside; 
they were frequently employed by the Company itself. As British hegemony developed in the 
course of the eighteenth century its reliance on locals only increased.
43
 
While the post-colonial perspective has resulted in the view of colonial activity as 
necessarily antagonistic to those upon whom it was imposed, the process was less 
straightforward. Indigenous actors were frequently complicit in colonial enterprises. As well, the 
British did not necessarily go into regions like Southeast Asia with the intention of establishing a 
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colony. Colonies were expensive, difficult to maintain and required a significant investment in 
personnel and infrastructure. The system of establishing factories at strategic locations was a 
careful balance between more transient modes of trade where Company merchants arrived on a 
Company ship and departed when the ship did, as was the situation in China where the political 
situation was more homogenous, versus the establishment of full colonies. Factories allowed the 
Company to maintain a continual presence, which gave employees the opportunity to ingratiate 
themselves into the local culture and meant they were less dependent on immediate 
circumstances when conducting trade. The Indian subcontinent had an established and well-
developed model of credit.
44
 The addition of Europeans to the trade led to the expansion of these 
credit systems, but it did not result in a fundamental reorganization of what was already in place. 
The presumed hierarchy of the English East India Company has been preserved in its 
archive; however, the Company archive is a nineteenth-century construct. Though the Company 
generated massive amounts of paperwork and engaged in correspondence that spanned the globe, 
it did so in a rather haphazard fashion. The clean categories into which the Company’s papers are 
organized today were only put into place at the very end of the Company’s existence and often 
do not entirely stand up to close inspection. Much of the surviving correspondence can be found 
scattered and repeated in multiple series and what was preserved as opposed to what was not at 
times appears arbitrary. For example, despite Company mandates that its agents keep journals, 
there are actually very few surviving examples. While there are many more available logbooks 
or journals from ships, again only a very small portion of voyages left behind a written record. 
As keeping a log was essential for navigation, it is unlikely that any of the ships did not keep a 
logbook; however, many may not have submitted theirs to the Company at the end of the 
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voyage. The Company did not have an official librarian or archivist before the nineteenth century 
and, therefore, did not maintain any reflective record of its archival practices.
45
 Essentially, the 
archive was kept for practical and not historical purposes. Employees of the Company used the 
preserve of papers and records as a daily reference and not as a coherent narrative of the 
Company’s history. It is not a coincidence that the best maintained and most complete records 
are the Company accounts. 
The official correspondence of the Company was often formulaic and composed 
primarily of copying out the same basic set of instructions. In between the many repetitive letters 
listing orders from the Directors, however, are records of the dynamic relationships that made up 
the East India Company. The surviving private correspondence of the East India Company 
makes clear the power struggles and bitter rivalries that existed within its ranks. An example of 
this can be seen in the angry response by one member of the Company to another Company 
member by the name of Edward Hurst, in which he pronounced that he had “perused your false 
malicious and absurd Epistle which you are pleased to terme a Protest against me.”46 Hurst, it 
would seem, had placed the author under the risk of being reported to the government as a pirate, 
a charge which he protested strongly against. Such a charge was not only damaging to himself, 
he argued, but also to the English East India Company and he sought to protect the Company 
from the damages that might accrue due to Hurst’s charge. Indeed, while Hurst had accused him 
of stealing pepper that belonged to Hurst, the aggrieved author, instead, asserted that in fact he 
had bought said pepper in the Company name and it was rather Hurst who had sought to steal it. 
By responding to Hurst’s accusations, he was attempting to insulate himself from the charges 
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and, moreover, to reverse them. Though paperwork was seldom quite as dramatic as this 
incident, it frequently served the role of self-justification and to protect the writer against 
possible future accusations of misdoing. The journal kept by Robert Douglas during his 1698-
1700 voyage to China (discussed in detail in Chapter Four) is a good example of this. 
Douglas had been ordered by the directors of the Company “to keep a Dyary or Journall 
of all your Transactions as exact as you can to be produced by yourself, & in Case of your 
mortality, by your Successors, who are to continue the same dureing the whole voyage.”47 The 
journal, as has been shown, went considerably beyond simply providing an account of Douglas’s 
transactions and also supplied an extensive record of his day-to-day dealings and the actions he 
attempted to undertake on behalf of the Company. In this regard, the journal was not intended by 
Douglas only for the benefit of a possible successor should he die or for the purpose of regular 
record keeping such as was the case with account books. While it did serve both of those 
functions, it significantly also provided Douglas with the opportunity for self-justification and to 
explain his actions at length. Thus, though in a very different context than the letter to Hurst, it 
too had the function of protection against possible incriminations. One of the obvious benefits of 
bureaucratic anonymity, from the perspective of a member of the bureaucracy, is that it insulates 
against the consequences of mistakes. The English East India Company employees, on the other 
hand, were typically isolated and held responsible for the consequences of their actions. The 
chain-of-command was generally short and direct and the individual actors relatively clear. 
The use of paperwork for the purpose of discipline has been recognized and is especially 
clear in the case of journals and logbooks kept by officers aboard ships. The considerable record-
keeping demanded by the East India Company served to benefit future voyages by 
communicating the hard-earned knowledge gained on earlier expeditions. An example of this is 
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seen in the use of John Ovington’s publication A Voyage to Surat, which the directors of the 
Company frequently referred to as a valuable source.
48
 For instance, in the instructions to the 
supercargoes aboard the Discovery in 1700 was included “some directions concerning the Trade 
of Mocha in a printed book entitled A Voyage to Surat by Mr Ovington, which wee have caused 
to be transcribed and are here inclosed, not knowing whether you have seen y
e
 book.”49 While 
Douglas’s journal might have been useful for such a purpose, I do not have evidence that it ever 
was.
50
 Moreover, the printed Voyage to Surat was principally a work of travel writing. Thus, 
Ovington’s work emphasized the usual themes of the genre describing the local political 
structures, cultures, peoples and geographies rather than the day-to-day dealings found in 
unedited journals. As was common, Ovington included significant material from other sources 
and did not clearly delineate when he went outside his personal experiences.
51
  
Voyage to Surat was intended to be instructive to those traveling to the East and was not 
especially an account of John Ovington; however, many of the books written by world travelers 
were much more clearly intended to aggrandize the adventures of the author.
52
 Global seafaring 
was difficult and dangerous, which made it inherently romantic and attractive for literature. More 
importantly for the argument of this chapter, the rules of behaviour were ill-defined and its 
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activity was carried out at a great distance from supervision and at considerable expense. 
Because of the expenses involved, the demands placed on those in positions of authority were 
extremely high. The distances, however, meant that the expectations and realities were in 
constant conflict. Thus, those who made the voyages on behalf of the East India Company were 
constantly forced to armour themselves against likely disappointment. And, as the example of 
John Vaux shows, the tensions within the Company meant that one was also at risk of having 
one’s position undermined by ambitious underlings. 
Between 1698 and 1709 the situation was particularly confusing due to an Act of 
Parliament that saw the original East India Company lose its monopoly on the India trade and the 
formation of a new company. The reason for this was due to considerable concerns regarding the 
management of the original company and the real worry that the East India Company was on the 
verge of collapse and the East India trade would thus be lost. The loss of the monopoly meant 
that for the decade that followed there operated in Southeast Asia two companies, known as the 
Old and New companies. The situation was reflective of the belief that England’s place in world 
trade was in decline. Though it was, ultimately, the Dutch who would decline, in the late 1690s 
the Dutch were seen to have “miserably lessened us in all Trades in the World, not secured to us 
by Laws, or by some natural advantage which over-ballanceth the disproportion of our Interest of 
Money.”53 To make things extra difficult, it was frequently unclear even for those involved as to 
which company one was working for or to whom goods belonged. Meanwhile, the fierce 
competition created both new opportunities and problems for Company employees in the East. 
Ultimately the situation was resolved by the two companies being merged in 1709 back into a 
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single company known as the United English East India Company, but prior to that return of the 
monopoly the state of affairs were one of considerable turmoil. The decisions made by the 
presidents of the Company’s factories were often subjected to intense scrutiny; however, the 
instable situation the Companies found themselves in at the beginning of the eighteenth century 
added a new risk that one might be accused of being an agent for the other company. An 
example of this can be found in the case of William Tillard. 
Tillard had been the second in command as well as the warehouse keeper at Fort St. 
George until the death of John Pitt resulted in his promotion.
54
 The Company soon expressed 
concern that it had “been very ill used by Mr. Tillard and others in the matter of the Bills of 
Exchange drawn on you for the Payment of Your Debt to the Black Merchants.”55 Tillard and his 
associates at Fort St. George had used Company money to pay off debts. When the Directors 
wrote to Duke Faunce and Philip Baker (a steward and accountant respectively) in an attempt to 
learn more details as to what had actually occurred, the two men denied any particular 
knowledge explaining they had been “at that time being 270 Miles from Fort St. George at a 
Place abandon’d by all English but ourselves.”56 While they defended Tillard as having sought to 
act in the Company’s best interests, they suggested he had been forced to rely on unscrupulous 
advisers: 
Those with whom he was necessitated to Consult made their advantage of his 
necessity, advising more for their own private Interest then for the Good of the 
Company, and here is a Braeham belonging to the Company yet with a small 
matter of Instruction knows how to dress up a Grievance to the best advantage, 
and express himself in proper English, as may be seen by the Merchants last 
Petitition Deliver’d the United Councell against the New Company, which Philip 
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Baker saw render’d into English by him very lately, a Copy of which We Suppose 
Your Honours have from the United Councell.
57
 
Though Faunce and Baker claimed to know nothing of the actual affair, they were quick to 
speculate that private speculators had taken advantage of the Company. In order to resolve an 
immediately pressing problem regarding debt owed to local merchants: 
We may imaginarily infer from the Gentlemens advanceing their own Money for 
Payment of so dangerous a Debt as they gave it out to be, and to serve those they 
all along held to be their Enemies, (whom yet they wont afford a good word) from 
which We may reasonably Conclude some Siniste[r] Interest to be the Indueing 
Motive, that Put them upon doing the New Company Such a Signal Service (as 
they are pleas’d to term it) in Paying their Debt, saving their Credit, and Runing 
the Risque of their own money, in which if they had perceiv’d the least Danger, 
Wee are fully Perswaded but lightly Affect them.
58
 
One possible motivation for the whole affair, it was suggested, was an effort to undermine the 
New Company’s credit.59 As trade in India was deeply dependent upon credit, if the New 
Company were to lose its reputation, its ability to carry out business would be significantly 
impaired. This was acknowledged by eighteenth-century commentators such as Charles 
Davenport who wrote: 
Of all beings that have existence only in the minds of men, nothing is more 
fantastical and nice than Credit; it is never to be forced; it hangs upon opinion; it 
depends upon our passions of hope and fear; it comes many times unsought for, 
and often goes away without reason; and when once lost, is hardly to be quite 
recovered.
60
 
As the historian John Brewer has pithily put it, “credit was a matter of confidence and 
confidence was a matter of opinion.”61 
Private merchants had to “give out money before hand” when buying goods, while the 
East India Company preferred to buy entirely on contract, which lowered costs and protected the 
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Company from bad debts.
62
 The involvement of speculators in the management of the 
Company’s debt seemed ripe for abuse. The complicated state of affairs that saw the English 
East India Company divided in two while continuing to compete against a spate of foreign 
interests meant that the state of the New Company’s credit was of particular importance. Indeed, 
when the two Companies merged back into a single enterprise, it was emphasized that “When 
the Old Company will expire like unto a dead man to use your own phrase and therefore the 
King of England has ordered you his Consull to tell the Governours of Suratt they are to pay 
their debts before their servants depart this Empire.”63 
It was imperative that the Company be on a firm foundation and the Old Company depart 
with its credit good. The trouble William Tillard found himself in was due to his predecessor 
having agreed to prices: 
At such extravagant rates, that after their arryvall, and the company had paid the 
Freights & high Customes for them, most of the said Goods would not sell for 
more mony then what he has charged them at in the Invoyces for their first cost, 
whereby the Company have lost an incredible Sume of mony, and could not 
avoyd suspecting there was an understanding underhand betwixt out Presid
t
: & 
those Merch
ts
.
64
 
The Company had originally sent two men (surnames Fraser and Wright) to assist Tillard with 
adjusting the Account Books in order to clarify what the new Company owed to the merchants of 
Metchlepatam and Maddapollam.
65
 Tillard had requested advice on multiple occasions and had 
told the governor and council at Fort St. George that he had been offered a considerable loan on 
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his New Company Bills of Exchange at the rate of 10 shilling and 6 pence. He expressed concern 
at this point in time that the debt owed by the new Company was considerably bigger than he 
believed the Company expected. In the aftermath the council stated that at this point they had 
advised him to leave the debt for Metchlepatam unpaid until it had been thoroughly investigated 
by the Company. Furthermore, they had told him to return to England on the Dutchess, bringing 
with him all books and papers so that “they may clearly see how the Debt arrised.”  
The Directors soon claimed, however, that Tillard had allowed the “Black Merchts: all 
their demands with Interest thereon, without makeing the least enquiry into the extortant prizes 
or frauds committed in Piscashes Dustores or any other wayes.”66 In paying off these debts, 
Tillard had valued the bills of exchange as being ten shillings and six pence when at the time in 
London they were actually worth only nine shillings. In the meantime, the debts to the “black 
merchants” had been renegotiated at a rate of sixty to seventy percent of what had originally 
been owed. The council at Fort St. George believed the reaction from London was due to a lack 
of information. The Directors had responded thus because “it plainly appears that when they 
wrott that Letter, they knew little or nothing of their great Debt on this Coast, or they would 
never have wrott so doubtfully of it.” Thus, the council was confident that once Tillard arrived in 
England with the account books it would be seen that they would “expect that no considerable 
part of the Debt remaining be pay'd till their farther orders, which we may depend on they will 
send by next shipping.” 67 That was essentially what the Directors decided after Tillard arrived in 
London and was able to explain the situation in person.  
The entire incident came down to two related issues, the debt owed to the merchants and 
the loan that had been offered to Tillard in order to pay the original debt. While the debt was 
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much greater than the Directors had expected because Pitt had supposedly purchased goods for 
greatly inflated prices, it was ultimately resolved by renegotiating the debt with the merchants to 
something more in line with what the Company regarded as reasonable. The question of the loan 
was a different problem because it resulted with those who had underwritten Tillard’s original 
scheme involving the sale of bills of exchange in order to cover the debts claiming to own bonds 
worth more than what was due to the merchants. Such a situation was a threat to the stability of 
the New Company’s credit. Moreover, it was a threat to the value of the Bills of Exchange as it 
left the Company owing bonds that exceeded assets and debts. The Company survived the affair 
without any noticeable effect; however, the example of the bursting of the South Sea Bubble a 
decade later demonstrates an extreme example of the possible consequences of such situations.
68
 
 The incident demonstrates a number of this dissertation’s themes. Tillard, who had not 
been specifically chosen for a governing position at Fort St. George was still able to take 
considerable unilateral action when he found himself so empowered after the death of the 
Company’s chosen president. The Directors of the Company were quite limited in their ability to 
affect the ongoing affairs in India and were frequently forced to respond retroactively after 
actions had already been taken. Despite the level of recordkeeping demanded, in this instance, 
the Directors lacked the information necessary to understand what had taken place. What they 
knew was that Tillard had drawn substantially upon the bills of exchange in order to pay debts 
that seemed out of line with standard practice. They were only able to come to a final resolution 
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of the affair after Tillard had returned to England two years later and was able to answer their 
questions directly. While the Company’s bonds derived their value from the assurance that they 
were to be paid out on demand, in this instance the Company refused to pay bonds they believed 
to be either fraudulent or more than they “justly” owed.69 As a final side note, Duke Faunce 
would himself be dismissed by the Company along with a man named John Bridge a few years 
later when they refused to be responsible for a Mr. Berlue’s perquisites while he was away from 
the factory, preferring, instead, to be suspended and discharged.
70
 
Harold Cook has argued there was a direct relationship between the rise of global 
commercial exchange and the birth of the scientific fact because the kind of large-scale and long 
distance trade carried out by joint stock companies like the East India Companies required credit 
on a scale that went beyond what could be managed by local networks. Cook contended that 
Dutch capitalism spurred the development of consensus in science by restricting practitioners’ 
attention to empirically verified facts.
71
 In order to carry out trade on a global scale and with 
commodities that were not locally familiar, a new vocabulary for commerce had to be developed. 
The new vocabulary of global exchange, according to Cook, allowed for unfamiliar goods to be 
described in a language that allowed for them to be compared to commodities that were known 
by Europeans and thereby given a value. Cook has presented a highly compelling argument for 
the development of global exchange in the European context, but the way the English East India 
Company operated within India does complicate the picture somewhat. Much of the English East 
India Company’s operation relied on the cultivation of interrelated local networks in its many 
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places of operation and on the actions undertaken by employees who were significantly 
empowered to act on the Company’s behalf. The history of the Company in South Asia, 
therefore, had less to do with classification or the mathematization of nature though the flood of 
new commodities and ideas from hitherto little or unknown parts of the globe may have had such 
a result in Europe.
72
 
The outgoing correspondence by the directors of the English East India Company was 
substantially made up of detailed orders to those in positions of responsibility such as the 
captains, supercargoes and presidents of the various factories. These instructions were both 
exhaustively detailed and repetitive as essentially the same orders were copied out over and over 
again. To take one example, supercargoes were instructed on what they were to buy, at what 
price and how much. The orders did not stop there, however, as they also were informed how the 
ship was to be laden in order to protect the newly purchased goods. For instance, Robert Douglas 
was told:  
In packing up your Raw Silks, observe you putt first a Wadd of Cotton over the 
whole Bale or parcel of Silk & dry paper next and then oyld paper over that and 
then your matts, which is to avoid the damageing or discoloring the Silks w
ch
 will 
happen if the oyld Cloth be next to it, but pack it rather in chests then Bales. 
Meanwhile, regarding tea he was to “be sure that all the wood used for making your Cases & 
Tubbs be well seasoned & made of such Stuff as will not prejudice the Tea.”73 The long return 
trip placed the expensive cargo at considerable risk of damage and, therefore, it was important 
that proper procedure be followed. Presumably, however, crews experienced in the voyages to 
China and India were well familiar with how to laden the ship correctly. Such orders, thus, might 
be understood not as giving needed instruction, but providing officers with a means of 
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disciplining their crews. An example of using the Company’s directives for the purpose of 
discipline can be found when Douglas wrangled with his assistant regarding the keeping of 
accounts as per Company requirements: 
I offered Mr Strong two of y
e
 Company Books w
ch
 he refused to accept of, I told 
him it was his Bussiness as he was Second to me, to keep them, but he denyed y
t
 
it was his businesse & refused to keepe them, I told him he must answer it to y
e
 
Court of Directors for I designed to keepe an exact acco
t
 of all things in my owne 
Journall. att last when he had better Considered of it he came and told me y
t
 he 
was willing to keepe y
m
 butt till our Goods were all delivered he coud not doe any 
thing exactly therefore he wanted some wast books to keepe ruffe daughts, till 
they could be entred fare in y
e
 other Books y
t
 y
r
 might be no blotts.
74
 
By including such written instructions, the directors gave their chosen officers a point of 
reference upon which to base orders to their subordinates that they might otherwise have been 
unable to enforce.
75
  
The inclusion of written orders such as “you are not to touch at Batavia either outward or 
homeward bound” would not be enough to compel submission when the crew of the Rising 
Eagle found the supply of water at risk of falling short if the ship did not stop at Batavia to 
resupply.
76
 While Douglas made the case that his orders explicitly forbade landing at Batavia for 
any reason, the crew refused to continue further without the issue of water being resolved and 
Douglas was forced to relent.
77
 The incident provides one of the more clear examples of Douglas 
using his journal in order to justify his actions as he clearly failed to follow the direct order of his 
superiors. Thus, he was careful to make clear that he had advocated the Company’s position and 
had only relented when it became clear there was no other alternative. It also calls attention to 
the dynamics aboard ships. Though hierarchical in nature and authoritarian to a degree, the crew, 
in fact, had significant power due to the constant shortage of able seamen—which meant that 
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capable crew members were always able to abandon their current ship for another when in port, 
and frequently did—along with the threat of mutiny if the situation became particularly 
untenable.  
The journal of John Cremer (self-styled as Captain Ramblin’ Jack) has numerous 
examples of the negotiating power possessed by capable seamen as he was able to move from 
ship to ship with relative ease.
78
 As Nicholas Rodger has put it, “Men joined a King’s ship or a 
merchant’s ship as opportunity or preference suggested, and they moved easily from one to 
another.”79 Though it is generally assumed that mutineers were swiftly prosecuted and hanged, 
Greg Dening has shown that this view is due to the attention being primarily given to the more 
extreme cases. In practice the Navy was often more tolerant of considerable insubordination and 
even mutinous behaviour depending on the situation.
80
 It is this reality of life aboard at sea that 
underlies Douglas’s account of the affair even if he does not explicitly discuss the danger. The 
Company’s written directives were evidently of greater influence for those in positions of greater 
responsibility as they were the ones who would have to make an account of their actions. 
Company employees such as Douglas depended upon the favour of the Company’s directors for 
their future well-being, which was not the case for common sailors who were always able to 
move to another ship. The ease by which sailors were able to leave their current ship can be seen 
when Douglas noted after three members of the crew ran away after the Macclesfield arrived in 
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Macau that “just nine” had done so since the beginning of the voyage: two at Madera, four at 
Batavia and now three at Macau.
81
 
The “Nabobs,” (from the term Nawab, which was the title given to provincial governors 
in the Mughal empire), that is Indiamen who accumulated tremendous fortunes while in India, 
did not really exist until around the 1750s onward; however, there was still plenty of opportunity 
for private enterprise.
82
 Such trade was not opposed by the East India Company, though it did 
attempt to assert some control over private trade by its employees. The chance to participate in 
potentially lucrative private trade was one of the things that made India service attractive for 
would-be members of the bourgeoisie whose prospects were otherwise limited. This private trade 
did not damage the Company’s enterprise because it maintained a monopoly over the sale of 
goods imported to England from Southeast Asia. As the century progressed, however, India 
service became increasingly associated with corruption and greed as men like Warren Hastings 
obtained enormous wealth via “gifts” from local luminaries in the course of administrating the 
Company’s interests. These Nabobs then increased their notoriety by pouring the new riches in 
an effort to establish a bloc in Parliament favourable to their interests.  
While the Nabob controversies did not begin until the 1760s, private trade was never 
without contention. This was due, in part, to the way in which such practices displayed the 
tensions between the disparate institutions that made up the British state. As compelling as John 
Brewer’s narrative of the formation of the fiscal-military state might be, the institutions upon 
which his argument rests were often in direct competition with each other. As William Ashworth 
has shown, this was particularly the situation when it came to customs and excise. Importers, 
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small and independent and giant corporations such as the East India Company alike were united 
in their efforts at avoiding paying taxes. The East India Company, with its important connections 
and powerful shareholders, often did this by influencing Parliament to create exceptions for it, 
the most significant and long-lasting of these being the case of tea imported by the Company. 
Smaller traders were forced to rely on different means; namely, trickery and smuggling. 
Members of the English East India Company were not above such efforts at trickery and 
smuggling. For instance, a customs officer by the name of John Snow accused the captain and 
mates of the East India Company ship the Caesar of having: 
Taken out goods belonging to the Honorable united East India Company and 
showed them in other parts of the Said Ship and put into the hold a Large quantity 
of Bales of Coffee belonging to themselves and that these were private Scuttles 
made on purpose for the Conveying the said Bales of Coffee out of the Hold in 
order to cary it a shore without payment of His majesties Customs or the Honorable 
Company their dues.
83
 
The Caesar was hardly an isolated case. Snow made similar charges against the crew of the 
Townshend, the Drake and the Devonshire.
84
 For his trouble, the captain of the Townshend Philip 
Worth paid a fee of £78.15.0 to resolve the situation.
85
 William Ashworth has gone so far as to 
argue that the ingenuity required for the evasion of taxes and fees were in fact a significant driver 
of technological improvement.
86
 Such incidents point to the competing interests within and 
between commerce, the state and the ancillaries of the government and the many individual 
actors involved. While John Snow may have been dutifully performing his job, there was 
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obvious opportunity for corruption by customs officers. Bribes were not the only means by 
which some attempted to benefit from uncovering clandestine trade. For example, in 1710 Josiah 
Cliffe of London wrote to the East India Company to demand a reward for having uncovered and 
revealed such activity the previous year.
87
 The problem of customs fees was not limited to 
England either as the East India Company was in regular conflict with local officials on the other 
side of the trade as well. The customs imposed in, for instance, China were portrayed by those on 
the English side of the trade as examples of Chinese corruption and as part of the unfair tactics 
employed by Chinese merchants against European merchants.
88
 For instance, John Ovington 
noted in Voyage to Suratt, “Bartholomew Harris has urged to me often this case, that he thought 
it no Injustice to evade the payment of as much Customs for the English goods as they were 
injur’d in them above two and a half per Cent by the Mogul.”89 
In 1700 the Company’s position was more tenuous and its riches much more of a promise 
than a reality. Thus, it had to tread particularly carefully. Britain did not yet have a large market 
for tea and it was only after decades of effort by the East India Company that tea would take its 
place at the centre of English culture and be seen as an essential commodity.
90
 Meanwhile, 
pepper was not actually a financially viable good by the middle of the eighteenth century, yet the 
Company continued to buy it in large quantities and ship it back to England because it provided a 
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necessary ballast to stabilize their ships as they made the long, dangerous voyage.
91
 Even goods 
that were in demand were not without controversy. The importation of goods from India and 
China were not regarded by all as a good thing. The demand for silks was an immediate concern 
for English cloth manufactures and merchants, especially since global trade had not managed to 
secure the hoped for new markets for English woolens. Thus, there were regular efforts to limit 
or even ban the importation of silks, such as an Act of Parliament that sought to outlaw the 
wearing of wrought silk.
92
 Global trade may have played a crucial role, as the economic historian 
Jan de Vries has shown, in creating the conditions that allowed modern capitalism and industry 
to develop, but it did so at considerable cost to those who depended on the models that had come 
before.
93
 Though the benefits of globalism have come to be taken as an article of faith by modern 
economics, the tension between the global and the local remains unresolved. 
Conclusion 
 In 1694 the president of the English East India Company, Josiah Child, published a 
treatise on trade.
94
 The primary aim of his book, unsurprisingly, was to promote the growth of 
trade as essential for the good of the nation. Child anticipated the rise of the fiscal state arguing 
for low interest rates and available credit in order to advance England’s position in the world.95 
In making such an argument, Child was hardly alone as John Locke and Daniel Defoe also both 
favorably addressed the question of trade and the Bank of England was established in 1695 with 
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such concerns specifically in mind.
96
 All looked to the Dutch as the model the English ought to 
be following. Defoe enviously termed the Dutch “the Carryers of the World, the middle Persons 
in Trade, the Factors and Brokers of Europe” who “supply’d from all Parts of the World, that 
they may supply all the World again.”97 If England was to become a leading power in the world, 
it was believed that it would have to address its institutional weaknesses. 
Yet, the example of the English East India Company challenges the assumption that long-
distance control was necessary for global trade. The case of John Vaux that opened the chapter is 
one example of how the East India Company was not only unable to attain long-distance control, 
but did not even manage local control within its administration. William Ashworth’s example of 
the hydrometer is another telling example of the limitations of institutional authority and 
expertise. In the mid-eighteenth century the excise commissioned the instrument maker John 
Clarke to design an instrument—the hydrometer—to provide a quantified measurement of the 
alcohol content contained in spirits. This measurement was intended to resolve disputes between 
the excise and distillers because spirits were taxed according to their alcohol content. Thus, 
distillers and merchants were motivated to misrepresent their spirits in order to reduce their taxes 
and the hydrometer was intended as an objective mechanism to prevent disputes. While the 
hydrometer was widely adopted, distillers continued to find new methods of adulteration in order 
to evade the excise.
98
 The institutions of state and trade, both public and private, were 
intertwined with the knowledge practices seen at the Royal Society and in the Philosophical 
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Transactions.
99
 As Harold Cook has argued, knowledge production and commercial practices 
existed within the same spheres and one cannot be fully understood without recognition of the 
other.
100
 At the same time, however, the institutions were composed of complex social relations 
and competing sets of self-interests. 
That the origins of modern science and industrialization occurred in the context of global 
expansion and imperialism is not a coincidence. The complex web of relationships between the 
imperial, capitalist world and the history of science has been recognized by a great many 
historians. While the East India Company and the India trade has been afforded a great deal of 
attention by historians of science, the Company as an institution remains less explored. The 
principal goal of this chapter has been to bring the institutional imperatives into the conversation. 
Joint-stock trade companies, especially the East India Company, and the British Navy were 
crucial to the history of science in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; however, the 
advancement of science was never their primary concern. The interests of natural philosophy and 
natural history often overlapped with those of the East India Company and the Navy enough that 
the two were able to be of mutual benefit. Obvious examples of such cooperation can be seen in 
the improvement of navigation during the eighteenth century or the many voyages of discovery. 
Edmond Halley was given a naval rank, ship and crew with which to lead three scientific 
voyages in the 1690s. Similarly, James Cook’s explorations are remembered for their scientific 
endeavours and, like Halley, were done at the Navy’s behest and with its ships. However, in both 
of these examples, there was actually considerable tension between naval priorities and those of 
natural philosophy and natural history. In perhaps the most dramatic example, Greg Dening has 
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argued that it was partly William Bligh’s obsequiousness to Joseph Banks and the demands of 
natural history was one of the major grievances that led to the infamous mutiny on the Bounty.
101
 
Though the results were less extreme, the relationship between Banks and Cook was also a tense 
one and ultimately prevented Banks from directly participating in Cook’s later voyages.102 
This chapter, then, has sought to tease apart bureaucratic and institutional concerns from 
the interests of the actors who made up the English East India Company. The thesis has been that 
the tensions that existed between rival actors within the Company and the contradictions that 
define the Company’s history played an essential role in the way in which knowledge practices 
happened in the eighteenth century. Global expansion irrevocably changed the way in which 
Europeans viewed the world; however, their perspective was altered less in philosophical terms 
than in commercial ones. Benjamin Schmidt has argued that the concept of the exotic was 
invented principally for the benefit of commercial interests. Exotic geography, as he explained, 
was intended mainly to sell books.
103
 Historians of natural history, similarly, have acknowledged 
the way in which the commodification of nature, global commerce and the history of science 
were intertwined. The East India Company was a leading participant in this process because if it 
was to be viable and profitable it needed markets for its products.  
Yet, as this chapter has shown, on a day-to-day basis, the employees of the Company 
tended to be taken up rather more with self-interests. I hope to have shown something of the 
messiness with which the East India Company developed; I also hope to have begun to articulate 
something of an argument regarding the circulation of knowledge. Knowledge is produced and 
circulated in a wide variety of contexts. Moreover, its transmission is not always symmetrical. 
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Indeed, I would argue that the power dynamics in the circulation of knowledge is almost always 
asymmetrical. Yet, as examples provided in this dissertation hopefully demonstrate, the 
imbalance is not always in the direction one would assume. In the case of the East India 
Company, the institutional power would seem to lie with those directing the Company from 
London; however, frequently limitations in communication and access to knowledge greatly 
undermined the intended hierarchy. My intention here is not to make any grand claims regarding 
the circulation of knowledge, but to place a greater emphasis on knowledge as practice. 
Ultimately, knowledge is intended to be used. The focus of this dissertation is to understand a set 
of knowledge practices. The question is less how was knowledge produced and more how was 
knowledge used and what tension existed between lay use of knowledge and elite conceptions of 
knowledge? 
The concern of Andre Wakefield has been to write a history of German cameralism that 
looked forward from the perspective of his historical actors and not backward from the point-of-
view of the present. In doing so, his aim was to “make the ‘rise of the modern state’ seem a little 
less inevitable and a little less monolithic.”104 Imperialism, capitalism and global trade are 
defining features of what is understood as the modern world. The modern world in which we 
live, however, was not inevitable. More crucially for the purposes of this project, it was not 
obvious from the perspective of the eighteenth century. The directors of the English East India 
Company did not intend to create a colonial power. The rise of British imperialism in Southeast 
Asia was the result of a series of events and decisions often made for reasons of self-interest by 
increasingly powerful Company administrators. In this chapter, I have provided a handful of 
examples that are particularly demonstrative of the contradictions of the English East India 
Company as an institution in the early eighteenth century. Considering the magnitude of its 
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operations and the severe limitations of its resources, the English East India Company was an 
impressive achievement. It was also, however, frequently chaotic and disorderly and seldom able 
to achieve its goals to the extent that its directors hoped. Its eventual hegemony at the end of the 
century is a testament to persistence. Why its directors, its shareholders and the politicians who 
supported it continued to persist in the endeavour, and why the English company succeeded in 
ways that others such as the Dutch, the French or the Portuguese did not remains unclear to me. 
The Company state was not inevitable or remotely likely seeming at the turn of the eighteenth 
century; therefore, the questions I have raised here are crucial to understanding the English East 
India Company and suggest that the eighteenth century is as important for historians of the 
Company as the nineteenth century. In this chapter, I have not attempted to answer such 
questions. Rather, my aim has simply been to insist that they be asked. 
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Chapter Four 
London as the Periphery: The English Experience in Canton c. 1700 
Eighteenth-century Europeans accepted as a matter of fact that China was in a state of 
stagnation. David Hume explained this stagnation by pointing to China’s homogeneity and 
insularity: 
In CHINA there seems to be a pretty considerable stock of politeness and science, 
which, in the course of so many centuries, might naturally be expected to ripen into 
something more perfect and finished, than what has yet arisen from them. But 
CHINA is one vast empire, speaking one language, governed by one law, and 
sympathizing in the same manners. The authority of any teacher, such as 
CONFUCIOUS, was propagated easily from one corner of the empire to another. 
None had courage to resist the torrent of popular opinion. And posterity were not 
bold enough to dispute what had been universally received by their ancestors. This 
seems to be one natural reason, why the sciences have made so slow a progress in 
that mighty empire.
1
 
Hume, therefore, maintained a worldview that managed to be both parochial and globalist at 
once. Europe was accepted as the natural center of the world, which was explicated by 
Europeans’ role in global trade. Unlike the insular Chinese who closed their empire off to 
outsiders, the cosmopolitan Europeans had spread across the globe and to great benefit. Yet, as 
this chapter will show, Europe’s global influence was still limited, especially when viewed from 
the perspective of economic history. Britain had not yet become the industrial powerhouse it 
would develop into by the nineteenth century and its manufactured goods were of little interest to 
merchants in China.
2
 When historians have written about the metropole and the periphery, it has 
traditionally been taken for granted that the metropole was Euro-American and the periphery 
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everywhere else that came under nineteenth-century imperial domination. In this chapter, I argue 
that this is because we have taken Hume’s point-of-view. From the perspective of the Chinese, it 
was China and not Europe that was at the center of the world.
3
 As historians of economics and 
South Asia have shown, the Asian case is actually quite strong. The metropole and periphery can 
readily be inverted. 
Underlying this inversion of the traditional metropole and periphery is that there was a 
loose relationship between the directors managing the Company’s affairs from London and its 
so-called servants in Asia. A particularly acute example of this looseness can be seen in some of 
the correspondence of the East India Company captain Benjamin Brangwin. Writing from Surat, 
Brangwin was faced with an acute lack of information and wrote to his acquaintance Edward 
Owen at Gomeroon (Persia) for help. Brangwin pleaded for an update, stating that he “cannot 
imagine w
t’s become of Sir Josiah Child & Sir Thomas Cook not finding ye names mentioned; 
neither can I perceive how or who are y
e
 mangers of y
e
 Comp
a
 at present; if you know any thing 
pray inform me.”4 
It is, perhaps, unsurprising to learn that agents of the Company located in distant outposts 
found it difficult to keep abreast with news from home. However, to regard places like Surat, 
Bombay, Calcutta or Canton as simply distant outposts cut off from the metropole of London is 
to misunderstand the situation. The Company directors were arguably even more ill-informed of 
what was happening at the so-called periphery than those in that periphery were as to the goings 
on in England. A letter typically took six months to travel from India to England, its content 
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largely obsolete by the time it arrived. Thus, the Court of Directors in London were really only 
nominally managing the operations of the Company. Rather than a centralized hierarchy in 
which decisions were made at the centre and diffused outward to the far-flung “outposts,” the 
Company depended heavily on its individual representatives in its distant factories for much of 
the management of its affairs.  
The weakness of its organizational structure explains why it was obsessed with 
paperwork and record keeping. The consequences of bad management at the periphery could be 
severe. For example, when Charles Fleetwood replaced John Sowden at Benkulen it was because 
Sowden’s governance had been so bad as to occasion “an actuall warr and distruction of the 
Town and Frightning away the Inhabitants and trade.”5 Other Company employees, however, 
lost their jobs for a much more mundane, but not unrelated, reason: the failure to supply the 
directors in London adequately with reports. Rather than existing at the centre of global 
exchange, London was simply one of a great number of nodes in a complicated network. As was 
shown in the previous chapter, the directors of the English East India Company were highly 
circumscribed in their ability to influence economic and political activity over long distances.  
In this chapter, then, I have two objectives. As the quotation from David Hume points 
toward, the key conceit of Newtonian science was the claim that it produced universal 
knowledge and, correspondingly, that it was the only method by which such universal 
knowledge could be reliably obtained. This universalism was developed over the course of the 
eighteenth century and played a pivotal role in nineteenth and twentieth-century justifications of 
imperialism. Moreover, eighteenth-century assumptions remain embedded in twenty-first century 
historiography. The first objective of this chapter, then, is to begin to address this historiographic 
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problem. One expression of it has been the various proposals for how knowledge circulates. On 
the one hand there is Bruno Latour’s concept of centres of calculation—which makes explicit use 
of a metropole and periphery model of the world, while others in science and technology studies 
have proposed a more egalitarian circulation of knowledge.
6
 While greater efforts have been 
made to make the history of science less Eurocentric, the primacy of science itself remains 
mostly unchallenged. In order to begin to develop a historicized understanding of the relationship 
between scientific universalism and the metropole, the first section of this chapter puts the 
metropole into historiographic context. 
Global exploration and commerce were important reference points as the new science 
developed and matured between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. History of science, 
too, has recognized the significant role played by global commerce in shaping science during the 
eighteenth century.
7
 The European trading companies were at the centre of this expanding world 
trade. Thus, it is unsurprising that this trade has been increasingly recognized as having played a 
key part in the history of science.
8
 The tendency, however, has been to focus on those individuals 
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who were doing what can be recognizably described as science. Yet, the vast majority of the 
trading companies’ activities were devoted to just what their names suggest: trade. In that spirit, 
the second part of the chapter is devoted to understanding the experience of European-Chinese 
trade circa 1700 by following the story of the English East India Company supercargo for the 
Macclesfield Robert Douglas as he struggled to execute his duties in Canton (Guangzhou). 
Douglas was not involved in any scientific enterprises. Nor was he a central figure in the history 
of the East India Company. He left to posterity little other than the journal he kept while in 
China. Yet, his story can tell us much that is of value to the history of science because it is very 
illustrative of the commercial relationship between European and Chinese merchants.  
His journal is a valuable source because it demonstrates many of these key themes that 
have been the focus of investigations of the European imperial project. Though Douglas is an 
obscure figure who has been largely forgotten by history, he serves as an invaluable exemplar of 
global exchange and is useful as a type case. Douglas was the supercargo for the English East 
India Company ship the Macclesfield during a trading voyage to China at the turn of the 
seventeenth century. As supercargo, Douglas was responsible for selling the English goods the 
ship carried with it on its outward voyage and for purchasing the Chinese products desired in 
Europe. As such, he was given a detailed list of instructions by the Company, but also had 
relatively substantial latitude to carry out his role while he was in China. Though the Company 
sought to define the terms of the exchanges to be made and impose prices favourable to the 
Company, in practice the Company’s representatives were significantly constrained by the 
realities of the marketplace. The purpose of the Douglas case study is to demonstrate a more 
complex account of centres and peripheries. Rather than presuming the metropole to be 
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European and the periphery to be the rest of the world, in this chapter I advocate for a plurality of 
metropoles and peripheries. From the context of trade, at least, in 1700 Canton can be regarded 
as a metropole and London as a periphery. 
The Metropole and the Periphery 
Examples such as Benjamin Brangwin demonstrate the difficulty of asserting the 
existence of the metropole and the periphery. The metropole was original conceived to describe 
the British Empire. One of the more straightforward illustrations of the idea of the metropole can 
be found in a promotional scheme devised by the Empire Marketing Board in 1927.
9
 The Empire 
Marketing Board requested and received from the Master of the Royal Household the very recipe 
for the Christmas pudding that the Royal family would be eating with their Christmas dinner. 
Beside each ingredient listed in the recipe was listed the location in the empire from which the 
ingredient originated. Thus, the Empire Christmas Pudding perfectly embodies the notion of the 
metropole. As the centre or home territory of the colonial empire, the metropole was understood 
as determining the character of the rest of the empire. While the ingredients for the Empire 
Pudding come from around the globe, once in the metropole they were transformed into the most 
English of dishes. While historians of science have increasingly taken a broader view of their 
subject, a concept similar to the metropole has formed the foundation of how science has come 
to be understood. Perhaps the most explicit and developed model of the metropole and periphery 
in science studies can be found in Bruno Latour’s concept of “centres of calculation”; hence, 
Latour serves as the provocation for this chapter. 
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By centre of calculation, Latour argued that scientific knowledge is produced at a centre 
of political power (the metropole) and then disseminated outward from there to the periphery. He 
illustrated his concept of centres of calculation by discussing Jean-François de Galaup, comte de 
La Pérouse’s expedition on L’Astrolabe to an area of land in the East Pacific that was named 
“Segelien” or “Sakhalin” in Lapérouse’s travel books.10 This land was controversial in Europe 
when Lapérouse landed there on July 17, 1787 because no one in Europe knew if it was an island 
or a peninsula. It was to resolve such disputes that had led to Lapérouse being commissioned by 
Louis XVI to produce a map of the Pacific. Latour described how when the French arrived they 
sought geographic knowledge from the natives. An older Chinese man drew a map in the sand 
and demonstrated with gestures the size of the straight that divided Sakhalin from the Chinese 
mainland.
11
 As the tide threatened to erase this map, another Chinese man took Lapérouse’s 
notebook and sketched out another map in which he used little marks to signify a day’s travel by 
canoe and, therefore, indicate scale. Latour notes that the islanders were less successful at 
communicating to the French the depth of the straight because they had little understanding of 
the ship’s draught. Having received such helpful knowledge, Lapérouse decided to leave the next 
morning to see the straight for himself; however, fog, winds, and bad weather all conspired to 
prevent him from sighting the straight. Thus, months later when they arrived at Kamchatka, he 
had still not seen the straight. Instead, the French used the geographic knowledge received from 
the Chinese in order to conclude that Sakhalin was, indeed, an island and a young officer by the 
name of De Lesseps was asked by Lapérouse to carry the maps, notebooks, and astronomical 
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bearings the expedition and gathered over the previous two years back to Versailles where it 
could be assimilated into the corpus of geographic knowledge. 
Latour wrote that Lapérouse rushed to learn as much from the natives as he could and 
described their culture, politics, and economics. His naturalists gathered specimens, took notes, 
and made astronomical observations. All of this was done in a single day’s observations. This 
rush to collect as much knowledge as possible as quickly as possible is at the centre of what 
Latour regarded as the point of the story: “If they were interested in the island could they not stay 
longer? No, because they are not so much interested in this place as they are in bringing this 
place back first to their ship, and second to Versailles.”12 Data is collected at the periphery, but, 
Latour implies, it is only at the European metropole that such data can be transformed from a 
collection of facts into scientific knowledge. That is, it is in the metropole that natural knowledge 
is assimilated into the systemic body of universal knowledge of Western science. The role played 
by the Chinese in Latour’s account was only to provide unsystematised information that 
Lapérouse could then send back to Versailles. It was only after knowledge had been made 
scientific in the European centre that it could be transmitted back out into the periphery. The 
relationship between the periphery and the metropole is clear. 
Yet, the conception that knowledge is produced in the Euro-American metropole and 
then transferred to the periphery does not hold up to historical scrutiny.
13
 For instance, Michael 
                                                 
12
 Latour, Science in Action, 217. 
13
 David Philip Miller has found Latour's ideas to be productive for his study of Joseph Banks, see David Philip 
Miller, “Joseph Banks, Empire and ‘Centres of Calculation’ in Late Hanoverian London,” in Visions of Empire: 
Voyages, Botany and Representations of Nature, edited by David Philip Miller and Peter Hanns Reill (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), while other historians of science of have lodged a number of criticisms such as 
that Latour's model denies agency to the periphery in the making of science and that Latour assumes that 
instruments can work equally well in any context, see Kapil Raj, Relocating Modern Science and Graeme Gooday, 
“Instrumentation and Interpretation: Managing and Representing the Working Environments of Victorian 
Experimental Science,” in Victorian Science in Context, edited by Bernard Lightman (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997), 411. On the difficulty of replicating experiments, see Otto Sibum, “Reworking the 
Mechanical Value of Heat: Instruments of Precision and Gestures of Accuracy in Early Victorian England,” Studies 
183 
 
Bravo’s analysis of Lapérouse’s expedition found a very different account than what Latour had 
given. While Latour presented the encounter between Lapérouse as a one-off event and 
represented it as an example of the cycles of accumulation and calculation that allowed the West 
to gain and maintain its mastery over the world, Bravo’s adherence to the historical details 
resisted such unambiguous interpretations. As Lapérouse was, in fact, in Sakhalin waters for 
seven weeks, his party participated in a number of exchanges with the locals. Thus, Lapérouse 
was much more dependent on the locals than Latour’s account of the same event would lead one 
to believe.
14
  
Latour’s work is a continuation of a longstanding historical problem regarding the role of 
the “East” and the “West” in the development of science and technology. An illustration of the 
controversies that have arisen can be found in the contrasting views between the Joseph 
Needham and Herbert Butterfield circa 1949. In The Origins of Modern Science, Butterfield 
framed his inquiry around why modern science originated in Europe and not somewhere else.
15
 It 
was his thesis that the Scientific Revolution was the result of Renaissance scholars rediscovering 
ancient mathematics that had been lost in the “Dark Ages.” While Butterfield accepted that 
experimental work was done in the medieval period, he contended they lacked the necessary 
mathematical tools for the accumulation of knowledge necessary for the Scientific Revolution. 
As he put it, “Without the achievements of the mathematicians, the scientific revolution, as we 
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know it, would have been impossible,”16 It was only in the seventeenth century that mathematics 
became sufficiently sophisticated to allow modern science to be born. Thus, from Butterfield’s 
point-of-view science is explicitly European. It arose in Western Europe because it was only 
there that the social, cultural and intellectual conditions existed such as to allow it.
17
 While few 
historians of science today would engage in so blatant Eurocentrism, elements of his thesis 
persist as historians continue to frame their subject in ways that favour Euro-America as the 
scientific center. 
At the same time as Butterfield was working on his book, his Cambridge contemporary 
Joseph Needham was also grappling with the question of the origin of modern science. A 
chemist by training, Needham came to be interested in Chinese science and technology as a 
result of being placed in China during the Second World War. While in China he was impressed 
by what he learned of Chinese history and culture and was persuaded that the absence of Chinese 
science and technology in the historiography was a gross deficiency and he immediately set 
about to rectify the situation. His monumental Science and Civilisation in China published its 
first volume in 1954 and remains ongoing to this day. Needham was “convinced of the 
universality of science as a human enterprise, an expression of an innate curiosity fundamental to 
human nature, and intrigued by the momentous scientific and technological achievements of 
China up to the fifteenth century,” which led to him asking why modern science originated in 
Europe and not China. As Needham would put it, “Why, then, did modern science, as opposed to 
ancient and medieval science (with all that modern science implied in terms of political 
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dominance), develop only in the Western world?”18 This question was important for Needham 
because he wished to view science as culturally universal while acknowledging it as uniquely 
Western in origin.
19
 
The scientific universalism that can be seen in the work of Joseph Needham has a long 
history. While Isaac Newton was not the origin of the concept, I would argue that he is the most 
significant figure in the formulation of the Universalist worldview. In the General Scholium of 
the second edition of the Principia Isaac Newton defended his theory of gravitation against 
criticism that it lacked an explanatory theory by writing: “it is enough that gravity is real.” 
Gravity was demonstrated physically through experiment and, thus, it was not crucial that he did 
not provide a causal theory. Moreover, gravity was demonstrably true wherever one was in the 
world—or indeed in the universe. He made this point most succinctly in the explanation of his 
second rule of reasoning: “Examples are the cause of respiration in man and beast, or of the 
falling stones in Europe and America, or the light of a kitchen fire and the sun, or the reflection 
of light on our earth and the planets.”20 He was explicitly making a Universalist claim for natural 
philosophy. Newton’s Universalist position represented a transition from the experimental 
philosophy practiced by Robert Boyle, which was concerned with particulars and regarded an 
experiment as a discreet historical event.
21
  In making the argument that experimental philosophy 
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could be made abstract and universal, Newton represents a crucial transition in the history of 
science because this claim to universality is at the foundation of the “scientific method.” 
 The presumption that science is universal has significant implications for the deeply 
embedded Eurocentrism that permeates the history of the modern world and the history of 
science most especially.
22
 Science is a product of nineteenth-century Europe.
23
 Much of human 
history and its “progress” occurred without any of the supposed pillars of modernity. Yet, the 
history of science has tended to regard such conditions as not only essential for progress, but as 
the definition of it. To read history as the inexorable march toward modern technoscience is a 
disservice to the past. As the Bengali historian Benoy Kumar Sarkar recognized in a 1917 lecture 
delivered at Clark University, New York, while “Western” scholars of the “Orient” “seem to 
assume these have been the inseparable features of the Western world all through the ages,” in 
reality “the people of Asia from Chandraguptu to Kanghi would not have found any fundamental 
difference in Europe from Pericles to Frederick the Great.”24 As the rapid rise of Japan from the 
introduction of the locomotive in 1870 to its defeat of Russia in 1905 demonstrated to Sarkar, “in 
spite of the epoch-making ‘industrial revolution’ brought on by steam the West had not gone 
very far ahead of the East.” The East was slightly poorer than the West “only because it had not 
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independently produced the steam engine.”25 Similarly, Joseph Needham’s monumental history 
of science and technology in China was motivated by a desire to demonstrate that the rise of 
modern science in Europe was not due to an inherent superiority in European culture, but that 
many of the necessary conditions for science also existed in China.
26
  
Despite Needham’s strong support for Chinese intellectual achievements, he was unable to 
overcome what Andre Gunder Frank has termed Needham’s “Eurocentric original sin” because 
he had framed the entire inquiry on a Eurocentric frame of reference.
27
 As Benjamin Elman has 
observed, “modern portraits of the rise of science” have tended to “represent variations of a story 
of Western European scientific ‘success,’ and, by comparison, non-Western ‘failure.’”28 Though 
Needham wrote against a narrative of European technological supremacy, he did little to counter 
this basic account. The history of science has increasingly come to recognize the importance of 
the local and the social. There is not a history of science, but histories of science. By recognizing 
science to be situated, the stories told by historians of science can no longer presume an easy 
teleology from a primitive, pre-scientific past to a triumphant scientific present. Out of this 
attention to the local and the social—what Jan Golinski has called the constructivist approach to 
the history of science—has been the recent “global turn” in the history of science.29 
Historians of science have developed a number of approaches in order to overcome 
Eurocentrism and the asymmetrical relationship between the centre and the periphery in order to 
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challenge the hegemonic nature of the European intellectual tradition.
30
 The most prominent 
approaches have been the “circulation of knowledge” and Peter Galison’s conception of “trading 
zones.”31 Fa-ti Fan, however, has been unsatisfied with both of these alternatives. Though the 
circulation of knowledge “shifts attention away from the presumed centers, emphasizes the two-
way flow of knowledge, and…takes a broad view of the participants, actions, and sites in the 
enterprise of science, it asserts an equality that did not necessarily exist.
32
 Meanwhile, Galison’s 
trading zones are not universally applicable because not all knowledge production and transfer is 
analogous to commercial exchange.
33
 In all of this, the history of science has begun to fumble 
along a path previously followed by history of Empire and has only just begun to really confront 
ideas that historians of late Victorian imperialism first articulated in the 1950s.
34
  
The circulation of knowledge does make an admirable attempt at taking seriously the 
argument by historians of Southeast Asia that “the establishment of empire in India was far from 
the imposition of despotic rule over an inert people” and that “Imperial purposes appeared to be 
compatible with the interests of significant Indian elites.”35 As well, such language potentially 
directs attention to the way in which the colonial enterprise invented not only the Orient, but the 
Occident as well. However, the historical asymmetry between the hegemonic West and the 
colonized East should not be unduly obscured. Though Steven Shapin has noted the degree to 
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which Latour depends on militaristic and imperialistic language and Warwick Anderson how he 
has omitted local agents and context, his model is more flexible than often described.
36
 The 
Eurocentrism often seen in Latour’s work does not have to persist in the application of his 
vocabulary. The metropole does not have to be in Europe nor the periphery outside of it. Indeed, 
a given site might be regarded as a centre in one context and a periphery in another. 
Communication and Empire 
In a series of lectures delivered in 1949, the Canadian economist Harold Innis outlined 
“the competing tendencies of lightweight portable media such as papyrus and paper to effect the 
control of space, and of more durable, heavy, materials such as stone, clay, and parchment to 
permit the control of time.”37 As Innis argued, communication “occupies a crucial position in the 
organization and administration of government and in turn of empires and of Western 
civilization.”38 That communication is of central importance to empire is perhaps unsurprising 
because without a well-developed means of communication how is the imperial will to be 
imposed? Yet, the example of the English East India Company suggests that the role played by 
communication cannot be easily established. As Thomas Richards has argued, it might seem 
obvious that power cannot exist “without its underlay of documents, memoranda, licenses, and 
files…this assumption was new in the nineteenth century.”39 Indeed, even at the height of the 
British Raj, the disorder and chaos of communication makes it astounding that the British 
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imperial agents were able to get anything done.
40
 The limitations of communication were even 
more acute a century-and-a-half earlier.  
Despite the massive flow of communication, the English East India Company was 
constantly desperately short of information. Indeed, since it took at least six months for a letter to 
make the voyage, it was not really possible for someone in London to be current on the news in 
India or China. One possible reading of the history of the English East India Company is the 
process by which it established systems of bureaucratic forms of long-distance control by which 
it was able successfully to conquer not only trade, but much of South Asia itself. In 1700, 
however, the position of the Company was much more tenuous. Indeed, it was not even the 
Company at the time as it had recently split apart and was operating as the Old and New 
Companies. Yet, trade continued and profits were made by the Company and its stockholders. 
Despite its weaknesses, the East India Company served its purpose. 
While effective systems of communication and long-distance control might appear 
retrospectively as crucial to the English East India Company’s success, the reality was more 
complicated. I do not deny Miles Ogborn’s thesis that writing served as a tool of power for the 
East India Company or that “these letters and the writings that traveled alongside them were a 
vital part of making the relationships necessary to establish a global network.”41 Ogborn, 
however, might go too far in assigning to what Christopher Bayly called the “information order” 
of the East India Company causation in the development of British hegemony in Southeast 
Asia.
42
 Writing was certainly a central feature of the Company and it was no accident that its 
foreign employees were called “writers,” but it was only enforced in a consistent and coherent 
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way after the Seven Years’ War—after the Company began the transition from commercial 
enterprise to imperial power.
43
 For Bayly, the way that the Company set about collecting and 
systematizing material it drew from Indian sources demonstrates that its intelligence gathering 
was crucial to the Company’s success.44 That may have been true in the period after 1780 
discussed by Bayly, but at the beginning of the eighteenth century the Company did not even 
systematically arrange its own correspondence let alone information obtained from Indian 
sources. The East India Company only began to take a sustained interest in its historical records 
from the latter part of the eighteenth century. Before then “it appears that the records were 
largely left to accumulate with fairly minimal attention in the offices of the Secretary and other 
officials at East India House.”45 
 In 1700 England was not yet the global power it would eventually become. While it had 
begun to establish itself as a naval power, competition for sea trade to the Indies was fierce and 
the Dutch were still at the forefront even if they had begun their economic decline. Meanwhile 
Britain’s colonies in the Caribbean and North America were yet to generate significant profit. 
Historians who have studied the economic history of Southeast Asia during the eighteenth 
century have demonstrated that the European influence on the Asian economy was limited at 
best.
46
 Despite a concerted effort by the English East India Company to promote English trade 
goods, there was little interest in the products of English manufacturing. As a result the 
Europeans were forced to trade primarily in South American bullion, which meant there was a 
massive trade deficit in favour of the East up until at least 1780 when the increasingly 
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imperialistic English East India Company began to change the balance of power. While it is easy 
to view the history Southeast Asia with the benefit of hindsight, as Jack Goody has noted, while: 
The arrival of the Europeans led to the decline of Indian sea-power. But it also 
meant an increased demand for exports which could not be sent to the West 
more cheaply and in greater volume to satisfy the rising middle-class demands. 
And contact through trade and conquest led in turn to a growth in Indian 
business.
47
 
Southeast Asia was ultimately colonised by European powers, but colonisation was neither 
inevitable nor negative to all non-Europeans. As such, the remainder of this chapter will be 
devoted to Robert Douglas’s expedition to China at the turn of the eighteenth century. 
Robert Douglas in China, 1699-1700 
Robert Douglas arrived at Macau at the end of August, 1699. While English ships had 
visited the area previously, the Company had not yet established regular trade in Macau and 
Canton.
48
 Indeed, Douglas noted that the “Portigueese have ye name of ye Government” though 
“ye Chinese have ye Cheife power and all ye Customes of ye port excepting some small privileges 
y
t
 y
e
 Portigueese ships injoy,” demonstrating the Portuguese established presence and the late 
arrival of the English as well as the dynamics in the Chinese/European relationship.
49
 Though 
China had long had contact with Europe and was involved in extensive trade throughout Asia 
and the Pacific, the political situation was very different from that of India. In India the English 
East India Company had been able to establish permanent factories and settlements from which 
to operate with agents who lived there for many years at a time. As such, they were able to 
develop relationships with local merchants and rulers that allowed the Company to entrench its 
position in the local economic and political spheres. Importantly, the Company was able to play  
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Figures 4.2: Google Map of Pearl River Estuary 
Figure 4.1: Location of Macau and Canton (Guangzhou) 
(Uwe Dedering CC BY-SA 3.0. Annotated by Author) 
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different factions and rulers against each other in order to ensure that the Company’s interests 
were not undermined by the local governing forces despite the Company’s relatively weak 
position in India at the time. 
In China such permanent inhabitation was resisted strongly by the ruling members of the 
Qing dynasty. In contrast to India, the Qing Dynasty was able to maintain the “Canton sytem” of 
trade until 1842. The Canton system required Europeans to trade through the “Co-hong,” which 
was a group of firms that had been given monopoly rights by the Chinese state to trade in tea and 
silk, while in return were responsible for collecting duties, leasing factory space, and controlling 
foreigners.
50
 Controlling foreigners was a constant concern for the Chinese. According to a 
petition circulated while Douglas was in Canton, the Chinese wished foreigners to leave because 
they were “whoremongers and quarrelsome people.” Douglas was told by the Hoppo—the local 
administrator for the ruling Mandarins—that “Great Mandarines were offended at [their] stay” 
and the Chinese admiral had “sent him an order to Command us out of the River of Canton.”51 
This tension points to conflicting sets of interests within China and how the benefit of trade with 
European nations was not universal. Similar tensions were at play in England. For instance, at 
the same time as many Parliamentarians invested in the East India Company the House of 
Commons also passed an Act at the behest of the English woolens industry that sought to 
prohibit “the wearing of all wrought silks from India & China.”52  
Though Company ships had visited previously, the tenuous relationship between 
European merchants and the Chinese administration meant that Douglas was largely forced to 
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develop his own contacts and local network upon his arrival rather than being able to rely on an 
already established structure. By preventing European trading companies from permanent 
occupation of Chinese cities, the Chinese retained the dominant position. It was only much later 
and after the political and military situation had changed dramatically that the English were able 
to wrest power away from the Chinese.
53
 According to Susan Naquine and Evelyn Rawski, 
“Chinese officialdom was probably the most highly bureaucratized in the world.”54 This claim is 
demonstrated by the fact that civil servants continue to be referred to in Europe as mandarins to 
this day. The imperial administrative position of the Hoppo is both central to the story of 
Douglas’s efforts in Canton and instructive regarding how the Qing Emperors sought to define 
their relationship with the Europeans. 
Superintendents of foreign trade had long existed for the purpose of regulating foreign 
trade, customs collection and to receive and send off tribute missions coming by sea. The precise 
form, number and location of these superintendents varied depending on the dynasty in power 
and the post of the Hoppo had only been established in 1684 as a direct successor to the haitao, 
which was a civil servant answerable to the Governor and had filled the functions that were taken 
on by the Hoppo. The Governor had held the lucrative supervisory function over maritime trade 
since 1522; however, the Hoppo took over this function, which resulted in a revival of the 
traditional rivalry between the bureaucrats and inner court favorites. This rivalry had further 
tension because most bureaucrats were Chinese while the Hoppos were Manchus.
55
 According to 
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Weng Eang Cheong, the Hoppo filled both administrative and ceremonial functions and was 
“unencumbered by rival sources of authority over his competence.”56 Each Hoppo served for a 
term of one or two years, which caused additional difficulties for Douglas as his stay in Canton 
overlapped between two terms. While according to Cheong there was only one Hoppo at a time, 
Douglas’s diary gives the impression of him dealing with two different Hoppos at the same time 
and attempting to play them off of each other.
57
 As will be seen, Douglas clearly expected the 
Hoppo to be favourable to him and to provide protection against deceit or malpractices attempted 
by Chinese merchants. In practice the Hoppo’s favour toward Douglas appears to have been 
quite limited. Though the Hoppo was not necessarily inclined to support the Chinese merchants 
due to existing tensions, this did not mean that he preferred foreign traders such as Douglas. 
Furthermore, Douglas was severely constrained in his ability to navigate the administrative 
apparatus as access to the Hoppo was guarded by his secretaries, who had ties to Chinese 
merchants and political concerns of their own. Douglas, on the other hand, was a foreigner who 
lacked political connections or the ability to speak the language. 
The terms of the relationship between foreign traders such as Douglas and the Chinese 
was established right from the Macclesfield’s arrival. Before he could begin trade, or even leave 
the ship, the Macclesfield was inspected by the Chinese and Douglas was required to establish 
the price of the English goods on board. Until that was done to the Hoppo’s satisfaction, he was 
essentially stuck on board the ship waiting for permission to begin trade. The Chinese merchants 
in Macau, meanwhile, looked to turn Douglas’s presence to their advantage and Douglas was 
concerned not to enter into any obligations until he better understood the situation: 
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The Hoppos Secretary sent a present to me & the Cap
t
: of provisions and fruit, w
ch
 
I was very unwilling to accept, but was strongly advised by noe meanes to refuse 
it lest it should be taken as an affront, but I examined ye messenger strictly to 
know if it did not come from any of ye Merch
t
: for if so resolved not to accept of 
it on aney termes, because I was resolved to be under no lye nor obligation to any 
of them, till I knew who I was to deal w
th
.
58
 
As has often been recognized, gifts and obligations played an important role in the operation of 
trade and both the Chinese merchants and Douglas were clearly cognizant of this fact. Indeed, 
European travelers had a clear view of how such exchanges were to be conducted and took great 
offense when they considered the established norms to be violated.
59
 
The Chinese seem to have dealt with each arriving ship individually and Douglas was 
treated essentially as an independent merchant rather than as a representative of a large trading 
company. Though he wrote repeatedly about putting the interests of the Company first, 
Douglas’s status with regards to the Company while in China appears to have been a bit 
ambiguous. For example, when the Portuguese accused the Macclesfield of being pirates and 
compelled the crew to endure interrogation about whether they had come directly from England 
and what their intentions were, Douglas and the captain of the ship did not produce their 
documentation and instructions from the Company as a means of establishing the Macclesfield as 
an India Company ship. The members of the Macclesfield were repeatedly reminded of the 
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weakness of their position as the only English ship in a city thousands of miles from home. Both 
the Portuguese and French were more strongly established in Canton due to a longer trading 
history and, in the case of the French, the presence of a number of Jesuit missionaries.  
While the concept of the go-between has been invaluable for understanding native-
newcomer interactions in the history of science, such go-betweens depended upon established 
relationships, which did not yet exist for English East India Company traders. Indeed, the 
formation of such relationships was part of Douglas’s job as supercargo. Even when his identity 
was not questioned, cooperation was not assured as the Chinese merchants and bureaucrats had 
their own interests to protect. In Rudyard Kipling’s classic novel Kim, the protagonist Kim is the 
orphaned son of an Irish soldier in the British army in India. Kim spends his early years on the 
streets of Lahore, easily assimilating into his Indian surroundings; however, he possesses his 
father’s masonic certificate which proves his status as British and he understands something of 
the implications of this. When he eventually demonstrates his potential worth to the imperial 
regime, he is provided with an English education and used as a member of the extensive British 
intelligence network in late-nineteenth-century India. Kim’s significance is that of a “go-
between,” as he easily moves between the worlds of the colonizer and the colonized and is able 
to use both to his benefit. Kim, thus, is an ideal exemplar of the structure of British colonial rule 
described by Christopher Bayly.
60
 For Bayly, what made the British Empire possible in India 
was the way in which it was able to co-opt the existing local intelligence networks for the 
purposes of imperial rule. Bayly’s thesis contributed to the development of recent work 
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regarding brokers or go-betweens.
61
 Rather than a hard dichotomy between the colonizer and the 
colonized, the concept of brokers recognizes individuals such as Kim for whom the boundaries 
were more fluid and were, therefore, able to exist in both worlds. Moreover, the European 
imperial project deeply depended on such brokers in order to function.  
The example of Robert Douglas shows the challenges the English East India Company 
faced when operating in a location where it did not have an established network or reliable 
brokers. Kipling and Bayly, however, both were writing about the nineteenth century when 
power was in favour of the British. The emphasis, thus, is on how those individuals outside of 
the colonial regime were able to take advantage of the system and use it to improve their 
situation.
62
 My concern is that such an emphasis promotes an undue sense of inevitability about 
nineteenth-century imperialism and results in a teleological narrative in which the British Empire 
in India is the ultimate result. By the end of the eighteenth-century intermediaries “not only plied 
their trade as go-betweens, but actively and intelligently theorised the role of the go-between;” 
however, the China being discussed in this chapter was not yet colonised and the balance of 
power between European and Chinese commercial interests greatly favoured the latter.
63
  
The Macclesfield attracted the interest of a number of Chinese merchants, but Douglas 
had difficulty finding a merchant with whom he could enter into an equitable contract. After 
being disappointed by the merchants in Macau, Douglas and his assistant John Biggs decided to 
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go directly to Canton themselves in hopes of obtaining more advantageous trade closer to the 
source. Suspecting that the prices he had been offered thus far were inflated: 
This morning Mr Biggs and I went very early into y
e
 City to try y
e
 pryces of 
Several Goods w
th
out letting y
e
 Merch
t
 know nor our Linguist Rosario (Mr Biggs 
understanding y
e 
way of tradeing by y
e
 Dutchen) y
t
 we might know whither 
y
e
Merch
ts
 came near y
e
 marke w
th
 y
r
 pryces and we found we could by Chepper in 
y
e
 Shops then we had bene yet offered, we returned againe by 9 aclock to meet 
some merch
ts
.
64
 
Without an established presence or regular merchants it was difficult for the Company’s 
representatives to obtain fair prices and quality products. It is, however, important to remember 
that just because the Company’s directors regarded a certain price to be fair does not mean that 
the price they wished to pay was actually market value and European merchants had little ability 
to affect prices.
65
 Though Douglas might technically have been able to buy goods at a lower 
price directly from the shops, he still needed an approved merchant from whom he would be able 
to purchase in bulk and who would also find markets for the English goods on board the 
Macclesfield. 
 Due to his tendentious status, Douglas was forced to negotiate himself with the Hoppo 
and was at a distinct disadvantage. He was not entirely without knowledge of how trade was 
organized by the Chinese administration as the Company collected as much information as it 
could from published works and previous expeditions and sought to disseminate this information 
to its agents.
66
 As well, his assistant, John Biggs, had some experience in the region and was able 
to offer advice.
67
 In practice, however, this primarily meant that Douglas was moderately 
informed as to the procedures and customs, but had limited ability to impose himself on the 
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Chinese bureaucracy. For instance, it was required that the goods carried on board foreign ships 
be measured and recorded when a ship arrived in port; however, Douglas had difficulty getting 
this procedure carried out to his satisfaction. Much of this was because Douglas expected the 
Hoppo to carry out his duties personally and to meet with Douglas himself. When the Hoppo 
neglected to do this, hoping that Douglas could be satisfied with an assistant, Douglas was 
incensed and told the assistant to inform the Hoppo that he “would doe nothing as to any 
Contract…till I had finished wth him about our measurage.” At which point the Hoppo’s 
secretary “intreat[ed] me to stay 7: dayes longer else he was undone for yt ye Hoppo could not 
possibly arrive sooner,” though Douglas noted that the Hoppo was already in town. 68 The Hoppo 
would continue to try to deal with Douglas through surrogates and Douglas’s path to the Hoppo 
was consistently blocked by the lower level administrators in a way that is undoubtedly familiar 
to anyone who has attempted to negotiate a bureaucracy. As well, in this early incident Douglas 
demonstrated his prevailing concern with the signing and execution of written contracts that 
would continue throughout his time in China. For Douglas, such written contracts were 
assurances of good faith and tools that would allow him recourse should they not be fulfilled and 
thus he was determined that he have them in every instance. His ability to ensure that the 
contracts be made in good faith and executed to his satisfaction was highly limited, however, due 
to the weakness of his position. 
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 Macau was not a particularly beneficial as a base of Douglas’s operation as it was not the 
main centre of trade and at the time he arrived there were no merchants of note in town. When a 
group of "Great Merchants" came to Macau, Douglas “received them very Courteously” and they 
“seemed verey well pleased by their eating and drinking freely;” however, they told Douglas “yt 
they came not now about business but only for a visit but y
t
 in 2: or 3: dayes they would provide 
musters of all Goods and likeways give me their pryces.”69 When a “Chinese Citizen” offered his 
services as translator, Douglas rejected him even though he had previously translated for the 
English and knew Mr. Biggs because the man had served the French and Douglas had “often 
found verey great deceit in y
e
 World” and he “was resolved to be upon his guard and to suspect 
every one I did not thorrowly know.” This mistrust was also a factor with his difficulty finding a 
merchant as he was not impressed by his impression of the group of merchants from Canton who 
had visited him on board the ship. He had a rather better impression of a merchant—whose name 
Douglas gives as Hun Shun Quin—who came after the first group of merchants had left and 
whom Biggs knew because he had done business with Biggs’s ship in a previous voyage. While 
the first merchants had arrived with great pomp and with an introduction from the Hoppo’s 
secretary, the later merchant came directly by boat from Canton without calling at Macau. 
Unlike the other merchants who had eaten and drunk the Macclesfield’s provisions, but did not 
make any promises, this merchant offered to handle the whole of their cargo and to purchase 
Chinese goods for them as he would be able to secure them more cheaply. Perhaps because this 
was the offer that he had been hoping for, Douglas was more inclined to accept Biggs’s positive 
character reference than he had been with the translator whom he had refused to hire.
70
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Douglas had been careful to ensure that he be allowed to choose his own merchants, but 
he came up against collusion that impeded his plans. While the two “Great Merchants” “bid us 
try other Merch
ts
 and see w
t
 they would bid us & they would doe better by us then any of them,” 
Douglas found the smaller merchants “durst not sett any incurageing pryce nor…a Contract wth 
us” out of fear of the Great Merchants. In Macau Douglas found the merchants who had come 
down from Canton were “were combineing together to make a prey of us and to procure yt no 
others should be permitted to deale w
th
 us.” When they seemed to fall out and split into three or 
four competing groups of merchants, Douglas was informed that in fact the different factions 
were intentionally seeking to play him by colluding on their prices so as to drive down Douglas’s 
and ensure the chosen merchant would receive an advantageous contract.
71
 Such an incident fit 
well with Douglas’s existing prejudices that caused him generally to judge the Chinese as 
devious and untrustworthy. It is in the context of his perceived mistreatment by the favoured 
merchants that informed his positive initial impression of Hun Shun Quin.  
Hun Shun Quin was able to take advantage of Douglas’s mistrust of the other merchants 
in order to provide Douglas with a number of favours. It was aboard Hun Shun Quin’s vessel 
that Douglas went to Canton and they stayed at his house while there because of Douglas’s 
antagonism toward the French and mistrust of the other merchants. Hun Shun Quin had obvious 
motivations for his actions beyond hoping to make a financial profit. Taking on the responsibility 
of Douglas’s contract was a significant risk, especially at the prices expected by the Company. 
Hun Shun Quin was willing to take on this risk for reasons of self-interest. Douglas quickly 
found that Hun Shun Quin’s relationship with the other merchants in Canton was not good, 
describing them as “prejudiced to him wth whom we lodged” and observing that none of the 
merchants would treat them at Hun Shun Quin’s house. Unlike the lesser merchants, Hun Shun 
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Quin “seemed to stand in fear of non of them, nor their Masters nether and valued him selfe upon 
y
e
 frendship he pretended to have at y
e
 Court of Pekine
” where “he had formerly bene ye King of 
Cantons Merch
t
 before it was reduced to y
e
 Vice=Royship and likewayes had bene y
e
 Dutch 
Mercht for Many years since y
t
 time.
”72
 Hun Shun Quin saw Douglas as an opportunity he might 
be able to exploit to improve his own situation. The self-interest of go-betweens in their 
interactions with Europeans has been important to the way in which they have been portrayed by 
historians; however, the situation being discussed in this chapter is different because the power 
dynamics are not nearly so tilted in favour of European hegemony as has been the case in many 
such studies.
73
  
While in general terms Douglas and Hun Shun Quin’s interests were the same—to 
conduct business with each other—the reality was more complicated. European activity around 
the world relied on reliable go-betweens and native collaborators, but non-Europeans 
collaborated with Europeans for a reason and Europeans were hardly reliable in their 
interactions. Certainly, Douglas did not have the best interests of Hun Shin Quin in mind and 
was quick to undermine him if he thought it would benefit the Company. Everyone involved in 
European-Asian trade hoped to advantage themselves personally. Even the Hoppos saw 
opportunities to exploit. The Hoppo Douglas dealt with first in Macau was one of two who held 
the position in Canton. When Douglas and Biggs sent word to the Hoppo in Macau that they 
were preparing to go to Canton, the Hoppo “seemed much concerned at our goeing fearing he 
might loose y
t
 advantage he hoped to gett by us”74 As long as Douglas stayed in Macau, the 
Hoppo had an advantage over his rival as he had direct access to both Douglas and the merchants 
whom he favoured to receive the English trade. 
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Thus, Douglas found himself to be caught between the Great Merchants on the one side 
and Hun Shun Quin on the other. Due to Hun Shun Quin’s pre-existing relationship with 
Douglas’s assistant Biggs and the unfavourable impression the Great Merchants had made on 
him when he first arrived in Macau, Douglas was predisposed toward Hun Shun Quin. As well, 
Hun Shun Quin’s experience as a merchant for the Dutch might have helped him to present 
himself to Douglas in a favourable manner and to make the right promises to obtain the contract 
over his more powerful rivals. Unfortunately for Douglas, once he had settled upon Hun Shun 
Quin to handle his affairs, things did not go smoothly. Hun Shun Quin was not able to deliver on 
the promises he had made and his rivalry with the other merchants turned out to be problematic 
in ways that Douglas had not anticipated. 
Though he styled himself as a great merchant and claimed friends in high places, Hun 
Shun Quin’s position was rather more tenuous. While this may have encouraged him to take a 
greater risk in seeking Douglas’s contract, it also left him open to attack from his enemies if 
things did not work out as desired. The terms of Hun Shun Quin’s contract was questioned by 
other merchants and they responded by putting him under house arrest. These merchants tried to 
get Douglas to break his contract with Hun Shun Quin: 
He likewayes owned y
t
 y
e
 Cause of his Present trouble was from some 
Mandarines Marchts who did believe y
t
 he would reap great advantage by our 
Contract and were inraged y
t
 he had not Concerned y
m
 in it, who had promised y
e
 
En=Sha=Lee Money to detaine him a Month under Examination of such things as 
should be brought against him and by y
t
 time they questioned not but to dissolve 
our Contract and force us to Court them or loose our Monsoon.
75
 
Hun Shun Quin’s rivals claimed his contract with Douglas had not been done legally and that he 
had violated the monopoly laws. He assured Douglas that the dispute would ultimately settle in 
his favour as “he had such freinds as would stand by him and help him out of ys trouble and yt he 
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feared neither y
e
 power nor malice of all his Enimies, so much as our Displeasure.”76 His 
statement did not exactly deny the accusations against him; rather he claimed his political 
connections would ultimately protect him. Douglas was thus left in a difficult position. He could 
continue to deal with Hun Shun Quin and try to enforce the terms of the contract they had signed 
and run the risk of their stay in Canton dragging out so long that they would not be able to return 
to England as scheduled and even then there was no guarantee the trade would work in his 
favour. Meanwhile, abandoning Hun Shun Quin for the other merchants would all but assure a 
poor outcome. 
Meanwhile, the merchants with whom Douglas had contracts began to chafe against the 
terms. When Douglas visited his merchant to learn what the delay was, he told Douglas that he 
was having difficulty procuring so much money “to these Merchts to help him” and, while 
acknowledging the honesty of the English, “he was so unfortunate in our service as to loose by 
every thing he did and also how he had sould a great deale of our Cloath for less y
n
 he bought itt, 
and had paid y
e
 Custome likewayes.”77 The principal asymmetry between England and China in 
this period is reflected in the response that Douglas recorded with regard to the English cloth: its 
quality was substandard compared to Chinese products and there was little market for it. The 
merchant “complained how unjust it was to putt upon him for fine cloath wch was so course yt 
they had never seen such before for y
t
 in y
e
 Riseing Eagle had non such & it was because he 
presumed y
t
 our Cloath was like his y
t
 he did so willingly buy it from y
e
 masters w
th
 out seeing of 
it.” To the merchant’s complaints and attempts to get out of the contract, Douglas responded that 
it had been his “own choyce” to enter into the agreement and that “he could not expect any 
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alteration now & y
t
 he did ill not to declare his mind more positively before I sent my last letters 
by y
e
 French ship.”78 
In order to ensure the contracts he had signed would be carried out as agreed, Douglas 
felt compelled to take the issue to the Hoppo in hopes that he would rule in his favour. Doing so 
was less than straight-forward as the Hoppos were protected by a layer of bureaucracy below 
them in the form of their secretaries. The secretaries had their own interests to protect and much 
of their power was derived from their ability to control access to the Hoppo. When Douglas 
learned the eight merchants who had taken the English goods to sell intended to return them in 
order to get an “abaitment.” In response, he went the warehouse where the goods were being 
stored in order to see them and speak to the merchants. The merchants “seemed very much 
concerned y
t
 I should distrust y
r
 word and refused to give any writing, upon w
ch
 I left y
m
 and 
went imediatly to y
e
 Hoppo.” The Hoppos’ assistants, however, “told us we could not be 
admitted at y
s
 time, I told him my business was urgent and therefore entreated him to send in to 
tell his master, but when I could not prevail w
th
 him because he said y
s
 time was not convenient.” 
By this point Douglas was concerned about statements made in favour of the eight merchants 
with whom he was experiencing difficulties “by wch I found they had gained him over to yr 
intrest.” In an effort to resolve the issue and force the Hoppo to treat with him, Douglas 
threatened to take the matter to further up the bureaucratic chain: “After wch threatening wch I did 
seeme to doe w
th
 great passion & concernedness stamping and tearing like a Mad Man, he went 
in to acquaint y
e
 Hoppo, who imediatly came out to y
e
 Place of Justice and called us in.”79 
At this point Hun Shun Quin arrived having just spoken to the eight merchants and told them that 
“they had againe changed yr minds and insisted upon ye delivering of our Goods.” 
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Unfortunately for Douglas, gaining access to the Hoppo did little to resolve the situation. 
Though he assured Douglas that he would not force him to do so, he advised “as a friend” that 
Douglas take the goods back from the eight merchants without receiving any money, which 
Douglas stated was not in the interest of his King or Company. Instead of siding with Douglas 
and demanding the merchants carry out the contract as agreed, the Hoppo decided that Douglas 
was to take back 1000 bales of his own goods from the merchants with Douglas requesting an 
equal quantity of Chinese goods in compensation. In response to the failed negotiation, Douglas 
concluded the Hoppo had gone over to the side of the eight merchants and sent his translator 
Quiqua to learn if the Hoppo’s “dispenser” could be brought over to their side and to assure him 
that he would be very well rewarded if he would help them in their cause and give them access to 
the Hoppo. When the assistant was amenable to bribery, Douglas told him he “was very sorry his 
Master had refused to doe us Justice In our affaires and y
t
 he knew it was not in our power to 
bring our Merch
ts
 to any reasonable termes w
thout his assistance.”80 While Douglas presented the 
merchants as being against him, their position that the English “goods were sould very Dear and 
y
t
 the merch
ts
 assured him they should loose by them” was not unreasonable, despite Douglas’s 
argument that they could not blame him “for yt since they were not compelled to buy ym it was 
their owne free voluntary Choice.”81 
 As the layers of bureaucracy that Douglas was required to negotiate demonstrates the 
complicated situation that he was in with regard to go-betweens. It was not a matter of a single 
go-between. Moreover, the situation was constantly fluid. The example of the dispenser makes 
this particularly clear, as he started out acting against Douglas’s interests, but was amenable to 
coming over to Douglas’s side for the right price. To a certain extent, the merchants could also 
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be regarded as go-betweens. For example, one of the qualities that Hun Shun Quin promoted 
about himself to Douglas was that his connections would aid the sale of Douglas’s goods.82 As 
Douglas himself argued, he could not do business in Canton without the support of the Hoppo. In 
order to have such support, he needed access to the Hoppo when required. More importantly 
perhaps, though, was that he needed an advocate on his behalf whose position in the community 
was less compromised than Hun Shun Quin’s turned out to be. In this regard, Douglas was in a 
difficult situation because the more secure merchants were in a position to negotiate from 
strength and, therefore, were not inclined to accept Douglas’s rather difficult terms. As well, as 
they had the backing of the Hoppo, they were not forced to abide by the terms they had 
originally negotiated when the situation turned out to be disadvantageous to them. This 
undoubtedly contributed to the perception of the Chinese merchants as untrustworthy; however, 
Douglas’s dogged insistence that the terms of the deal be adhered to even when it was clearly not 
working out for any of the parties involved and his constant demands to have all agreements set 
down in writing likely did little to endear him to the local merchants. 
An equally important example of go-betweens without whom Douglas was completely 
unable to operate was that of his translators. During his time in Macau and Canton, Douglas 
primarily employed two translators: Rosario and Quiqua with whom he often had a rocky 
relationship as he did not particularly trust their motives. For example, when Douglas wanted to 
leave Macau for Canton, he was afraid to leave “lest they might find some means to prevent our 
Chop.” In order to avoid this possibility, Douglas had “a Chinese Citizan privately to draw us up 
a petition to be presented to ye Hoppo” to remind him of his promise “and to signifie ye 
advantages and even almost nessicity of it in order to incurage trade.” Douglas presented this as 
the best approach because they did not dare “to trust our Linguists whom we found to favour 
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these merch
ts
 intrest and therefore would not be foreward to procure any thing to there 
disadvantage.”83 While the translators nominally operated as go-betweens between Douglas, the 
merchants and the Hoppo, in practice Douglas lacked the close relationship with them that was 
necessary for a go-between to be effective. 
Despite not trusting the translators whom he had hired, Douglas had limited options. 
When Douglas first chose his translators, his two candidates were Rosario—whom he judged as 
lacking the courage to speak to the Hoppo and the great Mandarines and Quiqua—whom he 
judged to be “very sharp” with “boldness and confidence enough and could express himself very 
well;” however, he “was also reputed by some to be a Rogue.”84 Faced with these two choices, 
Douglas judged Quiqua to be the better option, though he made use of both of them during his 
time in Macau and Canton. Upon his first return from Canton to Macau, Douglas noted that 
“Before I went off I accounted wth our Linguist Rosario who had bene at Canton wth me of whom 
I had received a bad Character and had heard severall ill reports as to his dealing w
th
 Mr 
Willmott therefore I resolved to discharge him hear y
s 
 being y
e
 place of his residence.”85 
Similarly, on a few occasions Douglas chose to visit markets without the benefit of a translator, 
which he did in part because he believed the translators would transmit information to the 
merchants that might have been used against him. 
By employing two translators and keeping information from them, Douglas sought to 
limit their ability to act against what he regarded to be his best interests. Be that as it may, 
however, he still required their assistance in most of his daily interactions. As much as he did not 
trust the translators to have his interests in mind, when he sought to replace his linguist with 
another, he quickly found how limited he was in this regard in finding a new translator knew the 
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Chinese or European languages necessary to carry out the job. A rather amusing example of this 
that I came across in the East India Company archives took place in Persia when a translator by 
the name of Auga Doud was fired due to alleged improprieties. He was replaced by a new 
translator who had been recommended by the Armenian merchants with whom the English 
merchants were trying to trade. The replacement translator, however, turned out not to speak 
“English nor any European language neither is he acquainted wt one word of our business yt hath 
past in Persia or w
th
 anything belonging to y
e
 Court so y
t
 we have no benifitt by him neither can 
we venture upon renewing Phirmaunds or getting others when we cannot understand w
t
 may be 
granted us.”86 Though Auga Doud might have been “a great Rogue,” they were “of opinion a 
Rogue may be made use off especial w
n
 no other is to be got y
t
 can doe y
t
 business.”  
As was emphasized in this example, the translator needed to have a strong understanding 
of business operations as well as the ability to speak the required languages. Moreover, the 
linguists were expected to act as go-betweens and Doud’s value came not only from his 
knowledge of languages and business, but that he “hath more influence on ye Officers at Court 
then any Christian in all Persia.”87 While to a certain extent this points to the weakness of the 
English presence; however, the English had made a number of recent voyages. Rosario, at least, 
had previously served in the same capacity for other English merchants despite his supposed ill 
character. Undoubtedly if the Company had a more established presence in Canton it would have 
been able to cultivate stronger relationships with locals and English nationals would be able to 
learn the languages necessary to do business with less reliance on translators. The mistrust of 
locals, however, continued through the whole period and can been seen reflected in the work of 
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Rudyard Kipling as a crucial aspect of what made Kim reliable was his British parentage and the 
British education that he received. 
The journal that Robert Douglas kept during his time in Canton and Macau is a valuable 
resource because it is representative of much of the problems and concerns that employees of the 
English East India Company had to deal with on such voyages in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries. In particular, it reflects the weakness of the European position when it came 
to the China trade. This is important to keep in mind because it is easy to forget that European 
hegemony was not a given and Imperial Britain and the East India Company as a colonial power 
should not be taken as a given. Indeed, the Company at this time had little interest in exercising 
colonial power as such activities were extremely expensive and it lacked the military personnel 
to impose itself in any significant way. Establishing an operational military in Southeast Asia 
would have required greater British naval support than it currently had and the expense would 
have undermined what profitability the Company had. As Douglas’s inability to sell the English 
wares demonstrates, the English needed the China trade far more than the Chinese did. Trade 
between Europe and China and India was financed almost entirely by European access to South 
American bullion.
88
 The English East India Company doggedly attempted to create a market for 
English goods, but did not have significant success until the nineteenth century. While modernity 
and industrialization is typically regarded as a European phenomenon and placed alongside the 
Enlightenment, China and India both had well-developed manufacturing systems and trade 
networks. Moreover, the reliance on transferring gold and silver from the Americas to Asia in 
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return for commodities desired in Europe such as silk, spices and tea emphasizes that the modern 
world and its history is inherently global, a point that is at the core of the world systems theory.
89
 
As useful as Douglas’s journal is, however, it is important to keep in mind that he too 
was motivated by self-interest. Douglas’s journal was not a private record. The Company 
required its employees to maintain accounts of their activities as part of its efforts of maintaining 
control over its representatives despite the vast distances separating London from Canton. This 
can be seen most clearly in the frequency and detail of the correspondence between the various 
factories and the Court of Directors. Like the correspondence, the log books and the accounts 
that were sent back to London, Douglas’s journal was meant to be read by others and to serve as 
something of an archive of his activities for the future benefit of the Company, which was 
concerned with building up a library of knowledge about those with whom it wished to trade. As 
such, Douglas framed his narrative with this in mind. In particular, he was careful to emphasize 
how much he had sought to protect the Company’s interests. In Douglas’s version of the story, it 
was always the obstruction of others, especially the cabal of Mandarin merchants, who thwarted 
his efforts to execute efficiently his orders from the Company. There does not seem to be other 
similar journals kept by Company supercargoes from this time period in the East India Company 
archives. Thus, it is possible that supercargoes did not typically keep such accounts or that 
Douglas’s survived due to its length and detail. It is somewhat difficult, therefore, to judge the 
success of Douglas’s voyage without similarly detailed day-to-day accounts from other voyages. 
There is little evidence to suggest, however, that his experience was unusual.
90
 The detail 
provided in his journal, therefore, provides us with a rare opportunity. Douglas’s journal is an 
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extremely valuable account of commercial trade on-the-ground and has not previously been 
subjected to historical analysis. 
Conclusion 
 What does Robert Douglas’s trade expedition have to do with the history of science? At 
first blush, the answer might appear to be very little. Yet, the case is illustrative in important 
ways that do relate to the history of science. As I discussed in the opening section, a basic 
assumption that has underlined the scientific view of the world over the past three hundred years 
is that science is universal. The universal nature of science, moreover, has had significant 
implications to the Euro-American worldview. One of these implications has been that of the 
metropole. Drawn directly from a model of the British Empire developed in the nineteenth 
century, the idea of the metropole has been one that has imperial connotations that must be 
addressed. I have sought to do so by historicizing the metropole with the example of Robert 
Douglas. What Douglas tells us about European-Chinese relations is that European hegemony 
was not yet remotely established or even really in consideration at the turn of the eighteenth 
century. Power—who defines and controls knowledge and how do knowledge practices get put 
to work—has been an underlying theme of this dissertation. The metropole and periphery has 
comes with the presumption of an asymmetrical power dynamic in which the metropole holds 
the greater strength. If, as has been the case, we take it as read that the metropole means Western 
Europe, we are stuck with the unavoidable problem that Asia and not Europe was to a significant 
degree the dominant economic and political power until well into the eighteenth century. The 
struggles experienced by Robert Douglas while in China illustrate the weakness of the European 
position. 
215 
 
 The example of Douglas, then, has everything to do with the history of science because if 
we are to comprehend the global development of science it is necessary to understand the 
historical context. As global commerce and imperialism have been recognized as having been of 
critical importance, it behooves us to understand the European experience of trade in the non-
European world. Historians of science have acknowledged the major role played by travel in the 
construction of the European view of the world. Travelers kept diaries, wrote letters and 
published books that sought to describe and explain distant parts of the globe to European 
readers.
91
 During the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such travel literature 
both exotified and normalized the non-European world.
92
 The cultures and peoples were 
exotified and contrasted to the “superiority” of Europe, but, at the same time, it has been argued 
that global travel and exchange served to render the world regular.
93
 This supposed 
normalization of the planet was of fundamental importance to the project of Isaac Newton’s 
experimental science and his contemporaries. Newton’s natural philosophy was based on the 
argument that the laws of nature are universal, which had obvious implications for global 
travelers. As discussed in Part One of this dissertation, such Universalism underlies the claim 
that navigation was transformed from a practice to a science in the eighteenth century. Rather 
than depending on local knowledge, recasting navigation as a science based on universal 
principles meant that navigators could operate according to a set of universal laws that could be 
applied regardless of the setting. Scientific Universalism combined with Eurocentrism to form 
scholarly assumptions that continue to inform the world today. 
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 In this chapter, I have sought to begin to unpack how the Universalist ideology underpins 
the historiography, especially as it relates to the history of science. While Bruno Latour’s notion 
of centres of calculation has been criticized on the grounds of being Eurocentric, I have tried to 
demonstrate that his vocabulary can be subverted for the purposes of critique. The study of the 
English East India Company at the turn of the eighteenth century demonstrates the dissonance 
between the presumption that Europe is ipso facto the centre and Asia the periphery. My 
intention is not to reject the accomplishments of science; however, it is imperative that we, not 
only as historians but as citizens, become more cognizant of the deeply embedded and pervasive 
connection between science and Western, imperialist hegemony. The historical record has made 
it clear that science can flourish outside of the European context and, contra Herbert Butterfield, 
there is little to suggest Western hegemony is due to some kind of European exceptionalism. 
Martin Bernal controversially argued that the contemporary understanding of the classical 
world emerged out of the development of the academic discipline of history at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century. Developing as it did in parallel with nineteenth century European 
imperialism, Bernal contended that the imperial worldview has deeply embedded Classics.
94
 
Such concerns are perhaps even more evident in the history of science because, as Lissa Roberts 
has put it, “no matter how local the origins of scientific knowledge, modern science seems to 
possess and validity that extends far beyond that point.”95 Yet, evidence needs to be interpreted. 
Centres and peripheries are historically constructed and are contingent on the political and social 
context in which they are placed. London is not the centre and Canton the periphery in all 
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circumstances regardless of the situation. By recognizing this we can more successfully harness 
the history of science as a critique of oppression rather than as an extension of it. To quote the 
geographer Derek Gregory in lieu of a conclusion: “In order to conduct ourselves properly, 
decently, we need to set ourselves against the unbridled arrogance that assumes that ‘We’ have 
the monopoly of Truth and that the world is necessarily ordered by—and around—Us.”96 
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Conclusion 
 This dissertation has a politics. Stated most broadly, it is concerned with the presumed 
progression toward what have come to be recognized as the institutions that comprise the modern 
state. In the second edition of his classic work on the formation of nationalism, Benedict 
Anderson wrote that his previous assumption that “official nationalism in the colonized worlds 
of Asia and Africa was modelled directly on that of the dynastic states of nineteenth-century 
Europe” was incorrect. He had since come to believe “that the immediate genealogy should be 
traced to the imaginings of the colonial state. Thus, “beneath the colonial ideologies and 
policies,” Anderson found there to be a grammar in which the lineage became much clearer. In 
particular, he pointed to three key institutions of power that made this grammar visible: the 
census, the map, and the museum.
1
 Anderson’s grammar, however, anticipated nineteenth-
century colonialism and did not interrogate the history of the institutions to which he pointed. 
The guiding agenda of this dissertation has been not to read history backwards from a position 
that presumes later developments like the English East India Company to be inevitable. Instead, I 
have sought to put concepts such as expertise into context in order to recognize specific sites of 
contest and to avoid writing history as a progression toward an inevitable end. 
 The argument that historians need to be careful not to write the present back onto the past 
is a standard refrain. Yet, for both the history of science and postcolonial histories the present 
reality has been allowed to define the problems of the past.
2
 Such an emphasis on history as a 
progression toward the present runs the risk of erasing from history the actions and concerns of 
the vast majority of people who did not explicitly contribute to such forward momentum. 
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However, I have not been concerned with simply rescuing my historical actors “from the 
enormous condescension of posterity,” to quote E.P. Thompson’s memorable line.3 Resuscitating 
otherwise forgotten individuals is important inasmuch as it enables us to detach history from 
established narratives and see a particular question or problem anew. The debates over 
navigation that I described in the first part of the dissertation are significant to our broader 
understanding of science because expertise was heterogeneous and contested. In other words, 
there were alternatives. Not only were there alternatives, moreover, the contests over authority 
that I described in this thesis continued through the eighteenth century. While many in science 
and technology studies have become increasingly concerned with an erosion of expertise and the 
authority of science, expertise has never been a closed subject.
4
 
 Similarly, postcolonial scholarship originated in the context of anti-imperialism and, 
therefore, has tended to emphasize the ways in which European hegemony was constituted and 
how that hegemony reshaped the peoples who were colonized. As Robert Young has defined it, 
postcolonialism “marks the broad historical facts of decolonization and the determined 
achievement of sovereignty – but also the realities of nations and peoples emerging into a new 
imperialistic context of economic and sometimes political domination.”5 Crucially, 
postcolonialism is an active intervention within the oppressive circumstances of imperialism. 
Thus, the postcolonial approach explicitly draws its analytical strength from the emergence of 
European hegemony and cannot exist separately from it. Though postcolonial theory has aimed 
to foreground the agency of colonized peoples, in practice it has struggled with its deterministic 
account of history. For example, Edward Said’s concept of orientalism has emphasized the way 
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in which “the Orient” was invented by eighteenth-century European scholars and then imposed 
during nineteenth-century imperialism as the colonial administrators sought to reshape colonial 
states to look more like Europe’s imagined version of the Orient.6 Said’s argument, then, gave 
little room for colonial agency and resulted in a rather top-down view of history. As Ernest 
Gellner noted (albeit in a review largely in defence of colonialism), Said at times appeared rather 
uncomfortably Orientalist in his approach.
7
 Ultimately, this was because Said’s primary 
commitment was to advance a political argument regarding Middle Eastern politics in the present 
rather than making a rigorous a historical argument. 
 The risk of focusing too much on nineteenth and twentieth-century colonialism is that it 
has the result of reinforcing the European hegemony that is meant to be challenged. For example, 
the imperial map has been held up by historians of cartography such as J.B. Harley and Matthew 
Edney for the way in which the map was used to constitute European power by asserting the 
European geography.
8
 In the nineteenth century, Europeans actively took their detailed earlier 
maps of Africa and remade them into Joseph Conrad’s Dark Continent and, therefore, into a 
“primordial point of space” in which colonialism was justified. Yet, it is crucial that we do not 
continue to perpetuate that colonial act by also disregarding this earlier knowledge or ignoring 
experiences within the colonial states.
9
 Furthermore, the projection of imperial power that we see 
in the imperial map was also in many regards an illusion. The assertion of power is not the 
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totality of the situation and in practice colonial administrations relied heavily on locals and 
sought to structure their institutions around previously established structures of power.
10
 
 This dissertation represents a first step toward a larger attempt at putting the vocabulary 
on which imperialism relied into a longer historical context. In particular, Benedict Anderson’s 
assertion of the map as crucial imperial grammar is in need of continued historization. It was in 
eighteenth-century India that the British began the project of the creating the imperial map and, 
therefore, continuing the investigation of India from a close perspective that emphasizes the 
experience on-the-ground is a logical starting point from which to historicize imperialism. At the 
heart of my historiographical concerns, then, has been the idea of the metropole and its 
relationship to expertise. An example of this can be seen with the Asiatick Society, which was 
established in Calcutta in 1784 for the purpose of advancing Orientalist knowledge. It did so 
from a notably European gloss, however, as it did not elect a single non-European member for 
nearly fifty years.
11
 Instead, the Asiatick Society appears as a relatively straightforward example 
of metropolitan science. Data (in this case ancient Indian texts) were collected at the periphery 
and transformed by the metropolitan scholars into part of a coherent system of knowledge. It was 
only then that this knowledge could be returned to the periphery where it was imposed on the 
native population. Orientalism was infused with European assumptions that privileged Western 
intellectual traditions and approaches and this Orientalism formed one of the bases by which 
nineteenth-century imperialism was justified. Moreover, the structure of the colonial 
administration was deeply informed by Orientalist assumptions about the peoples they were 
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governing. Thus, Eighteenth-century expertise is a subject that is deeply intertwined with 
colonial concerns.  
 The Asiatick Society is an example of one kind of expertise. Its membership included 
numerous representatives of the elite European intellectual world. Yet, we must be careful not to 
credit the Orientalists too much or regard them as the only form of expertise at play in eighteenth 
and nineteenth century colonial Asia. The Orientalists did not represent the only approach to 
knowledge production about Asia at this time. An example that complicates the Orientalist 
narrative is that of Scottish astronomer and experimental lecturer James Dinwiddie (1746-1815). 
Dinwiddie lived in India from 1795-1806 and was professor of natural philosophy at Fort 
William College from 1801. At first he would appear to be another example of metropolitan 
science. He was skilled in the experimental philosophy of his day and had originally traveled to 
China in order to demonstrate instruments for the Chinese emperor as part of Lord Macartney’s 
1792 Embassy to China, though the British instruments famously failed to impress the Chinese.
12
 
Instead of returning to England, Dinwiddie went on to Calcutta where he sought to make a living 
as a lecturer of natural philosophy and he became a member of the Asiatick Society. Thus, in 
principle he was occupied with disseminating Western natural and experimental philosophy. Yet, 
he does not comfortably fit the metropolitan model because he also was deeply engaged in 
intellectual, cultural and commercial exchange with the inhabitants of India.
13
 
 Dinwiddie is significant because he points to an alternative approach to understanding the 
production and circulation of knowledge. Instead of privileging elite European accounts, we can 
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look at the experiences of those who were there and engaged in knowledge production at the 
time. Thus, while I discussed the concept of the imperial map earlier, the view that the map was 
produced by the “West” and imposed on the “East” is not as simple as that might suggest. If we 
turn our attention away from the map as a finished product and toward sites of production we 
end up with a rather different story. Though the imperial map might have imposed European 
geography on the colonized, these maps could not have been produced without the active support 
and participation of non-Europeans. Hydrography and surveying, for example, were crucial sites 
of exchange rather than an example of metropolitan science at work. 
 A longer term project, then, is to continue the work of uncovering less remembered 
modes of expertise. This dissertation has begun that project in its approach to the issue of 
expertise. I have sought to demonstrate that expertise in the eighteenth century was a contested 
subject. Instead of an increasing stabilization of knowledge from diverse, artisanal practices to 
something more recognizably scientific, when eighteenth-century navigation is studied from the 
point of practice it points to the continued diversity of expertise. History tends to be normative in 
that one cannot write the totality of it, but must pick which evidence to use and to present it in a 
way that renders it coherent.
14
 The need for coherence has, to an extent, imposed imperialism on 
the history of science because it exists within the context of science. Science, in all its many 
facets, has been crucial to the history of the last few centuries to be sure. It is, therefore, 
necessary that we continue to study its history. At the same time, however, the more elite 
practices and theories that have often been regarded as the centrepiece of the history of science 
were not the only knowledge practices in existence and science did not go uncontested. As 
Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer argued in Leviathan and the Air-Pump, the alternatives 
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deserve to be taken seriously.
15
 They deserve respect not just because they were conceivable 
alternatives to the path that was ultimately taken, but because they were important in their own 
right. As David Edgerton has shown, the new does not simply displace the old; instead, old and 
new technologies and ideas continue to exist alongside each other.
16
 
 In the first part of this dissertation I emphasized the strength of the old for early-modern 
navigation. What I wanted to make clear was that there were longstanding navigational practices 
and the discipline had established methods of recognizing expertise and asserting credibility. 
Despite what Samuel Pepys thought, European navigation was broadly successful and its 
practices were the result of centuries of improvement derived from hard experience. While dead-
reckoning might seem haphazard and imprecise, it was in fact the most effective means of 
navigating and continued to be so for most mariners well after the longitude problem was solved. 
In the first chapter I used the example of the Royal Mathematical School because the school was 
a space where the tensions between traditional and new approaches to navigation were 
particularly vividly displayed. A key element that has previously been overlooked in accounts of 
the school is the way that the attempt to formalize the school as a centre of navigational expertise 
also sought to relocate the authority to assign credibility from mariners to the state. Thus, the 
Royal Mathematical School and the series of debates it engendered were fundamentally about 
power. 
 The contest of authority and the question of state power continued to animate the 
dissertation in the second chapter. Again debates over expertise played an important role. As the 
subject of Chapter Two was the dispute between Edmond Halley and his chief-mate Edward 
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Harrison, the tension between “craft” and “elite” conceptions of expertise were in even more 
sharp relief. In the second chapter I argued that the contests over expertise also undermine 
attempts to present early-modern European expansion as an example of successful long-distance 
control. Such long-distance control did not really exist on board English ships because to the 
degree that there was a unified system of navigation it was one that was largely independent of 
external control. Marine navigation was a practice that drew its strength from experience and 
local knowledge rather than from a broad understanding of astronomical theory and universal 
knowledge. Navigational practices often could not be unproblematically applied to new contexts; 
however, the depth of local knowledge and experiential skill was also its strength. In particular, 
the emphasis on experience enabled navigators to define expertise for themselves. Thus, Part 
One introduces and demonstrates the two central problems of this dissertation: expertise and 
long-distance control. 
 In Part Two the concepts developed in Part One are applied to the English East India 
Company. In particular the issue of long-distance control is pursued further. Chapter Three takes 
the tensions between institutional authority and local agency and puts it into the context of the 
East India Company bureaucracy. In this chapter I presented a selection of illustrative examples 
from the East India Company correspondence that demonstrated the limited ability for the 
Company in London to assert control over its agents on the other side of the globe. Despite the 
presumption that a degree of long-distance control was essential for European imperialism, it 
was at least not necessary for successful commercial enterprise.
17
 The Company administrators 
discussed in Chapter Three were a heterogeneous group who were motivated by advancing their 
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own personal interests. The Company administration outposts existed within a local context that 
operated at a remove from the situation in England and must be understood as such. 
 One of the lessons of the East India Company administration in India is that the British 
position in Asia was tenuous at the turn of the eighteenth century. The weakness of the Company 
was particularly central to the fourth and final chapter. I devoted this chapter to a close study of 
the journal of an East India Company supercargo in China by the name of Robert Douglas. His 
journal does much to demonstrate the status of the British circa 1700 and the lack of economic 
power that it possessed at the time. I argue that this story also has something to say for the 
history of science because it challenges efforts to frame the relationship between the “West” and 
the “East” as one of the metropole and periphery. To claim London as the metropole and China 
as the periphery also asserts a power relationship in which London is the dominant partner. From 
an economic point-of-view this was certainly not the case and from an intellectual perspective 
the example of Dinwiddie in China at the end of the century suggests that it was not in the 
stronger position in terms of knowledge practices. In Chapter Four I claim London as the 
periphery because it was in Asia and not London where the knowledge and trade commodities 
upon which the East India Company depended were located . 
 The principal argument of this dissertation is that expertise was contested and local and 
that this localization is important to science and technology studies.  Thus, by focusing largely 
on figures that have been forgotten by history, my intention was not just to rescue these 
individuals from obscurity, but to make a broader historiographical point. By subjecting 
expertise, one of the foundational concepts of science and technology studies, to historical 
scrutiny I also make an argument about the larger narrative of the eighteenth century. The 
diversity of local expertise further demonstrates that we cannot view history as a progression 
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toward “modernity.” In this dissertation I show how concepts like expertise should not be viewed 
deterministically. In doing so, I make the case for the necessity of a local approach to the history 
of global science. Instead of being minor figures that made no discernable contribution to 
science, I contend that the obscure figures such as some of those I have discussed in these 
chapters were in fact fundamental if we are to understand science in context. 
228 
 
Appendix: Guide to the India Office Records at the British Library 
This guide is intended to provide a sense of the scale and scope of the India Office Records and 
to help the reader to understand references contained within the footnotes of this dissertation. 
The source for the figures provided here is Martin Moir, A General Guide to the India Office 
Records (London: British Library, 1988), which also provides a more complete catalogue and 
description of the India Office Records. 
A   Charters, Deeds, Statutes and Treatises, 1500-1950 (3000 individual documents and 27 
volumes) 
B   Minutes of the East India Company's Directors and Proprietors, 1599-1858 (273 
volumes) 
C  Council of India Minutes and Memoranda, 1858-1947 (144 volumes) 
D  Minutes and Memoranda of General Committees and Offices of the East India Company, 
1700-1858 (262 volumes) 
E  East India Company General Correspondence, 1602-1859 (1607 volumes) 
F  Board of Control Records, 1784-1858 (2889 volumes/files) 
G  Factory Records, 1595-1858 (1555 volumes and 18 boxes) 
H  Home Miscellaneous Series, 1600-1900 (839 volumes) 
I  Records relating to other Europeans in India, 1475-1824 (214 volumes) 
J  Haileybury Records, 1749-1857 (127 volumes) 
K  Records relating to other Establishments, 1809-1925 (66 volumes) 
L Departmental Records 
/AG  Accountant General's Records, 1601-1974 (Approximately 8200 items, mostly volumes) 
/E  Economic Department Records, 1786-1950 (4245 volumes/files and 960 boxes) 
/F  Financial Department Records, 1800-1949 (Approximately 6538 volumes/files plus 225) 
/I  Information Department Records, 1921-1949 (1712 volumes/files) 
/L  Legal Adviser's Records, 1550-1950 (1095 boxes and volumes) 
/MAR  Marine Department Records, 1600-1879 (10571 volumes) 
/MED  Medical Board Records, 1920-1960 (173 boxes) 
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/MIL  Military Department Records, 1708-1957 (44968 volumes and 1935 boxes) 
/PARL Parliamentary Branch Records, 1772-1952 (726 volumes and 4 boxes) 
/PO  Private Office Papers, 1858-1948 (Approximately 495 files/volumes plus 5 boxes) 
/PWD  Public Works Department Records, 1838-1931 (4516 volumes/files plus 1 box) 
/P&J  Public and Judicial Department Records, 1795-1950 (Approximately 21660 volumes/files 
plus 224 boxes) 
/P&S  Political and Secret Department Records, 1756-1950 (Approximately 13246 
volumes/files plus 318 boxes) 
/R  Record Department Papers, 1859-1959 (Approximately 848 volumes/files and 117 boxes) 
/SUR  Surveyor's Records, 1837-1934 (26 volumes and 24 boxes) 
/S&G  Services and General Department Records, 1920-1970 (1670 volumes/files plus 720 
boxes) 
/WS  War Staff Papers, 1921-1951 (1840 files) 
M  Burma Office Records, 1932-1948 (Approximately 341 volumes/files and 505 boxes) 
N  Returns of Baptisms, Marriages, Burials, etc, 1698-1969 (1103 volumes) 
O  Biographical Series, 1702-1948 (487 volumes and 44 boxes) 
P  Proceedings and Consultations of the Government of India and of the Presidents and 
Provinces, 1702-1945 (Approximately 46500 volumes) 
Q  Commissions, Committee and Conference Records, 1895-1947 (Approximately 193 
volumes, 74 boxes/bundles and 285 folders) 
[Records transferred later through official channels] 
R/1  India: Crown Representative's Political Department records, 1880-1947 (Approximately 
7257 files/volumes and 163 boxes) 
R/2  India: Crown Representative's Residency Records, 1789-1947 (Approximately 1370 
boxes and 271 volumes) 
R/3  India: Other Records of the Central and Provincial Governments, 1899-1948 (488 
files/volumes) 
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R/4  India: British High Commission Cementary Records, 1870-1967 (Approximately 864 
files/volumes) 
R/5  Nepal: Kathmandu Residency Records, 1792-1872 (115 volumes) 
R/8  Burma: Records of the Governor's Office, 1942-1947 (50 files/volumes) 
R/9  Malaysia: Malacca Orphan Chamber and Court of Justice Records, 1685-1835 (98 boxes) 
R/10  China: Canton Factory Records, 1623-1841 (80 volumes) 
R/12  Afghanistan: Kabul Legation Records, 1923-1948 (207 files) 
R/15  Persian Gulf: Records of the Bushire, Bahrain, Kuwait, Muscat and Trucial Coast 
Agencies, etc, 1763-1951 (15326 files/volumes) 
R/19  Egypt: Records of the Cairo, Alexandria and Suez Agencies, 1832-1870 (27 volumes) 
R/20  Aden: Records of the British Administration, 1839-1967 (Approximately 12232 
files/volumes and 120 maps) 
S  Linguistic Survey of India Records, 1900-1930 (74 boxes) 
U  Documents in Oriental Languages, 1871-1880 (11 items) 
V  Official Publications, 1760-1957 (Approximately 70000 volumes, including duplicates) 
W, X, Y Map Collection, 1700-1960 (Approximately 40000 items) 
Z  Registers and Indexes, 1700-1950 (Approximately 2500 volumes)  
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